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ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A
TRIANGULAR FEDERAL SYSTEM: CAN THREE NOT
BE A CROWD WHEN ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITY IS SHARED BY THE
UNITED STATES, THE STATES, AND THEIR CITIZENS?
DAVID R. HODAS*
[V]igorous enforcement... is pivotal in promoting im-
proved water quality. Waste water facilities will operate
within their permit limitations if Federal agencies or States
are serious about compliance. But as long as EPA and the
States continue to take ineffective enforcement actions and
reduce proposed fines down to insignificant amounts, the
companies and local governments that comply with environ-
mental laws are the ones being penalized, not the violators.
-John Martin, Inspector General, U.S. EPA'
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INTRODUCTION
We look to our environmental laws to improve the quality of our
air, water, and land; enhance ecosystem health; reduce the adverse
public health effects from pollution; provide a level playing field in
competition among states; and to internalize pollution costs into a dis-
charger's activities. However, laws by themselves do not accomplish
any of these goals; only widespread compliance with the law can bring
about the desired ends. Unfortunately, polluters have no economic
incentive to comply with environmental laws because noncompliance
results in economic benefits-the free use of water or air for waste
disposal-while compliance exacts an economic cost-the internaliza-
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tion of waste disposal costs. Therefore, the degree to which laws pro-
tect the public health and improve the quality of our environment
depends not only on the soundness of the laws, but also on the effec-
tiveness of enforcement. Unfortunately, as one commentator has
noted, "[E] nforcement of our nation's water quality laws continues to
be weak and sporadic."
2
Our pre-19 7 2 water pollution law proved the point; it represented
"fundamentally symbolic enforcement that accomplished very little
environmental protection."3 Before 1972, the federal water pollution
law was based upon state water quality designations for interstate wa-
ters,4 but there was no enforcement against a discharger unless the
government could prove that the discharge caused a violation of the
relevant water quality standards.5 The law, which focused solely on
ambient water quality, imposed no specific requirements on discharg-
ers and made enforcement so difficult for the government that it es-
sentially never occurred.6 For example, only when the Cuyahoga
River in Ohio, which was designated under the law for waste disposal,
caught fire did the river's quality level dip below its designated use
level. Furthermore, the government could only bring enforcement
actions against those dischargers that it could show had caused the
river to ignite.7 Moreover, the pre-1972 law had no effective means of
enforcement even if the water quality goals had been for the protec-
2. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 689 (statement of Richard L. Hembra, Director,
Environmental Issues, General Accounting Office (GAO)); see also Wendy Naysnerski &
Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 109 (T.H.
Tietenberg ed., 1992).
3. PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAw: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE
POLLUTION 83 (1991).
4. See id. at 78 (discussing the limited jurisdiction of the pre-1972 law, and noting the
retreat from the use of the term "navigable waters" in the first offering of the legislation).
5. Id.
6. See id. at 82 (noting "the federal government made previous few attempts to en-
force the law").
7. ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw & PoLIcv. NATURE, LAw AND SO-
CIETY 828 (1992). By the early 1970s, burning rivers, such as the Cuyahoga and the Rouge
River in Dearborn, Michigan, were so common that courts would take judicial notice of the
condition. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transport Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1326 (6th
Cir. 1974). In Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958), the Supreme Court
vividly described this environmental disaster:
The seaman lost his life on the tug .... which, on the night of November 18,
1952, while towing a scow on the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia, caught fire
when an open-flame kerosene lamp on the deck of the scow ignited highly flam-
mable vapors lying above an extensive accumulation of petroleum products
spread over the surface of the river. Several oil refineries and facilities for oil
storage, and for loading and unloading petroleum products, are located along
the banks of the Schuylkill River.
Id. at 427.
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tion of human health and the environment rather than merely for
waste disposal.8
As a result, in 1972, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWCPA) 9 by enacting what is now known as the
Clean Water Act' ° (CWA)" "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" by first achiev-
ing fishable and swimmable water, and ultimately, eliminating the dis-
charge of pollutants into the waters of the United States.' 2 Although
the objectives, goals and policies of the CWA are national in scope,
Congress envisioned that the responsibility for meeting these national
ends would be shared by the federal government and the states, which
would have the primary responsibility to "prevent, reduce, and elimi-
nate pollution."l" Congress also recognized that government enforce-
ment alone would not be sufficient to insure that the goals were met.
8. Frank J. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1103
(1970).
9. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
10. Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 896, provided, "[t]his Act may
be cited as the 'Federal Water Pollution Control Act' (commonly referred to as the Clean
Water Act)."
11. For ease of reference, the text of this Article will follow the practice of many courts,
practitioners, and commentators of citing to CWA provisions by referring to the Act's sec-
tion numbers and not the codified section numbers. The form used will be: CWA §.
For example, instead of referring to the first section of the CWA as 33 U.S.C. § 1251, this
section will be cited in the text as CWA § 101. However, the footnotes will refer to the
codified section number.
12. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Section 101(a) provides:
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objec-
tive it is hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this chapter-
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into navigable wa-
ters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1,
1983.
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts be prohibited.
Id.
13. CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Section 101(b) provides in pertinent part:
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the pri-
mary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollu-
tion, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator
in the exercise of his authority under this chapter.
1555
1556
It therefore extended its allocation of enforcement responsibility di-
rectly to the citizens of the United States. 14
To achieve its ambitious water quality goals, Congress abandoned
the age-old water pollution control maxim that "the solution to pollu-
tion is dilution," and adopted a "command and control" pollution law.
The new law was driven by mandatory minimum national technology-
based standards for water quality, supplemented by more stringent
state requirements, all of which were to be translated into specific ef-
fluent limitations at the end of the discharger's pipe. 15 To make these
limitations directly enforceable, the CWA prohibited any discharge of
a pollutant into water from a point source 6 without a permit that
imposes specific effluent limitations and reporting requirements on
the discharger. 7
However, with over with over 1,000,000 miles of rivers and
streams, 61,000 square miles of inland water bodies and 94,000 square
miles of Great Lakes receiving billions of pounds of pollution annu-
ally'" from more than 70,000 direct dischargers 9 and 27,000 indus-
trial indirect dischargers,2 0 regulated by the CWA, achievement of the
14. CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e). Section 101(e) provides in pertinent part:
Public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of any
regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program established by the Ad-
ministrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] or any State under [CWA]
shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the
States.
Id.
15. For a concise summary of the changes made by the 1972 amendments, see John
P.C. Fogarty, A Short History of Federal Water Pollution Control Law, in CLEAN WATER DESKBOOK
5-20 (Envd. L. Rep. ed., 1988).
16. "Point sources" are discernible, confined, discrete conveyances, such as pipes, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The
CWA prohibitions do not apply to "nonpoint" sources of pollution such as sheet run-off
from fields, farms and highways.
17. CWA § 301(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(2)(A).
18. PROGRAM EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, GAO/PEMID94-9, WATER POLLUTION: POOR QuALriY ASSURANCE AND LIMITED POLLU-
TANT COVERAGE UNDERMINE EPA's CONTROL OF Toxic SUBSTANCES 13 (1994) [hereinafter
GAO, WATER POLLUrION].
19. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 688 (statement ofJohn Martin).
20. SCIENCE APPLICATION INT'L CORP., STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL SIGNIFI-
CANT INDUSTRIAL USER NONCOMPLIANCE (1992) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT] (re-
port submitted to Office of Water Enforcement and Compliance, EPA). Industrial indirect
dischargers release effluent into municipal sewer systems. See CWA § 307(b), (c), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(b), (c) (stating that indirect dischargers must comply with pretreatment require-
ments imposed by EPA on various categories of industry, and with general prohibitions on
the discharge of pollutants that either pass through the system untreated or interfere with
the operation of the sewage treatment system).
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CWA's goals depends on widespread voluntary compliance by the reg-
ulated community.
Generally, the tools available to motivate compliance fall into two
categories, carrots-incentives and subsidies-and sticks-penalties,
injunctions, and criminal sanctions. In the CWA, Congress created
the paradigmatic command and control environmental statute-a
statute that relies primarily on sticks to induce compliance with its
standards. The CWA provides no financial rewards or market-based
incentives for meeting or exceeding its standards. Those who do com-
ply, however, suffer the stick of the expense of pollution control costs.
Conversely, those who violate the CWA by using downstream waters
for free waste disposal gain a competitive market advantage over those
who internalize their waste disposal costs. As a result, voluntary com-
pliance with the CWA's requirements will not occur unless the regu-
lated community perceives the enforcement system as a credible
threat that violating the law will be more painful than complying with
it. To help make this threat credible, Congress designed the CWA for
ease of enforcement: any discharge of a pollutant from a point source
without a permit, or in violation of the permit, is a violation of the
CWA, subjecting the violator to injunctive sanctions,2 civil penalties
of up to $25,000 per day per violation,22 and criminal sanctions.2"
But does this enforcement structure motivate a vast, ever ex-
panding array of industrial, commercial, residential and governmen-
tal polluters to comply consistently with complex and ever more
stringent pollution control regulation?24 This is no small question.
The economic pressures to avoid pollution control costs constantly
gnaw at companies seeking to gain market share and to fend off com-
petition. Unchecked by vigilant enforcement, these pressures will
slowly, but inevitably, undermine our system of environmental laws.2"
21. CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a).
22. CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
23. CWA § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
24. As our population and economic activities grow, pollution regulations must be-
come more stringent just to maintain existing environmental conditions, let alone improve
deteriorating or deteriorated air and watersheds whose conditions jeopardize human
health and the environment. For example,
New York City shows how population growth affects pollutant load. From
1880 to 1980, the metropolitan region's population grew by a factor of five, from
roughly 3 million to roughly 15.2 million. Estimated waterborne discharges of
organic carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorous from human waste rose in direct pro-
portion to population growth.
WORLD RESOURCES INSTrrUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1994-95 34 (1994); see also THE WORID
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992 7-13 (1992).
25. According to James R. Elder, former Director, EPA Office of Water Enforcement
and Permits, "We have found repeatedly that nothing is self-sustaining in the NPDES pro-
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Similarly, as our nation's population grows, 26 new municipal sewage
treatment plants must be added, and existing ones maintained, ex-
panded, and upgraded simply to maintain current levels of treat-
ment,2 7  let alone meet demand for increasing residential,
commercial, and industrial development. Local governments facing
tight budgets inevitably will feel pressure to avoid expensive capital
investment and operating expenditures if sending pollution down-
stream is cost-free.2 8 Thus, compliance today, if it exists, does not as-
sure compliance tomorrow. Without vigilant, widespread, voluntary
compliance, our water and air pollution and hazardous waste control
programs will erode, and possibly collapse, leaving future generations
with the crushing expense of restoring the ecosystem, and the in-
creased morbidity and mortality caused by the contamination. 29
Unfortunately, our system of public environmental enforcement
is more fragile 0 and overwhelmed than most people realize.3 1 An-
gram. If a state's vigilance or EPA regional vigilance subsides, then noncompliance and
point source contribution [pollution] increase." James R. Elder et al., Regulation of Water
Quality: Is EPA Meeting Its Obligations or Can the States Better Meet Water Quality Challenges?, 22
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,029, 10,037 (Jan. 1992).
26. The United States population, currently slightly over 250,000,000 persons, grows
annually at the rate of 1.03%, which means that each year we must meet the needs of an
additional 2,633,000 people. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 24, at 269.
27. In the face of growing population, the CWA has been successful to the extent that
it has resulted in maintaining water quality across the nation, and even improving it in
some places. Between 1972 and 1986, the CWA was in part responsible for a roughly 50%
increase in the number of Americans being served by sewage treatment plants with secon-
dary treatment technology, but many communities still do not meet this minimal level of
treatment. WILLIAM R. LOWRY, THE DIMENSIONS OF FEDERALISM 66 (1992).
28. Lowry notes that it has long been true that "[plollution is wedded to political
power. Wherever water is bad the industries and cities that made it that way are ready to
use their influence and economic leverage on every level of government to stave off abate-
ment." Id. at 57 (quoting DAVID ZWICK & MARCY BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 168
(1971)).
29. The experience of the former Soviet Union illustrates this possibility. On paper,
the Soviet Union had extensive, stringent environmental laws and regulations, but there
was no enforcement of those laws. MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN
THE USSR: HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE 1-14 (1992). Without enforcement, there
also has been no compliance with the environmental laws, which are now a sham, "a false
front over grubby reality." Id. at 44. As a result, Russia suffers from widespread, severe,
even catastrophic environmental contamination. Id. at 252. Some Soviet scholars calcu-
lated the annual economic costs of environmental damage at 15% to 17% of GNP, id. at
254, which may cost more than $1.5 trillion to clean up. Id. at 258.
30. For instance, the enforcement system does not even protect our nation's massive
investment in sewage treatment plants:
To protect the 75 billion dollar public investment over the past 18 years,
federally-funded waste water plants are required to generate revenue to operate
and maintain constructed facilities. This is done through user charges. We au-
dited user charge systems in three EPA regions last year and found that 73% of
the delegated States did not perform user charge system reviews as required. Of
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nual enforcement accomplishment reportss 2 praise government's ef-
fectiveness in enforcing the law."3 But, there is less than meets the eye
to claims that the law is being effectively enforced.3 4 Despite the many
enforcement success stories reported by the government,3 5 the
those that were performed, 61% identified deficiencies. Indications from a na-
tional survey of user charges are that 37% do not generate adequate revenues.
The whole purpose of the user charge system is to prevent treatment facilities
from deteriorating to a level of non-compliance with water standards.
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 688 (statement of John Martin). Senator Chafee re-
sponded, "All I can say is it is a terrible tragedy if we're not keeping these places up after all
the money we have put into them." Id. at 698.
31. For instance, self-monitoring by the more than 70,000 direct dischargers is used to
identify permit noncompliance. However, according to the EPA Inspector General,
[o]nly non-compliance by the largest 10 percent of the facilities is reported in
[EPA's] monitoring system, and of those facilities, only the ones judged to be in
significant non-compliance for extended periods of time are counted against
agency goals. Thus, the number of facilities recorded as being in significant non-
compliance is vastly understated compared to the total universe of facilities that
may not be meeting the terms of their permits.
Id. at 688 (statement ofJohn Martin). Moreover, compliance monitoring information sub-
mitted by some states and EPA regions has been and continues to be inaccurate, federal
oversight of this process is inadequate or totally absent, and the noncompliance criteria
exclude many of the nation's chronic permanent violators. Id. at 693-94.
32. EPA's Office of Enforcement annually published an Enforcement Accomplish-
ments Report.
33. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 230-R-93-
001, EPA ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992 1-1 (1993) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT
ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992] (stating "FY 1992 was a very successful year for.., the Environ-
mental Protection Agency .... .").
34. According to EPA's Inspector General,I [EPA's] complex reporting criteria, coupled with often inaccurate reporting
from the field, and a lack of effective oversight at Regional and Headquarters
levels exclude many of the nation's chronic violators from oversight. Reliance on
compliance data obtained from EPA reports can give inflated impressions of ac-
complishments. Currently, no corrective actions for these reporting deficiencies
have been taken.
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 789 (statement ofJohn Martin).
Moreover, an EPA Chief of State under President Reagan explained:
Under most of our statutes EPA's enforcement role is residual, that is, allowing us
to take the enforcement lead if and when states can not take effective action. To
be blunt, I have concluded that EPA's reputation as a tough and effective enforce-
ment agency over the past several years has been largely unearned. There has
been little in the way of discernible enforcement strategy. Major polluters have
gone untouched, and numerous cases have languished at the Department ofJus-
tice for want of adequate preparation. But we "fattened" our average by going
after numerous small firms whose pollution problems were real but minor com-
pared with those of the ones that eluded us.
John E. Daniel, The Balance of Roles: EPA and the States Under the Reagan Administration, in 12
Envd. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 15,087, 15,088 (1982).
35. See, e.g., ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992, supra note 33, app. National
Penalty Report FY 1992, at 1 (stating the Office of Enforcement set a record in FY 1992 for
penalties assessed); ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIV., DEP'T oFJUsTICE DOJ STA-
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number of violations overwhelm the enforcement capacity of both the
federal and state governments.3 6
Much has been written about citizen suits"7 and a little has been
written about federal/state enforcement relationships,"8 but beyond
the intuitive comments of present and former government enforce-
ment lawyers,3 9 no one has analyzed this three-part system as an inte-
grated whole.40 This Article will analyze why both federal and state
governments are, for legal, policy, political, and institutional reasons,
unable-and will forever be unable-to cope effectively with the con-
stant flood of environmental law violations that inundate their offices.
The analysis will conclude that despite the hostility of some courts and
TIST1CAL REPORT FY 1993 5-13 (1994) [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICAL REPORT FY 1993] (de-
tailing significant achievements and accomplishments).
36. William Cohen, Chief of the General Litigation Section of the Land and Natural
Resources Division of the Department ofJustice (DOJ) stated that "frankly" there are just
too many enforcement cases "out there" for the federal and state governments to handle
and that citizen suits should be applauded as a "natural adjunct" to government enforce-
ment. William M. Cohen, Remarks at the ALI-ABA Environmental Law Course of Study
(Feb. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Cohen Remarks].
37. See, e.g., Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Prelimi-
nary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 833 (1985);
David T. Buente, Citizen Suits and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Closing the Enforce-
ment Loop, 21 ENrWv. L. 2234 (1991); Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environ-
mental Law, 65 TUL. L. REv. 339 (1990); Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal
Pollution Control Laws, Part I, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,309 (1983).
38. See, e.g., Hubert H. Humphrey III & LeRoy C. Paddock, The Federal and State Roles in
Environmental Enforcement: A Proposal for a More Effective and Efficient Relationship, 14 HARv.
Ervr.. L. REv. 7, 44 (1990) ("Today, faced with the task of assuring that a huge universe of
regulated facilities is complying with environmental laws, neither federal nor state officials
can afford the confusion, delay, disputes and duplicative enforcement efforts that result
when the roles of various governmental entities are not clearly and consistently laid out.");
Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Comment, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of
Local Air Pollution Variances, 20 EcoLOGY L.Q. 207 (1993) (examining the relationship be-
tween EPA and air pollution control districts in California). The Humphrey and Paddock
article proposes several federal/state enforcement allocation principles for Congress and
EPA to adopt. Humphrey & Paddock, supra, at 44.
39. In his remarks to the Environmental Law Course, William Cohen stated that the
collective action of citizen groups, EPA, DOJ, and state governments, working as partners,
is necessary to advance environmental protection. Cohen Remarks, supra note 36; see also
LeRoy C. Paddock, Environmental Enforcement at the Turn of the Century, 21 ENrrL. L. 1509
(1991) (Director of Environmental Policy, Minnesota Attorney General's Office); Joel A.
Mintz, The Future of Environmental Enforcement: A Reply to Paddock, 21 ENvrL. L. 1543 (1991)
(formerly a senior attorney in EPA's Office of Enforcement).
40. For instance, none of the 10 articles in a symposium evaluating EPA's first 20 years
addressed the structure of civil enforcement. Symposium, Assessing the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency After Twenty Years: Law, Politics, and Economics, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Au-
tumn 1991. Nor did any of the 25 articles in Symposium, Twenty-Five Years of Environmental
Regulation, 27 Loy. LA L. REv. 779 (1994).
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commentators,4" only extensive use of citizen suits as private attorneys
general can safeguard the enforcement system from collapse and pre-
vent states from using lax environmental enforcement as an economic
development tool.
This Article will examine critically the CWA's triangular structure
of federal, state and citizen enforcement. First, the Article will review
the evolution of the CWA into its current form. Then it will analyze
the federal/state leg of the CWA's enforcement triangle, discussing
the general strengths and weaknesses of federal versus state enforce-
ment. The Article will identify the legal conflicts that emerge when
enforcement authority and efforts overlap, examine how courts have
resolved these conflicts, and analyze the extent to which these con-
flicts impair the effectiveness of CWA enforcement. In particular, the
Article will focus on the intense interstate competitive pressures that
result from unequal enforcement among the states, which create a
cycle of diminished state enforcement. The Article will then outline
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) policy vision of the
CWA federal/state enforcement partnership, followed by an analysis
of the legal doctrines courts use to resolve conflicts arising from con-
current federal and state enforcement. As we shall see, courts have
tended to limit federal enforcement power, restricting EPA's ability to
level the playing field for state enforcement.
Having identified the legal and institutional problems in the fed-
eral/state CWA partnership, the Article will then examine whether
the CWA is being effectively enforced in the field. The evidence dem-
41. Those courts and commentators view citizen suits as improper interlopers in the
relationship between government and the regulated community. See, e.g., Arkansas Wild-
life Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that diligent
enforcement action by a state bars citizen suits); North and S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc.
v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that the preclusive effect of
CWA § 309(g) bars all civil actions, not only civil penalty actions); Robert F. Blomquist,
Rethinking the Citizen Suit as Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean
Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Depdent Values, 22 GA. L REv. 337 (1988)
(arguing that private citizen suits do not promote the policy interests that they were in-
tended to serve); Greve, supra note 37 (arguing that citizen suit enforcement is not sup-
ported by any plausible economic or environmental rationale); see aso Harold J. Krent &
Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MIcHi. L. REv. 1793, 1808-14
(1993); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SuFFoLK U.L. Rav. 881, 884-88 (1983).
Some constitutional scholars begrudgingly have accepted the use of citizen suits. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MIcH. L. Ray. 163, 222
(1992) ("IT]he citizen suit is probably best understood as a band-aid superimposed on a
system that can meet with only mixed success.... We should not forget, however, that
band-aids can do some good. The citizen suit may serve as an effective if partial alternative
to massive regulatory overhaul.").
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onstrates weak enforcement results and a failure to use civil penalties
as a fundamental deterrent of violations. Based on this analysis, the
Article demonstrates that federal enforcement alone is insufficiently
comprehensive and forceful to level the state enforcement playing
field. Federal enforcement cannot achieve this necessary parity
among states without either a significant increase in resources and
staff, a less-than-remote possibility, or the major supplemental support
of citizens as private attorneys general.
Next, the Article will examine the federal/citizen and the state/
citizen legs of the CWA enforcement triangle to see whether citizens
as private attorneys general are, can be, or should be the substantial
backstop to ineffective or insufficient government enforcement. At
present, citizens are frequent participants in the CWA enforcement
system, accounting for more judicial actions than does EPA, and al-
most as many judicial actions as all of the states combined. By bring-
ing these cases in significant quantities and with high visibility, citizen
suits materially minimize the effect of inconsistent enforcement
among the states. However, recent judicial activism undermines the
crucial role of private attorneys general by precluding citizen suits if
even minimal state enforcement activities are underway. Unchecked,
this judicial trend will have the effect of amending the CWA to its pre-
1972 days, when enforcement was limited and water was viewed as an
economically efficient waste disposal resource.
The last section of the Article will analyze the viability of citizen
suits in the CWA enforcement system by first outlining the general
legal principles and policy concerns that govern citizen suits. The Ar-
ticle then will examine the empirical data on the success of citizens
suits and the significant barriers several hostile courts and states have
raised to citizen enforcement. Finally, the Article will propose several
legal solutions to improve the CWA enforcement system through en-
hanced use of citizen suits. Enhanced use will help significantly to
level the enforcement playing field for the states, thereby freeing the
many states genuinely concerned with environmental quality to en-
force the law aggressively without worry that other states will use lax
environmental enforcement to entice businesses out of state.
The Article will conclude that a triangulated federalist enforce-
ment program can be successful only if citizens are unimpaired in
their ability to fill the substantial gaps that exist in state and federal
enforcement programs. Even in the most earnest federal and state
enforcement programs, there are substantial institutional and polit-
ical obstacles to adequate enforcement. Unfortunately, the present
system does more to hinder citizen enforcement than to promote it.
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If this trend continues, and as states continue to compete with each
other for business development by relaxing enforcement activity, the
regulated community will realize that it cannot justify voluntary com-
pliance with permit requirements. Under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, 42 the CWA's enforcement system soon will be applied
to the control of urban air quality, toxic air pollutants, and acid depo-
sition. Thus, not only will the cleanliness of our water depend on the
efficacy of the CWA's triangulated federalist enforcement system, but
so will the nation's hopes for clean air.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WATER POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
Before the CWA was amended in 1972, states were primarily re-
sponsible for setting water quality standards and enforcing federal
water quality goals,4 3 which were general in nature, applied only to
interstate water," and were not widely implemented as state-based re-
quirements.45 Where water quality standards were not agreed upon
by state and federal authorities, no federal enforcement was possible.
As of 1972, only twenty-seven states had federally approved water qual-
ity standards.' Even in those states with approved standards, it was
not possible to bring enforcement against individual dischargers on
the basis of ambient water quality standards alone because the water
quality goals did not identify what individual polluters may or may not
discharge.47
Even if the states and federal government had been able to assign
specific ambient water quality-based effluent limitations to each dis-
charger along interstate waters-an almost impossible task 4 -en-
42. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 StaL 2399 (1990).
43. See FRANK P. GRAD, TREATIsE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03(1) (a), at 3-71 to -72
(1993).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(a) (repealed 1972).
45. GRAD, supra note 43, at 3-73.
46. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
47. Id. at 8.
48. The process first requires defining water quality criteria for each use designation;
then identifying each source of pollutants, natural and human, discharged into the water;
identifying the maximum total load of pollutants the water can assimilate before exceeding
the criteria for the designated use; and finally, allocating among the regulated dischargers
the exact amount of total load of pollutants they may discharge, which is incorporated into
a document memorializing the allocation. CWA § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). For scien-
tific, economic and political reasons, making these determinations and allocations was al-
most impossible and was rarely done. See WILLAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW.
AIR AND WATER § 4.18(C), at 281-85 (1986) (discussing the difficulties of implementing
water quality-based effluent limitations).
As of 1994, this task still daunts states. For instance, Pennsylvania has assessed less
than half of its rivers and streams, about one-third of its lakes and none of its freshwater or
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forcement of those limitations would have been impossible because
the federal enforcement machinery was cumbersome and ineffec-
tive.49 Essentially, enforcement was based on an elaborate, protracted
conference procedure, which mandated extensive efforts to mediate
disputes before any court action was possible.5° As of 1971, only fifty
informal conferences had been held nationwide, only four matters
proceeded through the conference procedure to the administrative
hearing stage, and only one case went to court.51 Thus, when Con-
gress enacted the CWA in 1972, one of its central concerns was to
create a readily enforceable system of regulation designed to bring
water pollution under control.52
To this end, the core provision of the CWA prohibits discharge of
any pollutant from a point source into any waters of the United States
without a permit 5 issued from the yet-to-be-created National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) .5  NPDES permits set
specific limits on discharges against which compliance can be mea-
sured and enforced. 55 EPA designed these limitations so that there
would be a 99% certainty that any discharge would be due to the pol-
tidal wetlands to determine if water quality standards are being met. Of the rivers and
streams assessed, roughly 5000 miles, or 20% of the 25,000 miles assessed, do not meet
water quality standards. CWA § 303(d)(1)(C) mandates that states establish "total maxi-
mum daily load" levels, maximum levels of pollution that water bodies can tolerate, to
meet water quality standards with a margin of safety that takes into account any lack of
knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water quality. 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). However, in the 22 years since the CWA became effective,
.neither Pennsylvania nor EPA have established the maximum assimilative load limitation
for a single degraded water body in the entire State of Pennsylvania." Letter fromJames R.
May, Widener University School of Law, Environmental Law Clinic, on behalf of the Ameri-
can Littoral Society, to Carol Browner, EPA Administrator (July 14, 1994) (on file with
author).
49. See S. REP. No. 414, supra note 46, at 5 (addressing the weakness of the permit
system created in 1970 under the Refuse Act).
50. This excruciatingly cumbersome and slow conference enforcement system is de-
scribed in United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469, 470-73 (4th Cir. 1970). See
also 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d), (3), (f) and (g) (1979). Prior to the 1990 Clean Air ActAmend-
ments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642, federal air pollution enforcement laws also followed a simi-
lar procedure, with similarly dismal results.
51. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 46, at 5.
52. When Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1990, it attempted to make Clean
Air Act requirements more easily enforceable by repudiating the Act's ambient air-based
enforcement system and adopting a comprehensive permit-based enforcement system in
42 U.S.C. § 7661a-d (Supp. V 1993) modeled on the CWA. See Timothy L. Williamson,
Fitting Title V into the Clean Air Act: Implementing the New Operating Permit Program, 21 ENVrL.
L. 2085, 2089 (1991).
53. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
54. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
55. See CWA § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (outlining the standards for
compliance).
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luter's actions rather than statistical error.56 The permit-writing pro-
cess anticipates that dischargers will design their systems with
sufficient margin of safety for continuous compliance.5 7 Under this
"command and control"" approach, if the discharge violates the ex-
plicit terms of the permit, the discharger has violated the CWA, even if
there is no scientifically identifiable adverse impact on the receiving
water.
59
Underlying the CWA approach was the adoption of the principle
that no one has the right to pollute the nation's waters.6" This princi-
ple or ethic translated into the congressional mandate that any person
who discharges without a NPDES permit, or in violation of an existing
NPDES permit, is strictly liable under the CWA.61 This mandate
56. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir.
1986); see also infra note 128. This 99% confidence level is consistent with Congress's man-
date that 100% compliance is required. National Resources Defense Council v. Texaco, 2
F.3d 493, 507 (3d Cir. 1994).
57. Id.
58. Command and control is used to describe "measures that require or proscribe spe-
cific conduct by regulated firms." Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Adminis-
trative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1264 (1981). Some
commentators complain that such an inflexible system does not maximize economic effi-
ciency and may result in over-control of pollution. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard
B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM.
J. ENVrL. L. 171 (1988) (urging abandoning command and control in favor of market-
based incentive systems). Others reject "excessive preoccupation with theoretical effi-
ciency" in favor of the pragmatic effectiveness of uniform standards that can be enforced
to create a functioning pollution control system. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real
Regulatoiy Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and Tine Tuning' Regulatory Reforms,
37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1270 (1985). This debate will not be resolved here. This Article
focuses on the means to make enforcement effective irrespective of the policy orientation
of the law. Even in market-based systems, such as the Clean Air Act's S02 allowance trad-
ing system, dischargers are issued permits and violations must be enforced. See CWA § 408,
42 U.S.C. § 7 651g (Supp. V 1993).
59. See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) ("except as in compliance with ... sections
... of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.").
60. The CWA's ethical approach can be traced to the long dormant § 13 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988) (known as the Refuse Act), which barred
discharges of refuse that impeded or obstructed the flow of navigable waters. Id. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers revived the Refuse Act briefly in the 1960s, considering for the
first time "pollution and other conservation and environmental factors in passing on appli-
cations under [§§ 401, 403]." Using this authority the Corps began issuing simple permits
based on an absolute ban on discharges into navigable waters, because all discharges were
deemed to interfere with navigation. Under this absolutist approach, no interference was
reasonable. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 672-73
(1973).
61. See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a).
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places the burden of pollution control on the individual polluter, who
must internalize the cost of pollution reduction.62
In comparison, the pre-1972 FWPCA approach can be character-
ized as economically-based enforcement. The Act allowed pollution
as long as overall ambient water quality goals were met. Theoretically,
under an ambient water quality approach, only those pollution reduc-
tions necessary to achieve overall water quality are necessary. There-
fore, excess, or theoretically economically inefficient, pollution
control was not necessary. From an historical perspective, the pre-
1972 FWPCA, and its state water quality designations, reflected the
common-law view of public resource use. Under common law, water
could be used freely for waste disposal as long as the discharger did
not impair downstream riparian rights by unreasonable use,6" did not
unreasonably interfere with the quiet use and enjoyment of down-
stream land (private nuisance),64 or did not unreasonably interfere
with rights common to the public in the water (public nuisance).65
The pre-1972 FWPCA, oriented to this common law view, allowed ex-
ternalized or free use of water for disposal until the enforcement au-
thority proves that the discharger's pollution reaches the "point of
unreasonableness."6
6
The CWA rejected the economically based common-law view. In
prohibiting any pollution without a permit and mandating national
minimum standards of pollution control, even if the controls exceed
what may be necessary to protect water quality, the CWA is driven
more by a political or ethical view of environmental policy than an
economic one.67
Congress faced an analogous choice when it selected the enforce-
ment philosophy that underlies the CWA. Just as all environmental
62. The system requires all firms "to exercise their best efforts to eliminate or reduce
waste discharges." N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the
Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. RE'. 643, 644 (1977).
63. See Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 122 A.2d 233, 240-42 (N.J.
1956); Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, 462 (1856).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 821D (1979). For a modem case stating
that pollution of groundwater can constitute a private nuisance, see Adkins v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1992).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 821B. See generally David R. Hodas, Private
Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16
ECOLOGY L.Q. 883 (1989).
66. See 2 RODGERS, supra note 48, § 4.1, at 13.
67. Although dilution of existing pollutants might be an economically efficient solu-
tion to pollution, "Congress explicitly recognized that reduction of the amount of efflu-
ents-not merely their dilution or dispersion-is the goal of the CWA." Texas Mun. Power
Auth. v. EPA, 836 F.2d 1482, 1488 (5th Cir. 1988).
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laws represent political choices between the benefits and harms of en-
vironmentally unregulated economic activity, all environmental en-
forcement systems face a constant tension between those who
approach enforcement from a "sanctioning"68 perspective and those
preferring a "compliance" 69-riented enforcement philosophy.70 A
sanctioning strategy tends to be adversarial, focusing on punishing
prohibited conduct. Such a strategy views the imposition of sanctions
that deter the violator and others from future violations as resolving
the enforcement problem; remediation of existing violations is simply
a part of the overall sanction process. 71 A sanctioning enforcement
strategy does not ask the enforcer to balance environmental harms
with economic efficiency; rather, the regulator strikes that balance
when it establishes the substantive rules and standards.
In contrast, enforcers following a compliance strategy tend to be
conciliatory in style. These enforcers are concerned more with repair-
ing a problem and with bringing the specific violator into compliance
with the law than with either punishing violators or deterring future
violations with civil penalties and other sanctions.7 2 Adherents to the
compliance perspective tend to be adjudication averse, preferring
ongoing working relationships with violators over adversarial interac-
tion. They utilize private negotiations with violators that result in ex-
tended incremental advances that accommodate the economic
interests of the regulated community. As a result, the tensions are
minimized between the regulators and those that they must regu-
late.7' Businesses, and the states that seek to accommodate them, pre-
fer compliance-based enforcement for several reasons. Such a system
enables the enforcers to ease the impact of federal regulations
through extended compliance schedules, it results in enforcement
only when the state discovers the problem, it allows violators to retain
the economic benefit derived from their violations, and it does not
actively deter future violations.
To discourage potentially inconsistent enforcement philosophies,
Congress designed, and EPA has implemented, the CWA to be a sanc-
tioning-oriented Act. The Act dictates strict liability for all CWA per-
mit violations and provides that district courts shall assess civil
68. KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL
DEFINITION OF POLLUTION 3 (1984).
69. Id. at 3.
70. See id. at 7-14 (discussing the roles of compliance and sanctioning in environmental
enforcement).
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 5.
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penalties on violators to deter present and future violators.74 How-
ever, as we shall see, many, if not most, states have rejected the CWA's
federal sanction-based enforcement design in favor of a compliance-
based enforcement philosophy to foster economic development.75
Structurally, the CWA simplifies enforcement by requiring per-
mits, self-monitoring, reporting of discharges, and strict liability for
any civil violations. However, statutory power will induce compliance
only to the extent that the regulated community believes that regula-
tors will use the statute's enforcement power. Five elements must be
present to create effective use of statutory enforcement power: (1)
willingness to use discretionary enforcement power; (2) adequate re-
sources and personnel to find and prosecute enforcement actions
against violators; (3) easily accessible information on compliance sta-
tus; (4) sanctions and remedies; and (5) fora with the power to en-
force sanctions and mandate remedial action by violators. Because
the CWA provides legal authority for information gathering, 76 sanc-
tions and remedies, 77 and fora for enforcement, 78 successful use of its
enforcement system turns on whether anyone is willing and able to
enforce, and whether those to be regulated believe those elements are
present. To provide this final element, Congress allocated enforce-
ment power among the federal government, the states, and their citi-
zens in a triangulated federalist system of overlapping authority.7 9
Before analyzing the triangular enforcement relationships under
the CWA, it is necessary to digress briefly to describe the structure of
the CWA section 402 permit-granting process. The entry gate to the
74. See CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) ("In determining the amount of civil pen-
alty the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic
benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good faith
efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on
the violator and such other matters as justice may require.") (emphasis added); cf. CWA
§ 309(g) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (3) (establishing similar criteria for the administrative as-
sessment of civil penalties by EPA). "The general public interest in clean waterways will be
served . . . by the deterrent effect of civil penalties." Public Interest Research Group of
New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir. 1990).
To deter the violator and others from not violating the law in the future, EPA's written
policy seeks civil penalties to remove any significant economic benefit from the violator so
the violator is placed in the same position as if it had complied on time, and also to impose
a sufficiently large penalty to ensure that the violator is economically worse off than if it
had complied with the law in a timely fashion. EPA, Policy on Civil Penalties, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,083 (1984).
75. See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
76. See CWA § 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318.
77. See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
78. See CWA §§ 309(a), (g), 402(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a), (g), 1342(b).
79. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1977)
(discussing the purpose and enforcement structure of the CWA).
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CWA's regulatory system is the section 301 (a) prohibition on the dis-
charge of any pollutant without a NPDES permit."0 A person dis-
charges a pollutant when that person adds any pollutant from a point
source81 into "the waters of the United States."8 2 Thus, section 402
requires a permit to discharge lawfully a pollutant from a point source
into any body of water.8" The permit imposes specific, end-of-the-pipe
effluent limitations on the discharger that reflect the more stringent
of either national technology-based minimum effluent standards or
local water quality standards. Dischargers obtain NPDES permits
from EPA, unless the discharge is located in a state to which EPA has
delegated NPDES permit-writing authority.8 4 Under section 402(b),
any state desiring to administer its own permit program under the
CWA may seek approval from EPA.85 If EPA determines that the state
program meets the requirements of the Act and EPA regulations, then
EPA will suspend its issuance of NPDES permits in the state.8 6 How-
ever, EPA retains the power and responsibility to oversee the ap-
proved state program, to veto state permits that do not meet CWA
mandates, and to enforce the state permits. If an approved state fails
to modify an NPDES permit to meet EPA objections, then permit-writ-
ing responsibility returns to EPA for that discharger.87 When an ap-
proved state writes an NPDES permit, the state may include any state
requirements more stringent than EPA limitations.8  However, EPA
may always veto the permit if the discharge would impair the water
quality of a downstream state.8 9 When EPA writes a permit in a non-
approved state, or after vetoing a permit proposed by an EPA-ap-
proved state, it must incorporate any state water quality requirements,
even if they are more stringent than EPA effluent limitations.9"
The legal relationships under the CWA are complex. Although
the CWA is a federal law, the federal NPDES authority must defer to
any state that has a permit program approved by EPA pursuant to sec-
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
81. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12); see supra note 16.
82. CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); see United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985) (discussing the scope of "navigable water" in the CWA).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
84. CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
86. CWA § 402(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1).
87. Champion Int'l Paper Co. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 1988).
88. CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
89. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1055 (1992).
90. CWA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
1569
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tion 402(a) (5) and section 402(b). 91 Once EPA approves a state law
permit program, EPA must suspend its issuance of NPDES permits
within that state.92 The approved state programs issue NPDES permits
under state law. These programs use state agencies whose actions are
reviewed by state courts enforcing state law that EPA has approved
previously.9" However, this allocation of responsibility is delicate be-
cause EPA retains its full enforcement authority despite the approved
state's "capability of administering a permit program which will carry
out the objectives of [the C WA]"9 4 and its adequate authority to en-
force compliance with NPDES.95 The complexity has another level:
whether EPA or an approved state administers the NPDES, Congress
has created an enforcement triangle by granting citizens the right to
bring an enforcement action against any person who is alleged to be
in violation of a CWA effluent standard or limitation.96 In sum, the
federal government enforces violations of federally issued NPDES per-
mits and violators of NPDES permits issued by EPA-approved states
either in federal court, or within EPA by means of administrative pro-
cedures. EPA-approved states may concurrently enforce state permit
violations under state law in their courts and environmental agencies.
Citizens,97 comprising the third leg of the enforcement triangle, may
enforce violations of federal or EPA-approved state NPDES permits in
federal court.98
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a) (5), (b). Most federal and state officials refer to this process as
EPA "delegation" of NPDES authority to the states. However, federal power is not actually
delegated to approved states; rather EPA suspends its own permit writing program in defer-
ence to an approved state's permit writing program. States are not required nor can they
be forced to seek EPA approval; only states desiring to administer their own permit pro-
gram need apply for approval.
92. CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c). This suspension is subject to a state meeting
the requirements of § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), and to it conforming with guidelines
issued under § 304(i) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(i)(2).
93. CWA § 402(b) provides that EPA may only approve state programs if the state's
attorney general has certified that "the laws of such State... provide adequate authority to
carry out the described program." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). EPA may not approve a state pro-
gram if EPA determines that "adequate legal authority does not exist: (1) [tio issue per-
mits... ; and (7) [t]o abate violations of the permit or the permit program, including civil
and criminal penalties and other ways and means of enforcement." Id.
94. See CWA § 402(a) (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (5).
95. See CWA § 402(b) (7), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (7).
96. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
97. States are included within the definition of citizens and can bring citizen suits in
federal court; see also U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1991); CWA
§ 505(g), (h).
98. If citizen suits are authorized by the approved state's law, then citizens may also
enforce violations of state permits under state law in state court.
1570 (VOL. 54:1552
1995] ENFORCEMENT IN A TRIANGULAR FEDERAL SYSTEM
This Article examines the ebb and flow of power that results from
this shared responsibility to enforce compliance with the CWA. Sim-
ply stating that shared enforcement responsibility exists suggests the
possibility of conflict when the enforcement activities and the perspec-
tives of different participants overlap or collide. The conflicts fall
within two major categories: (1) federalism tensions arising out of the
ambiguous relationship between the federal government and the
states in their shared enforcement of the CWA; and (2) tensions aris-
ing out of the relationship between citizens, as private attorneys gen-
eral, and the federal and state agencies with CWA enforcement
authority.
II. ENFORCEMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
A. The Distribution of Enforcement Responsibility
Although all the major environmental laws are federal,9 9 the
quantity, variety, and geographic dispersion of those regulated by
these laws is so great that enforcement would be impossible if left
solely to the federal government. As a result, essentially all the mod-
em major environmental laws provide uniform, minimum national
standards with the states "deputized," to a greater or lesser degree, to
do the permitting and enforcing for the federal government. 00
Strong state enforcement programs are invaluable within a fed-
eral system. A strong state can respond more rapidly to local pollu-
tion problems than can the federal government. Additionally,
compared to the federal government, state environmental agencies
can better understand local environmental conditions, can be more
flexible and innovative in their solutions, can avoid the weight of bu-
reaucratically concentrated federal power, and can have more day-to-
day interaction with the regulated community and the public. More-
over, law enforcement traditionally has been the responsibility of state
and local police, prosecutors and courts.
A decentralized state-based system of environmental enforcement
should perform several functions. It should inspect and monitor
sources of water, air and land pollution, detect illegal activities in the
99. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Safe Drinking Water Act,
42 U.S.CA §§ 300f to 300j-26 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
76 7 1q (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6904-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. Panel Discussion, Symposium, The New Federalism in Environmental Law: Taking
Stock, 12 Envd. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 15,101, 15,101 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Taking
Stock] (remarks of Frederick R. Anderson).
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field, and bring violators into compliance through judicial or adminis-
trative prosecutions. This system would take advantage of the state
agency's relatively easy access to the dischargers, its proximity to the
affected water, land or air, and its knowledge of the dischargers' oper-
ations and local ecological conditions. Thus, it should not be surpris-
ing to learn that for the eight fiscal years (FY) between 1985 and 1992,
ninety percent of all site inspections1"' and over eighty percent of all
air, water, pesticide, and hazardous waste governmental environmen-
tal enforcement actions were brought by the states. 10 2
Unfortunately, because of shrinking state government budgets
and increasing interstate competitive pressures, state enforcement ac-
tivity has dropped dramatically and federal enforcement has not filled
the gap.10 3 Enforcement of water pollution violations has declined
even more than overall environmental enforcement activity. State ad-
ministrative water enforcement has dropped seventeen percent from
its peak in FY 1990 and state judicial enforcement has dropped sev-
enty percent from its peak in FY 1988."' Federal administrative water
enforcement dropped eight percent from its peak in FY 1989, and
judicial enforcement dropped thirty-seven percent from its FY 1989
peak.'0 5 In comparison, by FY 1992, overall state administrative en-
forcement dropped from its peak in FY 1989 by twenty-eight percent,
while state judicial enforcement had dropped over thirty-six percent
from its peak in FY 1988.106 Since 1983, however, citizen enforcement
has greatly exceeded federal efforts, and has almost equaled overall
state efforts in some years.10 7 The historical data is contained in Table
1.
101. E. Donald Elliot, Keynote Presentation: Making the Partnership Work, in FEDERAL VER-
SUS STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: CAN A NATIONAL POLICY BE IMPLE-
MENTED LOCALLY? (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL VERSUS STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
STANDARDS] (proceedings of the 19th Annual ABA Conference on the Environment).
102. ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992, supra note 33, app. Historical Enforce-
ment Data. For FY 1990, EPA no longer counted state pesticide warning letters as state
enforcement actions, thereby reducing the apparent level of state activity. Still, even for
that year, states accounted for over 76% of all enforcement actions. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. State administrative enforcement dropped 14% from its FY 1990 peak, when
pesticide warnings no longer were counted as enforcement actions. Id.
107. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1
CIVIL PENALTY CASES
EPA DOJ EPA State Citizen
Fiscal Referrals Filings Admin. Judicial 60-Day
Year to DOJTJ (court)" Penalty Referrals' Notices
1993 5 7T4 39 n/a 383 3 0 0 T5
1992 77 56 228 T  204 189
1991 91 83 147T 297 177
1990 87 72 429 200T
1989 94 87 489 200
1988 123 164" 687 200
1987 92 4 0 T0 286 200
1986 119 221 205TU
1985 93 137 135
1984 95 178
1983 56 11 0 2
1982 45 17 T13
1981 37 6
Sources:
TI. ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992, supra note 33, app. Historical Enforcement
Data.
T2. DOJ STATISTICAL REPORT FY 1993, supra note 35, at 47.
T3. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 300-R-94-003, EPA
ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1993, app. Historical Enforcement Data (1994) [herein-
after ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1993].
T4. According to its data, EPA referred 84 water cases to DOJ in FY 1993. Id.
T5. The data for 1991-1993 is taken from a printout of the EPA citizen suit log maintained
by EPA's Office of Water Enforcement. The data are for calendar years, not U.S. govern-
ment fiscal years.
T6. ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992, supra note 33, National Penalty Report FY
1992, at 6.
T7. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 300-R-92-008, EPA
ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1991 app. National Penalty Report FY 1991 (1992)
[hereinafter ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1991].
T8. EPA does not have this data compiled; the 200 notices figure is based on the best esti-
mate of Mary St. Peter, Attorney/Adviser, Office of Water Enforcement, EPA. St. Peter is
currently responsible for maintaining this data at EPA.
T9. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MONrrORING, U.S. ENVIL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF EPA PENALTY PRACrmCEs FY 1989 (1990) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF PEN-
ALTY PRAcrICs].
T10. Id.
T11. Citizen 60-day notice letter data for 1981-1986 comes from Brief of Amicus Curiae Con-
necticut Business and Industry Association in Support of Petition for Certiorari, app. A,
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (No. 86-
473). The data is based on calendar years, not fiscal years.
T12. The Environmental Law Institute reported 108 instances in its report. JEFFREY G.
MILLER & ENVrL. L. INST., CITIZEN Surrs: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CON-
TROL LAws 12 (1987).
T13. The Environmental Law Institute reported 19 instances. Id.
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Heavy reliance on state enforcement is a double-edged sword. When
we "deputize" the states to implement national environmental laws, we
shift the government's discretionary enforcement power to state and
local officials, who may not be interested in, or able to carry out, fed-
eral goals. For instance, state agencies may not have adequate budg-
ets to carry out their delegated responsibilities,10 8 or states may
compete with each other for economic development by offering mini-
mal environmental enforcement, particularly if the effects of pollu-
tion can be sent down-wind or down-stream to a neighboring state.
For example, in Indiana, an EPA-approved state with weak enforce-
ment, the few enforcement efforts the state agency was able to mount
caused a powerful backlash from both the legislature and the regu-
lated community. 1 9 These groups worked to further curb or elimi-
nate the agency's enforcement capability on the grounds that reduced
enforcement would improve Indiana's economic viability.1
Federal standards may be undermined by lax enforcement, af-
fected through an array of subtle forms. For instance, state A could
issue a strict permit, but be lenient in enforcement, while state B
could write permits that ease up on effluent limitations or testing re-
gimes '1 but enforce the liberal permits more regularly, although with
only de minimis sanctions. In reality, state A might be more demand-
ing of the regulated community than state B; although on paper the
former would appear to be ineffective in enforcement, while the latter
would display the false picture of a well-enforced program.
B. The Unlevel Playing Field Problem
When states evaluate their enforcement problems, one of their
central concerns is the consistency of enforcement across the country.
Without a level playing field, even the most conscientious state may be
driven to compete for economic growth by undermining enforcement
108. See Rosemary G. Spalding, Deputy Commissioner for Legal Affairs, Indiana Depart-
ment of Environmental Management (DEM), Remarks to Panel on Enforcement Proceed-
ings and Citizens' Suits, at the AU-ABA Environmental Law Course of Study (Feb. 19,
1994) [hereinafter Spalding Remarks] (noting that the Indiana DEM is so severely un-
derfunded and understaffed that its compliance and enforcement program is viewed by
many as largely ineffective) (on file with author).
109. Id.
110. Id. As a result of the Indiana DEM's lack of resources, the agency has begun the
process of returning its CWA program back to EPA, which does not want it returned be-
cause of its own resource limitations. See also Robert F. Blomquist, "Turning Point": The
Foundering of Environmental Law and Policy in Indiana?, 27 IND. L. REv. 1033 (1994) (analyz-
ing Indiana's voluntary return of federally-delegated environmental regulatory powers).
111. The choice of either of these alternatives will have the same effect.
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activity.112 State officials seeking to keep existing industry and to lure
new business into their state are acutely aware of the political danger
of creating a hostile business atmosphere through vigorous enforce-
ment of federal law." 3 As a result, states with strong environmental
programs feel intense local political pressure to slacken enforcement,
while states with weak programs are loath to abandon the economic
advantage that lax environmental enforcement provides." 4 Although
little evidence exists that industries relocate because of specific state
environmental policies, state officials are "particularly sensitive" to
economic competition among the states for business." 5 No politician
wants to open herself up to the charge of opposing, or not vigorously
promoting, statewide business development." 6
Thus, states view federal enforcement aimed at levelling the play-
ing field as the political and economic prerequisite to maintaining a
vigorous state enforcement effort. Theoretically, federal enforcers
recognize the federal government's duty to promote vigorous state en-
forcement by removing the competitive advantage enjoyed by under-
regulated entities in under-enforcing states." 7 But, because of con-
gressional reluctance to expanding the federal enforcement bureau-
cracy and because of resource limitations generally, the federal
environmental enforcement effort, although valiant,1 8 is so sparse
112. See J. Langdon Marsh, Executive Deputy Commissioner, New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation, Remarks to Panel on Enforcement Proceedings and
Citizens' Suits, at the ALI-ABA Environmental Law Course of Study) (Feb. 19, 1994) [here-
inafter Marsh Remarks]. The same can be said for standard setting, where the presence of
interstate competition makes it difficult for even the best states to exceed minimum federal
standards and guidelines. LowRy, supra note 27, at 47, 79.
113. LowRY, supra note 27, at 13-14.
114. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 699 (testimony of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman)
(stating that inconsistent enforcement places enforcing states at a competitive disadvan-
tage in trying to attract and hold businesses); see also Spalding Remarks, supra note 108.
115. LowRy, supra note 27, at 13-14.
116. But cf. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-
the-Bottom" Rationakfor Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992) (ar-
guing theoretically, on the basis of broad and empirically unconfirmed assumptions, that
interstate competition for business development should not result in an environmental
.race to the bottom" because total social welfare to states from increased business and
decreased environmental quality ought to reach an equilibrium that mitigates the "race to
the bottom"). Unfortunately, reality does not conform to Revesz's simple model. See gener-
ally LowgY, supra note 27.
117. Cohen Remarks, supra note 36.
118. DOJ environmental enforcement attorneys work very hard. In FY 1993 they logged
an average of well over 50 hours of work per week, and spent, as a section, over 268,000
hours on enforcement cases, of which about 101,000 hours were spent on CWA enforce-
ment (an average of 145.5 hours per CWA case in the year). DOJ STAnSTiCAL REPORT FY
1993, supra note 35, at 69-71, 81.
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and varied from region to region that it cannot create the level play-
ing field that the states need. 119
Ironically, while the states look to vigorous federal enforcement
to create a level playing field, the federal government believes that the
bulk of enforcement is where it should be-in the states.12 The re-
sult: uneven and steadily diminishing state CWA enforcement. Local,
regional, and national environmental public interest groups have
stepped into this gap as private attorneys general. Although they are
relatively small in size, handicapped by limited resources, and viewed
with hostility by courts, the regulated community and some embar-
rassed government officials, these groups can provide the states,
through dedicated and persistent litigation, with the level playing field
that the federal government cannot provide on its own. EPA is well
aware of its own limitations and has publicly recognized the value of
citizen enforcement:
[R] ecent history... shows a substantial increase in citizen
suit enforcement particularly for Clean Water Act (CWA) vi-
olations and now also for violations of the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community-Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA). The
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the Clean Air Act (CAA),
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Ocean Dump-
ing Act and the Solid Waste Disposal Act (RCRA) all have
citizen suit authority. We can expect the trend towards in-
creasing use of citizen suit authority will only accelerate in
the future due to the ever heightening environmental con-
sciousness of the public and the resource "squeeze" on gov-
ernment that precludes us from addressing every violation.
To the extent that citizen groups successfully undertake en-
forcement, a positive result has been achieved; namely, the
availability of citizen suit remedies has served to leverage our
scarce enforcement resources. More to the point, Congress
has leveraged the scarce federal enforcement resources.
Moreover, to the extent that the regulated community views
citizens enforcement as unpredictable, an even greater de-
terrent effect is achieved by the reality of active, broadly
spread citizen suits enforcement as regulatees seek to
achieve compliance to avoid not only federal and state prose-
cution but also to avoid independent citizen actions.'
119. I& Federal enforcement efforts have been characterized as "small potatoes" com-
pared to the states. Cohen Remarks, supra note 36.
120. Cohen Remarks, supra note 36.
121. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ENvrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 22E-2000, ENFORCEMENT
IN THE 1990's PROjEcr: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ANALYTICAL WORKGROUPS 5-47 to 5-48
(1991) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990'S].
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Citizen suits represent far more than an expedient congressional
solution to an enforcement resource problem. In a fundamental
sense, they are the necessary capstone to the public participatory pro-
cess which the CWA so paradigmatically represents. In our complex,
representative democratic society, we have come to understand that
open public participation and comment are integral to the process of
sound decision-making.12 2 In the context of the CWA, the public par-
ticipated in the decision-making process when Congress enacted and
amended the Act. After the legislation became law, the public partici-
pated in the drafting of EPA's implementing regulations by offering
comments on proposed rules and seeking judicial review of regula-
tions thought to be inconsistent with Congress's mandate. 123 When
the CWA regulations are implemented by NPDES permits, each per-
mit is subject to public comment, possible hearing, and judicial re-
view. 124 If EPA or an approved state agency simply ignores violations
after this extensive public process is completed, then that entity will
render prior public participation a meaningless exercise. Thus, the
CWA represents a pact with the public. The NPDES permit is the final
product of a long public process, and if the permit is to be changed,
the change must be done publicly, following the same process. 12 5
The CWA's pact with the public is that the government may only
issue a permit via a public process, and the Act may not be de facto
amended by the secret, nonpublic means of simply not enforcing it.
As part of this pact, citizens have been given the power to act as pri-
vate attorneys general. 126 This power insures that the publicly devel-
oped CWA, including its regulations and permits, are publicly
enforced. Under the CWA, Congress writes the statute, EPA promul-
122. See Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv.
1669 (1975) (analyzing the transformation of administrative law into a surrogate political
process to ensure fair representation of a range of affected interests); see also Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988) (mandating publication of general notice of
proposed agency rule-making in the Federal Register); id. § 553(c) (requiring an agency to
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule-making through submis-
sion of written comments).
123. See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989) (reviewing rea-
sonableness of EPA regulations limiting discharge of waterborne pollutants); American
Paper InsL v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1981) (setting aside EPA regulations which
were contrary to plain meaning of statute).
124. See40 C.F.R. § 123.27(d) (1987); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 175-77 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Citizens for a Better Env't v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720,
723 (7th Cir. 1979).
125. See Manasota-88, Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1986) (reviewing public
participation process in NPDES permit modification); Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
126. See CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
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gates the regulations, and EPA and EPA-approved states issue the per-
mits. Citizen enforcement does not redraft the CWA, EPA's CWA
regulations or any NPDES permits, it merely swiftly and directly en-
forces 127 the specific limitations established in the permit 21 with
which the discharger must comply.
1 29
III. THE FEDERAL/STATE LEG OF THE ENFORCEMENT TRIANGLE
A. Organizational Structure
Congress designed the CWA for governmental enforcement re-
sponsibility shared by the states and federal government. As the Act
has evolved, states with approved programs have assumed primary en-
forcement responsibility, with EPA retaining concurrent enforcement
authority and responsibility for program oversight in approved states.
Under this system, the states conduct the vast majority of compliance
inspections and bring the great majority of enforcement actions.5 °
Whether or not a state is approved, CWA enforcement is a decentral-
ized activity, as it is under virtually all other environmental laws. The
primary enforcing authority is either the approved state or the EPA
127. Corn Refiners Ass'n v. Costle, 594 F.2d 1223, 1226 (8th Cir. 1970).
It is axiomatic that Congress intended enforcement of the Act to be "swift and
direct." A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Senate Committee on Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 1483 (1973).
Enforcement is "swift and direct" when the case turns on the sharply defined
question whether the plant discharged more pollutant than allowed under the
simple numeric standards contained in the effluent discharge regulations.
Id.
128. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 293, 299 (3d Cir.
1982). The court stated:
The [permit] limits applicable to direct dischargers are based on empirical
studies of the amount and consistency of removal that can be achieved by a well-
designed and operated plant. These limits require consistency of removal in two
important respects. First, they are set so that a discharger can be in compliance
virtually all the time. See, e.g., General Pretreatment Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 27743
(1978). "Guidelines are generally calculated with a 99% confidence level. There-
fore, if a discharger exceeds the effluent limitations established by the guideline
regulation, there is a 99% certainty that it was caused by discharger error rather
than statistical variation." National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Reg-
ulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 38019 (1984). Second, the limits fix precise daily maxima as
well as monthly averages, neither of which may be exceeded by the direct
discharger.
Id.
129. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 177 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (stating that citizen groups are to be treated as "welcome participants in the vindica-
tion of environmental interests") (citations omitted).
130. ENFORCEMENT AcCOMPLISHMENTs FY 92, supra note 33, app. Historical Enforcement
Data.
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regional office for that state."'1 If either's vigilance subsides, then
noncompliance and point source pollution will increase. 1
32
EPA sets national policy and technology-based effluent standards
through its headquarters in Washington, D.C. The various regional
offices essentially conduct all inspection and enforcement at the re-
gional level, where the states and regulated community have their day-
to-day contact with EPA. However, unlike EPA headquarters, which
employs a primarily national policy perspective, the regional offices
are "more apt to reflect the different political cultures and varying
demands for environmental regulation across the country."133 As a
result, the extent of regional enforcement can vary significantly from
weak to stringent.1 3 1
EPA's national control over the states, which flows through the
regions, is even more diffuse than its control over the regions. How-
ever, it is a daunting challenge for EPA vigorously to oversee state
enforcement programs, especially because of the wide range in quality
of state programs and in state attitudes towards environmental regula-
tions. These attitudes tend to divide into four categories, which de-
fine the unlevel playing field states create.1 3- One observer has
divided the states as follows:
1. The Progressives-states with a high commitment to environ-
mental protection coupled with strong institutional capability;
2. The Struggers-states with a strong commitment to environ-
mental protection, but with limited institutional capability because of
limited allocation of resources;
3. The Delayers-states with strong institutional capacity but with
limited commitment to environmental protection; these states move
very slowly in implementing federal legislation; and
4. The Regressives--states with weak institutional capacity and
weak commitment to environmental protection. These states fail to
131. See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
132. Elder et al., supra note 25, at 10,037.
133. EVANJ. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL: POLITICS AND
PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING POLLUTION 37 (1993). This regional variation runs as deeply as
the inspection capability of the regions. For instance, the number of water inspectors in
each region widely varies, ranging from a low of 4 in Region X to a high of 75 in Region IV.
ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990's, supra note 121, at 4-129. However, EPA inspectors do little
inspection; more than three-fourths of the inspectors spend less than 20% of their time
inspecting. Id. at 4-126.
134. RINGQUIsT, supra note 133, at 38 (citing Susan Hunter & Richard W. Waterman,
Determining an Agency's Regulatory Style: How Does the EPA Water Office Enforce the Law?, 45 W.
POL. Q. 403 (1992)).
135. James P. Lester, A New Federalism? Environmental Policy in the States, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLuCY IN THE 1990s 73-75 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990).
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adequately implement federal programs, are unwilling to take in-
dependent action, and actively promote economic development at the
expense of the environment due to their "obsessive optimism"1 6 that
economic growth will not degrade or impair the environment, and
therefore, their economic policy need not be impeded by environ-
mental precaution.1 3 7
In reality, the states are relatively free from federal control,1 3 8
and possess such a wide variation in basic policy orientations and
agency organization that effective management oversight by EPA is
difficult, even though EPA funds and retains oversight responsibility
for approved state programs.13 9 EPA oversight is further complicated
because, for nonapproved states, EPA headquarters has oversight re-
sponsibility for EPA regional administration of the NPDES program.
Thus, EPA faces the management challenge of overseeing forty differ-
ent approved-state programs, 4 ' while retaining sole responsibility for
eleven states, 14 1 Puerto Rico, the Trust Territories and the District of
Columbia. 142 Eventually, EPA would like every state to have an ap-
proved NPDES program so that the Agency will no longer have pri-
mary responsibility for enforcement in any state.143
However, if every state program is approved, the variety of state
environmental agencies will increase, further complicating EPA's
oversight role. Currently, states divide into four broad categories of
organizational structure. 144 Some states house environmental protec-
tion programs in public health agencies; others create variations on
mini-EPAs; a third group of states has environmental superagencies;
136. Id. at 75.
137. See id. at 74.
138. RINGQUIST, supra note 133, at 38
139. See it; see aso ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990's, supra note 121, at 2-1 to 2-13.
140. EPA, Office of Water, State NPDES Program Status (Dec. 30, 1993).
141. Id These states include Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.
142. EPA Region II, located in New York, administers the Puerto Rico NPDES program
and oversees the Virgin Islands. Region IX, in San Francisco, administers the NPDES pro-
gram in the Trust Territories.
143. Reagan era federalism theory strongly encouraged this trend, although more as a
means to deregulate than to allocate resources more efficiently. See Taking Stock, supra note
100, at 15,101 (remarks of Frederick R. Anderson). According to Anderson:
What we have today is not a state/federal program at all, but a purely
through-and-through federal program. We deputized the states to do unpleasant
or routine work for our federal government. What the [Reagan] Administration
is really talking about is not so much the creative return of power to the states,
but an attempt to shrink the size of the entire budget and to dismantle the envi-
ronmental effort.
Id.
144. See RtNGQuIsT, supra note 133, at 38-39.
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and finally, some states, such as Texas and California, have no central
agency focus, but rely on separate boards and commissions."' As eco-
nomic competition among states intensifies, the Progressives and
Strugglers face powerful economic and political pressures to relax en-
forcement to enhance their competitive position.
B. Tensions in the Federal/State Leg of the Enforcement Triangle
Tensions between the federal and state governments arise when
EPA defers to state-approved programs for the issuance and enforce-
ment of NPDES permits, while retaining full federal enforcement au-
thority under CWA section 309.1" These tensions raise several
questions: (1) When should EPA enforce the CWA directly against a
polluter in an approved state? (2) If EPA decides to enforce directly
when a state is acting concurrently, although independently, against
the same or similar violations, which jurisdiction's enforcement au-
thority, if either, controls? and (3) How effective has this federalist
allocation of authority been? The answers to these questions will
emerge from EPA's policy, relevant judicial decisions, and empirical
analysis.
C. When Should EPA Enforce the CWA: Statutory Directives and EPA
Policy
1. Statutory Structure.-Even when EPA relinquishes the NPDES
program to the states, section 402(i)1 47 provides that EPA retains its
enforcement authority under section 309.148 If a person is discharg-
ing pollutants in violation of any conditions contained in a state-issued
permit, section 309 states that EPA may issue a compliance order; 49
bring a civil action in a United States District Court;150 assess civil pen-
145. These structures have various advantages and disadvantages. Environmental pro-
grams housed in public health agencies must compete for resources with other health
concerns. Id. States that create mini-EPAs centralize and improve the visibility and profes-
sional quality of the state environmental programs, but limit the agency's ability to deal
with cross-media environmental problems. Id. State superagencies combine pollution con-
trol, natural resources, fish and wildlife management, and related functions. These agen-
cies may be able to approach environmental problems broadly, if they are not too
compartmentalized, but they may de-emphasize environmental protection in favor of other
goals. Id. The states that employ separate boards and commissions to handle environmen-
tal issues, in effect, create an additional level of administration for federal regulators to
oversee. Id.
146. See infra notes 147-159 and accompanying text.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i).
148. Id. § 1319.
149. CWA § 309(a) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (3).
150. CWA § 309(a) (3), (b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (3), (b).
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alfies administratively; 5 1 or notify the polluter and the state of the
violation, wait thirty days, and if the state fails to enforce within the
thirty days, order compliance or bring an enforcement action in dis-
trict court. 152
In states without approved programs, EPA is the sole governmen-
tal enforcer of the CWA. Otherwise, EPA has the authority to enforce
violations of either federal NPDES permits or EPA-approved state per-
mits even if a state has instituted or concluded its own enforcement.
This statutory structure confers on EPA the power to monitor CWA
enforcement in approved states, and the authority, but not necessarily
the resources and staff, to assure that the CWA will be enforced ade-
quately. However, although section 309 empowers EPA to enforce di-
rectly and even to usurp the state enforcement program in its entirety,
it simultaneously encourages EPA to defer to state enforcement.
1 3
The CWA encourages deference by requiring, in section 309 (a) (4),
that a copy of any compliance order be sent to the state in which the
violation occurred and to other affected states.1 54 Section 309(b) fur-
ther requires that EPA send notice of the filing of a judicial enforce-
ment action to the appropriate state.1 55 Under section 309(a) (2), if
CWA violations are so widespread that it appears the approved state
effectively has failed to enforce its program, then, after ninety days
notice, 156 EPA can assume enforcement of the state's permit program.
But the threat of federally assumed enforcement is more theoretical
151. CWA § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). Class I penalties, which may not exceed
$10,000 per violation and $25,000 per assessment for all violations, may be assessed by EPA
after an informal hearing at which the violator will be provided a reasonable opportunity
to be heard and present evidence. Id. § 309(g) (2) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2) (A). Class II
penalties, which may not exceed $10,000 per day for each day during which the violation
continues and $125,000 overall, may only be assessed after notice and an opportunity for a
hearing on the record in accordance with § 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 554 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). CWA § 309(g) (2) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2) (B).
The assessment of Class II penalties is governed by EPA's Consolidated Rules of Practice
Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties and the Revocation or Suspen-
sion of Permits, 40 C.F.R pt. 22 (1993).
152. CWA § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1).
153. 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
154. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (4). The standards and procedures EPA is to use when faced
with a water quality dispute between upstream and downstream states were thoroughly
reviewed in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
156. Id. § 1319(a) (2). However, notice to the state is not a condition precedent to fed-
eral enforcement of a particular permit violation. United States v. City of Colorado
Springs, 455 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 (D. Colo. 1978).
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than real, for EPA does not have the. resources to take over state en-
forcement programs.
157
A similar ambivalence exists in the relationship between EPA and
EPA-approved states when EPA chooses to enforce CWA violations
with its administrative enforcement power. Pursuant to section
309(g), EPA has the power to assess administrative penalties for viola-
tions of a state-issued permit.' 58 However, if a state is diligently prose-
cuting an administrative penalty assessment or the state has issued a
final administrative order and the violator has paid the penalty, then
EPA may not seek civil penalties in court for the CWA violations.'15 9
The preclusive effect of section 3 09 (g) (6) only flows in one direction:
an EPA assessment of an administrative penalty does not restrict a
state's authority to seek civil penalties in court or administratively.
This asymmetrical structure can lead to uneven enforcement results.
If a state agency collects minimal penalties for a serious violation, then
EPA may not seek civil penalties in federal court, but stringent federal
enforcement will not preclude any state enforcement efforts.
2. EPA 's "Policy Framework for EPA/State Enforcement Agreements."
Within this federal/state enforcement partnership, EPA must decide
157. Letter to Sen. John Glenn, Chairman, U.S. Committee on Government Affairs,
from Richard D. Morgehstern, Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Policy, Planning
and Evaluation, U.S. EPA, at 6 (Oct. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Morgehstern Letter] (on file
with author).
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). Prior to the 1987 amendments to the CWA, Pub. L. No. 100-4,
101 Stat. 7 (1987), EPA did not have the power to assess penalties administratively for CWA
violations; only federal courts could assess civil penalties. CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d) (1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 131 9 (g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In the 1987
CWA amendments, Congress expanded EPA's power by authorizing it under § 309(g) to
assess penalties of up to $125,000 for a Class II penalty under EPA's administrative law
process. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g); see also 40 C.F.R. § 22.38 (1994) (containing supplemental
rules of practice governing Class II penalties).
Before the new power from § 309(g), the assessment of civil penalties depended on
DOJ agreeing to prosecute a violator in federal court. Institutionally, it was difficult for
EPA to insist that DOJ prosecute a matter that a state was handling already. Because Con-
gress was aware that this administrative power would greatly ease EPA's burden in seeking
penalties, some feared that EPA might too often seek penalties in cases where states had
already obtained them. Section 309 (g)(6) thus represents a compromise: Congress gave
EPA expanded authority and the ease of administrative enforcement, but EPA could not
use this power to take a second bite at the violator if an approved state was diligently
prosecuting, or had already prosecuted, the matter under state law comparable to the
CWA.
159. CWA § 309(g) (6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6). In states without an EPA-approved pro-
gram, EPA has exclusive authority and responsibility for issuing NPDES permits and en-
forcing the CWA. CWA § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). Any state water pollution laws in
nonapproved states are independent of the CWA and have no effect on EPA's power to
bring an enforcement action. See CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a).
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how and when to use its retained CWA enforcement power. Although
EPA has not issued any written guidance specific to this question, it
has developed a "Policy Framework for EPA/State Enforcement
Agreements." 6 ° EPA views states with approved programs as having
primary responsibility for enforcement within the state, but sees itself
as responsible for achieving the goals of "fair and effective enforce-
ment of federal requirements, and a credible national deterrence to
non-compliance." '' Because neither state nor federal enforcement
resources alone are adequate to address the majority of CWA viola-
tions, EPA cannot meet its enforcement goals without the combined
strength of an effective partnership with the states. The Policy Frame-
work attempts to minimize the differences between EPA and state en-
forcement perspectives that can drive the parties apart and weaken
the partnership.
162
The Policy Framework's tide is deceptive because the word
"agreement" is not used in its formal sense. The Policy Framework
does not require the production of a written document called "Fed-
eral/State Agreement on Enforcement," or anything of the sort.'
63
Rather, the Policy Framework envisions only that EPA regions and
their approved states will discuss EPA oversight procedures, criteria
for direct enforcement by EPA, procedures for advanced notification
and consultation, and state reporting requirements."6 None of these
discussions need to be reduced to writing if the topics discussed are
covered elsewhere.' 63 Furthermore, the oversight procedures, EPA
criteria for direct EPA enforcement, and the state reporting require-
merits described in the Policy Framework apply, unless otherwise spec-
ified in the discussions or other EPA documents.'
66
According to Edward E. Reich, then EPA's Deputy Assistant Ad-
ministrator for Civil Enforcement, each environmental program for-
malizes its own federal/state enforcement relationship in an annual
Regional/State Enforcement Agreement that sets forth mutual re-
sponsibilities and criteria to assess performance and also attempts to
160. Alvin Aim, EPA Memorandum on State/Federal Enforcement "Agreements" (June
26, 1984); see also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Implementing the State/Federal Partner-
ship in Enforcement: State/Federal Enforcement Agreements, (Aug. 25, 1986) (available
from Envd. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) Document Service) [hereinafter Policy Framework].
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id at 3052.
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avoid surprises.' 67 Reich states that the "agreements" are intended to
define the criteria to measure good enforcement performance. Such
criteria include: specific enforcement priorities, "high or improving"
compliance rates, "timely and appropriate" enforcement, "accurate"
record-keeping practices, "sound" program management practices,"
oversight procedures, standards for direct federal enforcement, 6 9 ex-
change of enforcement information, and state reporting
requirements. 170
Defining performance expectations in advance is a sound man-
agement practice, but it does not address the central federalism issue:
When should EPA wield its enforcement power in a state with an EPA-
approved program? Section 309(a) (2) provides the easy answer-
when a state program has failed. 171 EPA has interpreted failure to
mean that the state is "unwilling or unable" to take "timely and appro-
priate" enforcement action. 7 2 But, EPA assumption of a state en-
forcement program is the enforcement equivalent of a nuclear
deterrent. It is useless except to the extent that it prevents cata-
strophic collapse of state programs. Because EPA relies on the state-
approved program to assume primary enforcement responsibility,
EPA's budget does not provide the resources to take over the enforce-
ment role in the states. 173 For example, in most states EPA receives
DMRs only for major dischargers;174 DMRs for nonmajors, which com-
prise the bulk of state-approved NPDES permits, are never sent to
EPA. To assume the enforcement role in the states, EPA would have
to expand significantly its enforcement staff for those states.' 75 To
accomplish this, Congress would either have to increase EPA's budget,
167. Edward E. Reich, EPA/State Enforcement Relationship, in ALI/ABA ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 477, 479 (Feb. 16-18, 1989).
168. Id
169. Direct federal enforcement may be appropriate where a state requests EPA action,
state enforcement is inadequate, there is a possibility of national precedents, and where an
EPA order has been violated. Id. at 480-81.
170. Id.
171. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2) (requiring EPA enforcement if the Administrator finds
a failure of the State to enforce... permit conditions or limitations effectively").
172. Policy Framework, supra note 160.
173. Morgehstern Letter, supra note 157, at 6.
174. However, in some states, such as New York, EPA no longer receives DMRs even for
major dischargers, although much but not all of the data is placed into an EPA computer
data base; also most states put some DMR data for some minor discharges into the EPA
database. Letter from Jim Hecker, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice to author (Nov. 16,
1994) (on file with author).
175. Among other changes, EPA would be required to monitor all nonmajor discharg-
ers; develop extensive information handling systems; and hire inspectors, engineers, and
attorneys.
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a difficult thing to do, or permit EPA to shift resources from existing
programs. According to EPA, "even if only a small number of dele-
gated states returned their programs to EPA, [EPA's] enforcement
program would not be able to cope with the new responsibilities. Ulti-
mately, there would be less enforcement, not more." 176
Thus, it is hardly surprising that EPA has never taken back the
primary enforcement role from an approved state.1 77 When the state
program has not collapsed, EPA must define its role in state enforce-
ment against the backdrop of an "effective" approved program pos-
sessing primary enforcement responsibility. As a result, EPA must
limit enforcement resources for that state. Given these constraints on
EPA enforcement, it is hard to imagine EPA developing or imple-
menting its own active enforcement program in a state with an ap-
proved program.
Despite these policy and resource constraints, EPA's articulated
criteria for direct enforcement create the impression that EPA will
play a significant enforcement role in an approved state if necessary.
The Policy Framework requires EPA to consider three broad catego-
ries when deciding whether to take direct enforcement action: (1)
the type of case; (2) the timeliness and appropriateness of the state
enforcement action; and (3) the adequacy of the penalty imposed at
the state level.178
EPA will take direct enforcement action depending upon the
"type of case" only if at least one of the following factors is present:
a) violation of an EPA order or consent order;
b) state request for EPA action;
c) the case is specifically designated as nationally significant, such
as significant noncompliance or explicit national or regional priori-
ties;
d) legal precedent;
e) interstate issue;
f) significant environmental or public health risk involved;
176. Morgehstern Letter, supra note 157, at 6.
177. However, EPA is currently considering the petition of the Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion requesting that EPA withdraw Virginia's enforcement and permit-writing approved
status because Virginia allegedly has failed to enforce the CWA, has failed to provide ade-
quate public participation in its NPDES program, has allowed the issuance of illegal per-
mits, and is using water quality rules never promulgated by EPA. See Petition for Corrective
Action, An Order Commencing Withdrawal Proceedings, and Other Interim Relief with
Respect to Virginia's Water Pollution Control Program (Nov. 5, 1993) (submitted by Ches-
apeake Bay Foundation to EPA Region III). About a dozen similar petitions are pending
before EPA in other regions. Hecker Letter, supra note 174.
178. Policy Framework, supra note 160.
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g) significant economic benefit gained by the violation;
h) repeat violators; and
i) areas where state authority may be inadequate.179
Because EPA resources are so limited, the Policy Framework pro-
vides that the Agency generally will not act if the state has taken, or
can take, timely and appropriate action."' 0 This policy holds true
even in cases involving national priorities, interstate issues, significant
environmental harm or health risk, or significant economic benefit to
the polluter. Only when enforcement of an EPA order, a consent de-
cree, or a legal precedent is at stake will EPA permit itself to consider
the effectiveness of the state program. However, only if EPA had al-
ready instituted enforcement will an order or consent decree be at
stake. Thus, only in the limited situation where a legal precedent is at
stake does EPA allow itself to commence an action in the presence of
approved state enforcement activity.'" 1 Yet, even in this circumstance,
if EPA fails to act quickly enough or to coordinate its enforcement
with the states, prior state enforcement could render EPA's efforts un-
constructive or ineffective.182
According to the Policy Framework, EPA will not take action
based upon the adequacy of the state penalty unless clear national
guidance on penalties covers the violation and the EPA regions con-
sistently follow the national guidance. 8 ' Even if such penalty gui-
dance existed, EPA's lack of enforcement resources prevents it from
bringing a direct action every time a state penalty is inadequate. Fur-
thermore, if the penalty was the result of a state administrative action,
section 3 09(g) (6) would bar an EPA judicial action.'8 4 Because the
vast majority of state enforcement actions are administrative, the
number of state judicial cases, which EPA could second guess in court,
is extremely limited. 8 ' Ironically, state judicial actions inevitably in-
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-91-166, ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT: PENALTIES MAY NOT RECOVER ECONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLAToRs 2-3
(1991) [hereinafter GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT]. However, as will be discussed
infra notes 552-557 and accompanying text, almost all of the legal precedents involving
CWA enforcement issues have been established in citizen suit litigation, and not in EPA
enforcement actions.
182. See United States v. Cargill, 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981).
183. Policy Framework, supra note 160, at 3048. EPA has issued no such guidance docu-
ment. See CLEAN WATER AT CIIWL PENALTY POLICY (Feb. 11, 1986); Revised Interim Clean
Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy (Feb. 28, 1995), Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:0911 (July 7,
1995).
184. 33 U.S.C. § 309(g) (6).
185. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
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volve the most serious cases and penalties. Not surprisingly, EPA's
policy, which has not been modified since 1984, limits its direct action
to those instances when a state's penalty is grossly deficient consider-
ing the facts, the national concern and the state's own penalty author-
ity and policy."8 6
But EPA action because of an inadequate state penalty is essen-
tially nonexistent. The Agency will look for the assessment of any civil
penalty and turn a blind eye to the amount.18 7 EPA officially main-
tains that penalties are a crucial tool in deterring violators, and its
general policy requires collection of the economic benefit of noncom-
pliance as a minimum penalty.'88 However, EPA does not condition
approval of a state program on whether the state has a penalty policy
comparable to EPA's. 189 As a result, some states still view penalties as
counterproductive and tend not to impose them.'9 ° Furthermore, de-
spite its claim that penalties are an important compliance tool, EPA
does not require approved states to assess specific penalties in specific
circumstances. Moreover, no effective check exists for states that as-
sess little or no penalties on CWA violators. EPA's heralded policy of
threatening direct action if a state has not assessed a penalty or if the
186. Id. A grossly deficient penalty is one which has a de minimis effect.
187. Id.
188. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Policy on Civil Penalties, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 35,083, 35,083 (Feb. 16, 1984). EPA states:
The first goal of penalty assessment is to deter people from violating the law.
Specifically, the penalty should persuade the violator to take precautions against
failing into noncompliance again (specific deterrence) and dissuade others from
violating the law (general deterrence). Successful deterrence is important be-
cause it provides the best protection for the environment. In addition, it reduces
resources necessary to administer the laws by addressing noncompliance before it
occurs.
If a penalty is to achieve deterrence, both the violator and the general public
must be convinced that the penalty places the violator in a worse position than
those who have complied in a timely fashion. Neither the violator nor the gen-
eral public is likely to believe this if the violator is able to retain an overall advan-
tage from noncompliance. Moreover, allowing a violator to benefit from
noncompliance punishes those who have complied by placing them at a competi-
tive disadvantage. This creates a disincentive for compliance. For these reasons,
it is Agency policy that penalties generally should, at a minimum, remove any sig-
nificant economic benefits resulting from failure to comply with the law.
Id.
189. Morgehstern Letter, supra note 157.
190. Reich, supra note 167, at 483.
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penalty assessed is grossly deficient19 1  has never been used
successfully. 192
Instead, EPA merely encourages those states that do not have ad-
ministrative penalty authority 93 to enact legislation giving their state
agencies this power.' 94 If states adopt administrative penalty authority
comparable to EPA's, then section 3 09(g) protects them from EPA
interference. Under section 3 09 (g), a state's diligent prosecution' 95
or a state's assessment and collection of a penalty would bar EPA from
seeking judicial penalties even if EPA believed that the state penalty
was grossly deficient.' 96 This EPA policy presents a potential irony:
States which do not believe in using penalties to achieve compliance
can assess a de minimis administrative penalty and bar an EPA civil judi-
cial penalty action. Although the state action would only preclude a
subsequent EPA judicial penalty action, EPA is unlikely to bring an
administrative action for penalties if the pollution has been abated as
a result of the state proceeding. 197
Two interpretations of the Policy Framework's deference to state
enforcement are possible. One could interpret the deference as an
example of Reagan-era federalism that sought to diminish federal in-
volvement in environmental protection and have the states assume
"ownership" of programs administered by EPA and become "princi-
pally responsible for the day-to-day management of environmental
programs."198 Alternatively, one could infer from the Policy Frame-
work's emphasis on the interstate nature of water pollution and the
need for uniformly strong state enforcement programs that EPA's ap-
proach to inadequate penalties is more influenced by the Agency's
limited resources than by a states' rights federalism philosophy. EPA's
desire to support strong state programs bolsters the limited resource
interpretation. 99 For instance, instead of taking direct action itself,
EPA suggests that its regions take joint state/federal action when a
191. Id.
192. It is rare for EPA to take direct action because of an inadequate state penalty. In
the only reported decision involving EPA overfiling, United States v. Cargill, 508 F. Supp.
734 (D. Del. 1981), the federal action was stayed in favor of the state proceeding.
193. About half of all states do not have administrative penalty authority.
194. GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 181, at 13.
195. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6) (A) (ii).
196. Id. § 1319(g) (6) (A) (iii).
197. The question of whether a de minimis state administrative penalty can preempt fed-
eral action is effectively moot because EPA has circumscribed so severely the occasions on
which it will respond to inadequate state penalties that its power is more theoretical than
real.
198. Daniel, supra note 34, at 15,087.
199. Policy Framework, supra note 160, at 3048.
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state is moving responsibly to correct a violation but lacks the appro-
priate resources, legal authority, or national or interstate perspec-
tive.20 ° Similarly, EPA attempts to use enforcement tools such as state
inspection, data collection and witnesses, and enforcement penalties
(in whole or in part) to further state goals to the extent legally possi-
ble.20 1 EPA also supports strong state programs by attempting to en-
hance the credibility of the states in the public's eye as the primary
CWA enforcers. To accomplish this, EPA involves states in creative
settlements, issues joint press releases that share credit with the states,
ensures that it does not actively compete with the states, and attempts
to avoid creating an impression of weakness or failure of state pro-
grams.°  Finally, the Policy Framework admonishes EPA to avoid
conflicts, to keep states apprised of events and the reasons for EPA
action, and generally to build a common understanding of state-EPA
perspectives.2 0 ' Regardless of EPA's reasons for supporting state pro-
grams to this extent, the Policy Framework supports the conclusion
that EPA rarely intends to take direct enforcement action in states
with approved programs.
D. Problems of Concurrent Federal and State Enforcement
1. Preemption.-Our federal system is built on the constitutional
principle, grounded in the Supremacy Clause,2 4 that in any conflict
between federal and state law, federal law prevails. The doctrine of
federal preemption has evolved out of this constitutional idea. A fed-
eral law will preempt state law if (a) the federal statute explicitly
preempts the state law, (b) the federal legislation is sufficiently com-
prehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no
room" for supplemental state regulation, or (c) state law actually con-
flicts with a federal statute, in which case federal law will preempt state
law only to the extent of the actual conflict.2 5 Such a conflict exists
"where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physi-
200. Id.
201. Theses pronouncements are particularly ironic because it is the EPA resources in
an approved state that are so weak.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
205. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987).
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cal impossibility."2" 6 A conflict also exists "where [a] state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress," 07 such as where the state law inter-
feres with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to
reach its goal. °8
In the CWA, Congress turned this doctrine on its head. Although
the federal statute and EPA regulations comprehensively regulate the
discharge of pollutants into the water, 0 9 Congress explicitly intended
that the states have the primary responsibility for administering and
enforcing the CWA.21° Congress gave the states the power to adminis-
ter and enforce the Act,2 1 1 as well as the power to enact more strin-
gent regulations than those promulgated by EPA.212 Consequently,
even federally-issued permits, such as hydroelectric dam licenses
213
that normally preempt all state regulation, must yield to more strin-
gent state water quality requirements. 4
Congress intended that states, under EPA-approved state law,
would be the primary enforcers of the CWA. As a check on this
power, Congress granted EPA concurrent enforcement authority.
215
What is unusual is that this concurrent federal/state enforcement au-
thority2 1 6 exists without the presence of the preemption doctrine to
resolve conflicts between the federal and state governments. In the
absence of an overriding constitutional rule or statutory guidelines to
resolve federalism enforcement conflicts, courts have turned to tradi-
tional common-law and equitable doctrines to ease these tensions. As
206. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
207. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1977) (citations omitted).
208. Id.
209. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated by City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981).
210. CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
211. CWA § 402(b), (c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), (c).
212. CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
213. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issues such permits. See, e.g.,
California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
214. See PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct. 1900
(1994) (noting that under § 401 (d) a state shall impose any limitations necessary to assure
compliance with § 303).
215. CWA § 402(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i). Section 402(i) provides: "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant
to section 1319 of this title." Id.
216. The state NPDES permit is to be issued under state law no less stringent than the
CWA, and is enforceable in federal court under the CWA and in state court under state
law. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 453 F. Supp. 122,
126-27 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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we will see, -when these doctrines are used to resolve CWA conflicts,
state enforcement usually prevails over federal enforcement.
2. ResJudicata and Collateral EstoppeL--One of the doctrines that
courts use to resolve federalism conflicts where constitutional preemp-
tion principles would otherwise apply is res judicata. Courts ask
whether a judgment in a state enforcement action under an EPA-ap-
proved NPDES program can preclude a subsequent EPA enforcement
action under the authority reserved to it by CWA section 402(i). The
CWA does not, by its terms, bar an EPA enforcement action after a
state judicial enforcement action is complete; rather, it preserves
EPA's enforcement power despite the presence of an approved state
NPDES program.2 1' However, the plain language of the CWA does
not abrogate the application of the principles of resjudicata 218 or col-
lateral estoppel219 to the federal/state relationship.220 Courts also will
ask whether the relationship between EPA and a state environmental
agency is sufficiently close so that EPA could be collaterally estopped
from relitigating an issue which a state enforcement action previously
decided.2 If a state action can estop subsequent EPA enforcement,
then that would appear to negate the reserved statutory power of EPA
to enforce in an approved state. 2
217. See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319. However, in 1987 Congress barred EPA from
seekingjudicial penalties if the state has sought or obtained administrative penalties under
comparable state law. CWA § 309(g) (6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6); see supra notes 158-159
and accompanying text.
218. The res judicata rule requires that "a final judgment on the merits bars further
claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
219. "Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of resjudicata, has the dual purpose
of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party
or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). This doctrine differs from res judi-
cata, which bars a second proceeding involving the same cause of action and the same
parties or their privies. Id. at 326 n.5. With collateral estoppel, the second suit is based
upon a different cause of action from the first, but the judgment in the prior suit precludes
relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action. I
220. These doctrines are "central to the purpose for which civil courts have been estab-
lished, the conclusive resolution of disputes within theirjurisdictions. This policy protects
parties from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial re-
sources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions." Montana, 440 U.S. at 153.
221. See United States v. IT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980) (decid-
ing whether "the statutory language and history of the [CWA] ... creates a 'special circum-
stance' warranting an exception to the normal rules of preclusion").
222. But see CWA § 402(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i) ("Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to limit the authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 of
this tide.").
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However, the delicate partnership between state and federal en-
forcement agencies does not negate res judicata principles, and con-
gressional approval of concurrent enforcement does not "preclude
the operation of collateral estoppel after one action reaches final-
ity."22 3 In United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.,224 a CWA enforcement
case turned on a dispute between the United States and a discharger
over the meaning of a footnote pertaining to discharge standards in
the state NPDES permit, which EPA could have vetoed,225 but did
not.2 2 6 The court reasoned first that the federal/state relationship
under the CWA was sufficiently close to conclude that Congress did
not manifest an intent to abrogate collateral estoppel or res judi-
cata. 22 '7 The court reached this conclusion despite its determination
that the state did not act as EPA's "agent" in issuing the state
permit.22
s
The second step in the analysis conducted by the 1TT Rayonier
court involved a determination whether EPA could be deemed a party
or privy to the state action.22 a According to the court, a nonparty may
be bound by prior litigation if a prior party is so closely aligned with
the nonparty's interests "as to be its 'virtual representative.' 2 3 0 This
contemplates "an express or implied legal relationship by which par-
ties to the first suit are accountable to non-parties who file a subse-
quent suit with identical issues."2 3 ' The ITF Rayonier court found the
223. ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1001.
224. Id. at 996.
225. See CWA § 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (stating "[n]o permit shall issue (A) if the
Administrator... objects in writing to the issuance of such permits").
226. 1TT Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 999.
227. Id. at 1002. The court stated:
Congress has stated FWPCA does not involve a "delegation" of federal au-
thority. Although the NPDES state program is established under state law and
functions "in lieu" of federal authority, the source of the federal/state "partner-
ship" can be traced to a single act of Congress (FWPCA). Regardless whether the
state's enforcement positions can be accurately described as a "delegee" of pow-
ers, its authority vis i vis NPDES permits is derived from FWPCA and is revocable
by the EPA.
Id. (citations omitted). If EPA revoked program approval, the state could still use its water
pollution laws, even if more stringent than the CWA, to regulate dischargers within its
borders. However, only EPA would issue NPDES permits in the state. Even though the
state permits could be identical in requirements after the program revocation and even
though the EPA-issued NPDES permit would incorporate all state water quality standards,
see CWA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, the federal/state partnership would no longer exist, thus
collateral estoppel should no longer apply.
228. TT Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1002.
229. Id. EPA contended it was neither. Id.
230. Id. at 1003 (citing Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975)).
231. Id.
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interests of EPA and the state to be sufficiently similar because "they
share more than an abstract interest in enforcement."2 2 The state
filed its action after EPA warned that it would bring an enforcement
action if the state did not.2
33
The /TT Rayonier court deemed the relationship to be sufficiently
close to preclude relitigation, even though the state was not acting as
EPA's agent and EPA was not bound by the state's action.234 The fail-
ure of EPA to object to or veto 235 a state-issued permit is not subject to
appeal.236 If EPA vetoes a state permit, that EPA action is not subject
to judicial review23 7 until EPA issues its own NPDES permit.2 38 Even if
EPA allegedly coerces a state to write a permit that satisfies EPA's con-
cerns, the state agency actions are not transformed into federal ac-
tions reviewable in federal court.239 Nevertheless, the 1TT Rayonier
court reasoned that, because EPA could assert collateral estoppel of-
fensively against the polluter if the polluter had lost its state-law chal-
lenge to the permit terms, EPA should be subject to defensive
application of the doctrine by the alleged polluter.24 °
Pursuant to 1TT Rayonier, courts will preclude federal actions
questioning state enforcements when the same permit terms and con-
ditions are at issue.241 To the extent EPA assists, closely supports, or
actively oversees state enforcement actions, it may become bound to
the results in the state action by collateral estoppel. Conversely, where
EPA involvement is minimal, such as the review of the adequacy of
state penalties, EPA could most strongly avoid the preclusive effects of
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.; cf. Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Nor does anything in
§ 402... suggest the existence of an Agency relationship between the Administrator and a
state so that the latter's actions in issuing or denying a permit could be deemed action of
the Administrator.").
235. EPA may veto any approved state permits that do not adequately protect water
quality of downstream states, or that are outside the guidelines and requirements of the
CWA. CWA § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2).
236. Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 197 n.9 (1980).
237. CWA § 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) grants jurisdiction to the United
States Courts of Appeals to review the issuance or denial of an NPDES permit by EPA.
238. See Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 190 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that
EPA objections to state-issued permits can only be examined on judicial review after EPA
grants or denies a permit).
239. Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408, 414 (9th Cir. 1978).
240. United States v. ITr Rayonier, 627 F.2d 996, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1980).
241. However, courts do not consider consent decrees between a discharger and a state
to be a determinative finding as to the meaning of a permit for collateral estoppel pur-
poses, so that if the violation persists despite the agreement, EPA's subsequent enforce-
ment action will not be barred by ITT Rayonier. See United States v. Lowell, 637 F. Supp.
254, 257 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
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collateral estoppel. However, it is in this area that EPA seems least
interested and has most limited its action.
An opposite question to that presented in ITT/Rayonieris whether
a prior federal enforcement action against a violator of an approved
state permit bars state enforcement of the same violation. Violation of
an approved-state permit is a violation of federal law subject to federal
enforcement. 242 It is also a violation of the underlying state law.
Thus, pursuant to section 510, unless the state discharge requirements
are less stringent than the federal requirements, federal enforcement
shall not "preclude or deny the right of any State . . . to adopt or
enforce any standard of limitation respecting discharges of pollu-
tants."243 In light of this mandate, it is not surprising that there are no
reported cases in which a state has been collaterally estopped from
enforcement on the basis of a prior federal action. This result is con-
sistent with Congress's view of federalism under the CWA that federal
law could be bound by state enforcement, whereas state law, which
may be more stringent in substance and enforcement than the CWA,
should not be so bound.
3. Abstention. -ITT Rayonier is arguably limited by its facts to
EPA challenges to state permit terms to which EPA could have ob-
jected.2 44 Although the terms of a permit are crucial to standard set-
ting and pollution control, Congress requires EPA to suspend its
permit writing authority in approved states.245 This leaves EPA with
only the power to veto individual permits that impair downstream
states' water quality or otherwise do not meet CWA standards.24 In
the typical enforcement case, however, permit terms are not in dis-
242. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a).
243. 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
244. Under the permit-writing process in section 402, if EPA had not already waived its
power to object, it could have made timely objection to the permit. CWA § 402(e), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(e). In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979), the Court held
that if the United States, although not a party, had "sufficient 'laboring oar' in the conduct
of the state-court litigation," collateral estoppel could be triggered. Montana, 440 U.S. at
155. Thus, to the extent the state enforcement action was prompted, supported, or di-
rected by EPA officials, as may well be the case under EPA enforcement institutions and
ongoing EPA/state cooperative enforcement agreements, collateral estoppel or res judi-
cata might preclude EPA action.
245. CWA § 402(c) provides: "[T]he Administrator shall suspend the issuance of per-
mits [in approved states] unless he determines that the [submitted] State permit program
does not meet the requirements of [§ 402(b)] or does not conform to the guidelines is-
sued under [this Act]." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c).
246. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (explaining that great deference must
be given to the policies designed by EPA and it is not the role of the courts to decide which
policy choice is the best).
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pute, nor may they be disputed. 24 7 Thus, in these cases, the !TT
Rayonier doctrine does not limit EPA power.
Because EPA's enforcement capability is limited in an approved
state,2 4 8 these states inevitably take the enforcement lead. If EPA sub-
sequently wants to challenge a state permit term it will be estopped
under TT Rayonier. But what if EPA brings an enforcement action
entirely independent of one brought by an approved state? This situa-
tion presents several possible problems. Does section 402(i) allow
EPA to seek more stringent or alternate abatement remedies? Must a
federal court adjudicate the EPA actions and grant the relief EPA
seeks, even if incompatible with state actions? How can a court deter-
mine which enforcement authority should prevail or what remedy is
preferable? Constitutional preemption principles are not available to
resolve these federalism conflicts, nor are the principles of resjudicata
and collateral estoppel. What neutral principles then may courts use
to resolve these conflicts between federal and state governments? A
federal court has two possible choices: decline to hear the case or
enter the thicket of concurrent enforcement. However, if the federal
court were to decline to act in a case in which it has subject matter
jurisdiction, it is not clear where that authority would come from.
One principle that addresses this problem involves the doctrine
of abstention. In most cases, a federal court is obligated to hear and
decide a case over which it has jurisdiction of both the subject matter
and the parties."' However, the abstention doctrine provides three
narrow exceptions to the court's duty to decide cases and controver-
sies: Pullman abstention, 250  Burford abstention,251  and Younger
abstention.252
Pullman abstention applies where a federal constitutional issue
might be mooted or modified by a state court determination of unset-
tled state law. 25" A party properly invokes Pullman abstention when it
establishes with particularity the following circumstances: a serious
247. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F.
Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that permit requirements can be interpreted as a matter
of law).
248. But permit-writing does not exist in a vacuum. State permit writers need discharge
data, inspection authority, CWA § 402(b) (2) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2) (B), and the au-
thority to enforce violations of the permit. CWA § 402(b) (9), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (9). Ap-
proved programs employ inspectors, attorneys, permit writers, and other enforcement
officials.
249. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
250. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
251. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
252. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
253. Pul!man, 312 U.S. at 501.
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constitutional claim;254 an unsettled question of state law;255 and the
susceptibility of a state law to a limiting construction that could avoid
or modify the constitutional question. 56
Except in unusual circumstances, federal CWA enforcement
cases do not raise constitutional issues; the same is true for the appli-
cation and interpretation of state water law and regulations.25 7 How-
ever, cases involving these issues do arise. In Bernan Enterprises, Inc. v.
Jorling,25 s a barge owner brought a § 1983 civil rights action in federal
court after the state environmental agency imposed summary abate-
ment orders which revoked the plaintiff's state license, thereby
prohibiting plaintiffs operations. 259 The court determined that dis-
missal based upon Pullman and Burford abstention was appropriate be-
cause interpretation of the applicable state statutes and regulations
would decide the controvery 26 and because the federal interpreta-
tion of the complex state regulatory scheme might disrupt state efforts
to develop a unified, coherent set of rules.2 61 Similarly, where a state
law implementing the CWA is arguably invalid under that state's con-
stitution, a federal court will abstain from deciding a dispute concern-
ing the federal constitutionality of the law because the state court
ruling could render the federal matter moot. 26 2 But when the under-
lying claim in the district court is a federal question, the court is not
required to abstain from deciding a state tort law counterclaim involv-
ing no difficult issues of state law or matters of substantial concern. 263
Burford abstention applies where federal adjudication would in-
terfere substantially with a state's efforts to enforce a coherent system
of purely state regulation bearing on matters of significant impor-
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967) (interpreting Pu/lman).
257. See United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 746 (D. Del. 1981) ("Baldly
stat[ing] that an interpretation of relatively straightforward state laws and regulations
might avoid a constitutional decision without specifying what interpretation of what spe-
cific law or regulations would do so and, in regards to the constitutional issue, only vaguely
referring to due process and equal protection concerns [does not establish the special
circumstances necessary to invoke Ptdlman abstentions].").
258. Berman Enters., Inc. v. Jorling, 3 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 1993).
259. Id. at 606.
260. Id. at 608.
261. Id. at 606.
262. See Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. Ruckeshaus, 590 F. Supp. 385, 387 (E.D.
Mo. 1984).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1485, 1496 (C.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that defendants are entitled to bring counterclaims based on both tort law
and CERCLA).
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tance to the state. 264 Burford abstention makes little sense in the CWA
context.265 In Burford itself, the federal court was asked to enjoin a
state administrative order regulating oil well operations under a com-
plex state oil and gas conservation law-an area that Congress had left
explicitly to the states.26 6 The Court stated that abstention was neces-
sary because "sound respect for the independence of state action re-
quires the federal equity court to stay its hand."2 67 The relationship
between federal and state laws under the CWA differs from the rela-
tionship between federal energy law and state oil and gas laws, which
regulate different phases of energy production. 26' The CWA explic-
itly contemplates a federal/state partnership in which state law is cru-
cial to the implementation of the federal CWA. EPA only approves
state water laws if they meet minimum federal requirements, 269 and
EPA has the authority to revoke approval and to assume purely federal
administration of a state NPDES program. 70 States do not have ex-
clusive control or expertise over any aspects of the CWA, and states
have no authority to define minimum national standards required
under the CWA.2 71 'Thus, state courts have no greater competence in
applying the CWA than do federal courts. 72 For these reasons, a fed-
264. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 323 (1943).
265. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. P.D. Oil & Chem. Storage,
Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1074, 1085 (D.N.J. 1986) (summarily rejecting argument that court
should apply abstention doctrine to citizen suit because Congress clearly intended citizen
suits to supplement state governmental actions); Brewer v. City of Bristol, 577 F. Supp. 519
(E.D. Tenn. 1983) (declining to abstain in a citizen enforcement action contemporaneous
with a state action because the CWA demonstrated a comprehensive scheme approving
multiple litigation, federal issues were at stake, the state court proceedings might inade-
quately protect plaintiffs and the state action was not being diligently prosecuted). In fact,
the Cargill court held that Burford abstention considerations "simply do not apply" to CWA
enforcement. United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 747 (D. Del. 1981).
266. See, e.g., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493
(1989) (stating that states have the traditional power to regulate production as a means of
conserving natural resources and protecting correlative rights of producers).
267. Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
268. Federal energy laws regulate interstate transportation and wholesales of natural
gas, while state oil and gas laws regulate well placement and pumping practices. See, e.g.,
Northwest Cent. Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 510.
269. CWA § 402(a) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2).
270. Section 402(c) (3) states:
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing that a State is
not administering a program approved under this section in accordance with the
requirements of this section, he shall notify the State and, if applicable corrective
action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days, the Ad-
ministrator shall withdraw approval of such program.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). EPA may also assume administration of NPDES enforcement
alone. See CWA § 309(a) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2).
271. States may impose state requirements more stringent than the CWA mandates.
272. United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 747 (D. Del. 1981).
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eral court will not abstain in a CWA enforcement action on the
grounds that a pending state administrative action might ease permit
terms so that the discharger would no longer be in violation.2"'
Younger abstention generally applies where a federal court is
asked to restrain state criminal actions or civil proceedings closely
akin to criminal actions. 74 Younger abstention has no place in resolv-
ing CWA concurrent enforcement disputes because it only prohibits
federal courts from hearing cases seeking to enjoin or directly inter-
fere with state criminal prosecutions, and quasi-criminal state actions
in which First Amendment rights are at stake.2 75
4. Discretionary Stay of Enforcement.-As we have seen, the doc-
trines of preemption, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and abstention
provide little or no guidance to a court faced with the task of easing
the tensions of concurrent enforcement. Certainly, when both state
and federal actions are pending, and they seek incompatible or incon-
sistent relief, existing doctrines provide no rule of decision to help a
defendant determine which of its master's commands must be
obeyed.
Although CWA section 404(i) grants EPA the power to enforce
any violation of a permit issued by an approved state,276 that power
may disappear when a court exercises its inherent discretionary power
to manage litigation through the use of a stay.2 7 Concurrent federal
and state enforcement actions seeking potentially inconsistent or
counterproductive pollution controls are ripe for the exercise ofjudi-
cial power to stay an enforcement action. Although the stay is an im-
portant judicial lubricant for lessening federalism frictions, it is an
extraordinary remedy that courts use only under "exceptional circum-
stances" or in a "clear case of hardship or inequity."278 Nevertheless, a
273. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp.
801, 811 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Wiconisco Creek Watershed Ass'n v. Kocher Coal Co., 646
F. Supp. 177, 178 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that Burford abstention is also inappropriate
where a state agreement to build a mine runoff treatment facility is sufficiently separate
from the defendant's CWA obligations not to pollute).
274. Younger v. Harris, 410 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
275. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,-602 (1975).
276. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(i).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981) (holding that
a stay was appropriate to allow Cargill the opportunity to complete construction of its pol-
lution control facilities).
278. Id. at 748. The court stated that only in these circumstances "will the existence of
concurrent state proceedings warrant the abdication of 'the virtually unflagging obligation
of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.'" Id. (citations omitted).
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stay can be a powerful defensive tool with which a polluter can fend
off federal CWA enforcement
A court generally will consider several factors when deciding to
grant a stay or dismissal, the most extreme form of stay of the federal
action. These factors include (1) the inconvenience of the federal
forum, (2) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, (3) the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums,
(4) whether any federal policy exists militating for or against a stay,
(5) the identity of the issues in the two forums, and (6) the existence
of any countervailing federal interest, which federal courts might be
more likely to respect or enforce than state courts.2 79 If a stay isjusti-
fied, it must be crafted as narrowly as possible to restrain only those
aspects of the federal case that give rise to the adverse effects that
justify the stay.2 s°
In United States v. Cargill, the court presented the following factors
favoring a stay of federal CWA proceedings: (1) the avoidance of fed-
eral/state friction, (2) greater state familiarity with the facts, (3) the
state's interest in enforcing its pollution laws, (4) the existence of par-
allel state litigation adequate to protect the public interest, (5) the
conservation of judicial resources, (6) congressional intent that states
have primary enforcement responsibility over the NPDES program,
and (7) practical considerations concerning the effects of inconsistent
concurrent enforcement actions.2 81 Although the court did enter a
stay, it noted the following factors weighing against a stay: (1) a
court's obligation to exercise its jurisdiction, (2) the practical similari-
ties of federal/state injunctive relief, (3) lack of enforceable require-
ments for the polluter to upgrade its equipment, (4) Congress's intent
to create concurrent enforcement authority, (5) the existence of EPA
enforcement discretion, (6) EPA's interest in insuring national uni-
formity of enforcement, including adequate and uniform penalties,
and (7) EPA's nonparty status in the state action. 2
Because a stay is a quasi-equitable doctrine, a court's decision to
stay a case will depend on the particular facts involved. Generally,
courts are inclined to stay federal actions to the extent that federally
279. Id. at 749 (citations omitted).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 750.
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sought relief conflicts with prior state-based abatement strategies;283
however, courts will tend to allow EPA to pursue civil penalties.284
As a policy matter, if each sovereign knows that incompatible en-
forcement actions are subject to stays, then they will be encouraged to
coordinate their efforts to minimize the incompatibility of relief. The
federal government must be particularly mindful of coordination be-
cause its lack of resources and the approach dictated by the Policy
Framework often result in federal actions commencing long after
state actions are underway. Courts will insist then that EPAjustify its
late and incompatible action. 8 5
As a practical matter, a stay of the federal action can cause more
than a temporary delay in federal prosecution-it can put an end to
EPA's abatement efforts. To the extent that a settlement of an earlier
state action mandates installation of one type of pollution control
equipment, EPA may be precluded from insisting on the installation
of different pollution control equipment, thus putting an end to
EPA's abatement efforts. Thus, under the discretionary stay doctrine
EPA may be relegated to pursuing civil penalties, a course in which
EPA has almost no interest.
A discretionary stay can help resolve federalism conflicts. But if
the conflict is caused by an incompatible concurrent federal adminis-
trative enforcement action, can a federal court enjoin, temporarily or
permanently, a federal administrative action in favor of a pending
state judicial or administrative action? And, if so, may the court en-
283. If federal injunctive relief would require the discharger's approved state permit to
be amended, then the state would be a necessary party to the action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19(a) (2) (ii) because failure to join the state would make the discharger
subject to "a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obliga-
tions." Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 835 F. Supp.
160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). But cf. Wiconisco Creek Watershed Ass'n v. Kocher Coal Co., 646
F. Supp. 177, 178 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that a state agency was not an indispensable
party to a citizen suit CWA action, despite the state's agreement to build a facility to treat
the defendant's discharge).
284. For example, in Cargil, the court stayed the incompatible federal injunctive claim
but permitted the United States to seek civil penalties for past violations. Cargill, 508 F.
Supp. at 751.
285. The Policy Framework anticipates that EPA will receive its information about state
activities in after-the-fact reports and informal communications. EPA's lack of real-time
data means that EPA is rarely able to take the enforcement lead in an approved state.
Moreover, because of EPA's general inability to move quickly, the "timely and appropriate"
enforcement action guidelines do not apply to EPA consideration of whether to take direct
enforcement action. Those guidelines only apply to EPA when a direct enforcement ac-
tion actually begins. Thus, in addition to lack of resources and delayed receipt of informa-
tion, the longer EPA delays bringing an enforcement action, the longer it can avoid being
bound to the time guidelines it imposes on the states. Under these circumstances, it is
hard to imagine EPA ever instituting an action in advance of an approved state.
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join the federal action on the grounds that the federal relief is incom-
patible or inconsistent with the prior state relief? Under section
309 (g), a state administrative action will bar EPA from seeking judicial
civil penalties,2"' but it is unclear whether federal courts have the eq-
uitable power to enjoin federal administrative actions seeking injunc-
tive relief or abatement. Because EPA orders are not self-executing,
EPA must go to federal court for injunctive relief enforcing their or-
ders. At this point, a court could stay the EPA action. No cases discuss
a court's powers vis-A-vis EPA on this point. However, in the citizen
suit context, courts have extended the section 309(g) (6) ban beyond
EPA claims for penalties to also bar citizen claims for equitable relief,
despite its specific reference to only penalties and despite EPA's objec-
tions as amicus curiae. 8 7
If a federal court can bar a federal enforcement action on the
basis of collateral estoppel or stay the action by using its inherent
power to control litigation before it, it would seem to also have the
power in its equitable discretion to enjoin the administrative proceed-
ing under the same kind of exceptional circumstances in which it ex-
ercised its discretionary stay power.2 88 But unlike collateral estoppel
and discretionary stays, which allow a federal court to preserve the
integrity of its own process, conserve judicial resources, and monitor
its own docket, an injunction against an administrative action would
be an assertion of power over a co-equal branch of government. That
assertion of equitable power could be guided by administrative law
principles such as ripeness, primary jurisdiction, and exhaustion of
remedies. However, these principles should not limit the equitable
discretion of federal courts because of the importance of the proper
resolution of difficult federalism conflicts. Just such a conflict arises
when state and subsequent federal administrative actions are incom-
patible and exceptional circumstances exist, so that the failure of a
federal court to enjoin the federal administrative action could deny
the discharger due process of law.289
286. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (A) (ii).
287. See North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st
Cir. 1992) (discussed extensively infra notes 451-505 and accompanying text). But see
Washington Pub. Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 886
(9th Cir. 1993) (finding Scituate unpersuasive, and holding that under § 309(g) (6) citizen
suits are only barred by prior federal administrative penalty actions, not by compliance
actions).
288. The Supreme Court comprehensively analyzed the scope of a federal court's equi-
table discretion in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
289. Cf Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that the
opportunity for judicial review of any administrative order and the presence of judicial
discretion in enforcing any penalties may be sufficient due process protection).
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In reality, EPA-approved states have more than primary enforce-
ment responsibility; they have nearly exclusive governmental responsi-
bility for CWA enforcement.29 °  Without concurrent federal
enforcement, enforcement conflicts are rare. As EPA has all but aban-
doned its direct enforcement role in approved states, the CWA has
lost its character as a federally enforced law. Instead, it has become
largely a state permitted and state enforced law, granting states unfet-
tered enforcement discretion to establish the level of compliance they
expect from their permitted dischargers. Thus, policy, legal, and re-
source obstacles to federal enforcement have converted the CWA
from a national law designed to achieve national goals into state law
enforced to achieve state goals. Under these circumstances, is there
effective enforcement of the CWA? The next section of this Article
will examine this question.
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
A. The Erratic Enforcement Record
Compliance is essential to the success of any environmental regu-
latory program because it
is critical to realizing the benefits envisioned by environmen-
tal policy, statutes, regulations, standards, and permits. The
vast regulatory apparatus we have put in place to protect
public health and the environment amounts to empty words
and deeds without compliance. It is the regulatory bottom
line. All of the cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness studies that
go into assessing the best regulatory route become meaning-
less if the costs and benefits do not play out as predicted,
usually with assumptions of full compliance.2 91
290. For example, EPA anticipates that its federal/state enforcement partnership will
result in a sharing of the inspection burden at the information gathering stage of enforce-
ment so that each of the 7500 major NPDES facilities will be inspected once a year. Elder
et al., supra note 25, at 10,031. Theoretically, in approved states, EPA would perform about
10% of the inspections and the state would perform the balance. Id. The reality in ap-
proved states is that the inspection function of enforcement is almost exclusively a state
activity. In nonapproved states, EPA tends to do more; however, that increase is balanced
by EPA's practice in some approved states of performing no inspections at all. Id. For the
rest of the NPDES permits, some 53,000 dischargers, EPA performs no inspections, and
does not even receive the dischargers' own self-monitoring reports. Although EPA has
authority to require that discharge monitoring reports be sent to it, CWA § 308(b), 33
U.S.C. § 1318(b), Congress has allowed it to waive that power. CWA § 402(d), (e), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(d), (e). In fact, EPA waives its power to review most nonmajor NPDES per-
mits written by approved states, and does not receive nonmajor discharge monitoring
reports.
291. Cheryl E. Wasserman, Federal Enforcement: Theory and Practice, in INNOVATION IN EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICY 21, 22" (T.H. Tietenberg ed., 1992).
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To achieve compliance, an effective enforcement system must ex-
ist. Enforcement is the use of legal tools, formal and informal, to
compel compliance by imposing legal sanctions or penalties.292 Effec-
tive enforcement is based on the theory of deterrence, which holds
that a strong enforcement program deters the regulated community
from violating in the first place, deters specific violators from further
violations, and deters the public from violating other laws." Effective
enforcement accomplishes these goals by providing "visible examples
to encourage others in the regulated population to maintain desired
behavior to avoid a similar fate."" 4 Although there is little empirical
data or economic literature on how best to achieve widespread com-
pliance with environmental laws, 295 it is generally accepted that effec-
tive deterrence requires four elements: (1) significant likelihood that
a violation will be detected; (2) swift and sure enforcement response;
(3) appropriately severe sanctions; and (4) that each of these factors
will be perceived as real. 96
Unfortunately, government enforcement programs do not have,
and never will have, sufficient resources to meet these requirements.
Studies of government enforcement consistently indicate that viola-
tions of environmental law are widespread. Even under the CWA,
designed by Congress to be easily enforceable, enforcement remains
problematic. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO)
has reported:
[E]xperience with EPA's water quality programs suggests
that strong enforcement by EPA and the states is fundamen-
tal to their success. Effective enforcement serves as a deter-
rent to violations and, when violations do occur, helps to
ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken in a timely
manner.
Specifically, our work clearly indicates that:
- Enforcement of our nation's water quality laws con-
tinues to be weak and sporadic. Despite serious and long-
standing violations, most enforcement actions are mild,
informal "slaps on the wrist" rather than formal actions such
as administrative orders or fines and penalties. Further, even
in the relatively few cases where penalties have been assessed,
292. Id. at 23. Enforcement systems must monitor the regulated community and act to
force a change in violators' behavior. Clifford Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PuB-
LIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 243 (Paul Pormey ed., 1990).
293. Wasserman, supra note 291, at 23.
294. Russell, supra note 292, at 243.
295. Wasserman, supra note 291, at 21.
296. Id. at 23.
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they are often significantly reduced or dropped without ade-
quate documentation.
... EPA still has a long way to go before enforcement
serves as an effective deterrent against violations of the Clean
Water Act. Until then, violators will continue to enjoy com-
petitive advantages over those complying with the Act, and
the Act will not realize its full potential in protecting the na-
tion's waters. 97
Private studies of federal environmental enforcement have been
similarly critical. One study of federal environmental enforcement re-
ported systematic enforcement failures such as:
1. heavy reliance on self monitoring;
2. infrequent auditing of the self-reporting sources;
3. a lack of rigorous enforcement designed to catch ongoing vio-
lations of those audits that do occur;
4. ad hoc invention of the definition of violation to a level less
stringent than the permits, even though the permits are designed to
be complied with 100% of the time;29 8
5. infrequent and reluctant use of self-monitoring records as the
basis for notices of violation, even though the records show that signif-
icant violations have been occurring; and
6. when violations are found and federal enforcement actions
taken, the penalties assessed appear to be so small as to be insignifi-
cant in a violator's income statement.2 9
Based on these findings the investigator concluded: "Efforts to
monitor regulated behavior appear to have been inadequate to the
task-a very difficult task in many instances-and typical enforcement
policies appear to have been insufficiently rigorous. Together these
inadequacies seem to have encouraged widespread violations of envi-
ronmental regulations." °°
Federal CWA enforcement remains limited. For instance, an au-
dit of EPA's toxic water pollution program for direct dischargers
found that in five of the seven core EPA toxic standard-setting and
compliance-identification activities, EPA's data either does not exist or
297. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-91-53, GAO TESTIMONY: OBSER-
VATIONS ON EPA AND STATE ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 1-2 (1991) (state-
ment of Richard L. Hembra, Director, Environmental Protection Issues, before the House
Subcommittee on Water Resources, Committee on Public Works and Transportation).
298. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1986).
299. Russell, supra note 292, at 243.
300. Id.
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fails to meet a significant number of EPA data quality criteria.301 In
77 percent of the 1217 cases sampled by the audit, the NPDES permit
did not regulate toxic pollutants emitted by the facilities.302 Further-
more, for eighty-five percent of the facilities studied, the majority of
the toxic pollutants discharged were not controlled through the per-
mit process.303 The study also found that the pollutant category with
the greatest number of toxic dischargers was also the least con-
trolled,30 4 even though many of these pollutants are "bioaccumulative
chemicals of concern."3 0 5
A series of audits of enforcement by the EPA Inspector General
concluded that
enforcement actions taken by EPA and the States were fre-
quently ineffective in returning major municipal and indus-
trial violators to compliance....
... In reviewing enforcement actions taken by the dele-
gated States, we found a pronounced preference for infor-
mal action such as telephone calls and notices of violation.
These informal actions are not inappropriate, but when the
same facility remains in violation of its permit year after year,
stronger enforcement actions are indicated. In many of the
cases we reviewed, the States continued to use informal
means to bring violators back into compliance with little
success.
In addition to EPA and States not taking increasingly
stringent enforcement actions to encourage compliance,
they did not follow the general enforcement guidance for
penalty assessment.... Violators must be convinced that an
assessed penalty places them in a worse economic position
than those who comply.
In our audits we found that in 46 of the 69 cases we
evaluated, the penalty assessments were not sufficient to re-
cover the economic benefit gained by non-compliance. Fre-
quently, preliminary calculations were reduced down to only
a small fraction of their calculated amount with little or no
documentation to support the reductions. When penalties
are reduced to below what it would cost to comply with envi-
ronmental laws, they encourage rather than deter non-coin-
301. GAO, WATER POLLUmON, supra note 18, at 44.
302. Id. at 53.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 54.
305. Id. at 67. The GAO study notes that EPA has placed some of these pollutants in
higher risk categories in recent proposals. Id.
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pliance. Small fines and lengthy time limits to achieve
compliance promote a "pay to pollute" mentality.
30 6
An EPA funded study of the compliance rates in the indirect dis-
charger program reveals similarly dismal performance.307 That study
found that fifty-four percent of significant industrial dischargers into
sewer systems were in "significant noncompliance"30' with discharge
standards and self-monitoring and reporting requirements or both.3°9
Additionally, eighty-one percent of the significant industrial user per-
mits violated at least one pre-treatment requirement.310
Even the regulated community does not believe that regulators
adequately enforce environmental laws. In a poll of corporate envi-
ronmental managers throughout the country, forty-nine percent be-
lieved that the federal government's enforcement of environmental
laws was inadequate.311 Even those managers who believed that the
level of enforcement was either adequate (twenty-six percent) or ex-
cessive (twenty percent) agreed that enforcement was inconsistent
and unfair.312 One respondent complained, "We comply, and then
see so many other [companies] that do not and never get penal-
ized."31 3 Another respondent indicated that EPA "would be more ef-
fective if [it] were better staffed. Small companies, some major
polluters, may never see an EPA inspector."3 1 4 Another manager
agreed, stating that because of a shortage of personnel, EPA staff "do
all their enforcement by mail." 15
In fact, EPA only conducts about ten percent of the inspections
of major NPDES dischargers, and none of the inspections of
nonmajor dischargers, leaving the balance of inspections to the
states.31 6 Even in states without approved programs, where EPA is the
sole governmental enforcer of the CWA, EPA activities are minimal.
306. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 687 (statement ofJohn Martin).
307. STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, Executive Summary, at v-vi.
308. The report employed EPA's definition of significant noncompliance. Id. at 2-1.
309. Id. The report was based on a statistical analysis of available data. The authors
reported 90% confidence that the value was between 32% and 75%. Id.
310. Id. at 2-2. There was 90% confidence that the value was between 57% and 100%.
311. BNA Special Report, Government Has Too Many Rules, Too Little Enforcement, Not
Enough Prevention, Environmental Managers Report in BNA Survey, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2386,
2386 (Feb. 14, 1992).
312. Id. at 2388. This includes those managers who blamed the results on inadequate
enforcement staff. Id.
313. I& at 2386.
314. I& at 2388.
315. Id.
316. Elder et al., supra note 25, at 10,021. At the time of his publication, Mr. Elder was
Director of the Office of Water Enforcement and Permits, EPA.
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For instance, in Texas, which does not have an approved program,
EPA has contracted with the Texas Water Commission to perform
62% of the inspections at the approximately 900 major dischargers in
the state."1 7 Although EPA performs the balance of the Texas inspec-
tions, it relies primarily on self-reported discharge monitoring reports
mailed to EPA by the permittees. 18 Prior to 1985, Texas's enforce-
ment record was poor, although it has improved somewhat since then.
According to the Chair of the Texas Water Commission, Texas has
"initiated 727 enforcement actions and issued 539 orders since 1985,
for a seventy-four percent completion rate. Over the same period of
time . . .EPA initiated sixty-four enforcement actions and issued
thirty-eight orders for a fifty-nine percent completion rate.,
3 19
In the early 1980s, EPA enforcement collapsed because of polit-
ical decisions made by the Reagan administration and EPA Adminis-
trator Gorsuch that limited EPA's enforcement efforts.32 ° In response
to public outcry and the embarrassment of widespread citizen suit
317. Id. at 10,033 (remarks of BJ. Wynne, HI). At the time, Mr. Wynne was Chair of the
Texas Water Commission. The Texas Water Commission has 15 district offices, about 300
field employees, and a budget the size of EPA Region VI, which is solely responsible for the
CWA in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and New Mexico (none of which have EPA-approved
NPDES programs) and oversight of Arkansas's approved program. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. Wynne cautioned, however, that "making a direct comparison is impossible be-
cause of the many other intangible factors involved." Id.
320. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 37, at 870-72. Boyer and Meidinger explain that
the wave of citizen suits in the 1980s was motivated, in part, by the perception that "the first
Reagan Administration was rapidly undermining compliance with environmental laws."
Id. at 870. This perception was fed by managerial turmoil at EPA, scandals forcing high-
level EPA officials to resign, and by reductions in the numerical indicators used to measure
compliance and enforcement. Id. Case referrals from EPA to the Department of Justice
dropped dramatically, and investment in new pollution control equipment declined as
well. Id. at 870-71. Boyer and Meidinger do note, however, that other forces played a part
in the private enforcement movement, such as the leadership of the citizen suit movement
and changes in beliefs relating to compliance and enforcement. Id. at 872. EPA critics at
the time concluded that this lack of enforcement would result in a collapse in compliance
and that
[iun the long run the massive loss of voluntary compliance is the most harmful
effect of this failure to implement the law in the 1980s. Once firms lose confi-
dence that their competitors are complying, they too will stop. Regaining the
confidence of hundreds of thousands of business operators is an enormously diffi-
cult, very expensive, and painfully slow undertaking. The nation's small force of
environmental safety officers, armed with the key fairness argument that everyone
should do their share, could deal effectively with a handful of noncompliers. Ask-
ing them to deal with almost everyone, especially with the fairness argument
turned against them, is to ask the impossible and thereby insure failure.
Id. at 871 n.95.
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prosecution of major polluters,3 21 EPA strengthened its civil enforce-
ment efforts, which rose to a peak in 1990, but have since declined.3 22
This inadequacy in enforcement is not due to lack of a good faith
effort, but because of significant resource limitations, which never will
go away. In contrast, citizen suit activity has not diminished since its
increase in the early 1980s, and now accounts annually for almost five
times the number ofjudicial actions as the federal government, and is
almost equal to the total of all state judicial actions combined.323
B. Civil Penalties, Economic Benefit, and Deterrence
1. EPA and Civil Penalties: Theory vs. Practice. -Because EPA and
state enforcement resources are so limited, regulators must get the
maximum deterrent impact from each enforcement action in order to
motivate widespread voluntary compliance. To accomplish this, each
action must reliably result in civil penalties that (1) deprive the viola-
tor of all economic benefits derived from the violations and (2) place
the violator in a significantly worse position than it would have been if
it had complied. 24 Unfortunately, EPA resolves ninety percent of all
CWA compliance actions by settlement. Settlement is the quickest
and easiest method of meeting EPA case load volume performance
criteria, but often results in penalties so low that the violators econom-
ically benefit from their violations.32 5 A review of EPA and state pen-
alty practices between 1988 and 1990 by the GAO documented
numerous cases in which EPA regional offices and states had not fol-
lowed the Agency's penalty policy and had assessed low penalties, or
321. Miller, supra note 37, at 10,314. In late 1982 or early 1983, the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) began a national CWA enforcement effort in response to the
lack of EPA enforcement during the Gorsuch era. NRDC hoped to create new law, to show
local groups that citizen suits could be brought on a sustained basis, and to embarrass EPA
because of its terrible enforcement record. Interview with James Simon, Esq., then Direc-
tor of the Enforcement Project of the Natural Resources Defense Council (Mar. 21, 1989).
NRDC hoped that EPA might take steps to improve its record, and stop perceived deals
between industry and EPA-approved states. Id. NRDC's approach was to pick a state,
screen through the DMRs to find the most serious CWA violators, send out a 60-day notice
of suit letter, attempt to negotiate settlements and then sue if necessary.
322. In FY 1989, EPA's peak year, EPA administrative actions and referrals to the De-
partment of Justice under all environmental laws totaled 4500; in FY 1990, 4179; in FY
1991, 4318; FY 1992, 4028; and FY 1993, 4141. By comparison, in FY 1982, the figure was
976. Criminal enforcement has steadily risen from 20 referrals to DOJ in FY 1982 to 140 in
FY 1993. ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1993, supra note T-2 of Table 1, app. Histori-
cal Enforcement Data.
323. See supra Table 1, Civil Penalty Cases.
324. See supra notes 292-296.
325. Energy and Environment Study Institute, EPA Enforcement Policies Reviewed, ENERGY
AND ENV'T STUDY INST. WKLY. BULL, June 17, 1991, at.Bll.
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none at all, for significant violations.3 2 6 Although total penalties as-
sessed by the Agency increased in FY 1990, the amounts, for the most
part, still show little relationship to the economic benefit of the
violation.327
For instance, in 65% of the 685 cases evaluated, EPA did not
know the amount of the violator's economic benefit.328 This problem
is even more pronounced when judicial cases are compared with ad-
ministrative actions. Eighty percent of judicial cases documented the
violator's economic benefit, while only twenty-five percent of the ad-
ministrative cases, which comprise ninety percent of all EPA enforce-
ment actions, had economic benefit information in the file. 329 The
Agency cannot collect the economic benefit derived if it does not
know the amount. Significantly, in eighty-five percent of the cases in
which the economic benefit calculations were documented, EPA's fi-
nal penalty assessments were greater than or equal to the economic
benefit enjoyed by the violator.3
Benefit recovery performance in the states is considerably worse
than EPA's. The states, which are responsible for seventy percent of
all government enforcement actions, regularly do not recover eco-
nomic benefits through penalties.3 3 ' GAO's review of some 1100 state
enforcement actions in 1988 and 1989 revealed that over 50% of the
violators paid no penalty at all, and those penalties which were as-
sessed were far below the economic benefit enjoyed by the violator.3 32
For example, a violator which exceeded its permit limits for over six
years, ultimately was assessed a penalty of $15,000 even though EPA
calculated the economic benefit alone to be $231 ,000.333 Two months
later the facility again was violating its permit limits .3
When an administrative action results in a compliance order with
no civil penalties, violators will often continue their pollution un-
326. GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 181, at 4. The reviews covered
NPDES, pretreatment, oil pollution, Clean Air Act, and Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (hazardous waste) programs, covering 10 EPA regions, 22 states, 685 EPA cases,
and 1100 state actions. Id. at 4-6.
327. Id. at 5. These results hold true for penalties assessed by EPA and, according to
available data, for state penalties as well. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 6.
330. Id
331. Id. at 1. States fail to do so even though in the absence of adequate penalties
violators repeat their violations. Id.
332. Id. at 6.
333. Id. at 6-7. EPA did not intervene in the case on the grounds of inadequate penalty.
See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
334. Id. at 7.
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abated, causing serious environmental contamination, and economic
hardship to the public and competitors. A prominent example is
Avtex, a company in serious violation of several environmental laws
for over nine years, with almost 2400 documented violations and sev-
eral state administrative orders against it."35 The state did not revoke
the facility's permit until it discovered that the facility was discharging
a toxic substance, PCBs, into the local water.33 6 The company is now
bankrupt, the site is on EPA's National Priority List under CERCLA,
and the clean up costs will be extremely expensive. 3 7 These public
damages were compounded by the market distortion caused by inade-
quate enforcement. One competitor complained that it had spent
over $30 million on pollution control equipment, but Avtex did not
and thereby was able to underprice the law-abiding competitor in the
rayon market.338
The GAO report noted that, in interviews, EPA staff supported a
strong penalty policy that could serve as a deterrent to violations and a
leveler of the economic playing field. At the same time, however, the
GAO found, for a variety of reasons, a poor prognosis for improve-
ments in penalty assessment and EPA oversight of state penalties.339
First, EPA has limited civil enforcement resources, which are likely to
decrease in the foreseeable future .3 1 Second, EPA standards for mea-
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 4, 14.
340. Id. at 10. The only recent increase in enforcement resources has been in criminal
investigation and prosecutions, where EPA is best able to leverage enforcement activity
into public warnings that increase deterrence. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines make it
probable that defendants will receive significant terms of imprisonment. As the one pen-
alty that owners and operators of violating facilities cannot pass on to customers, imprison-
ment deters egregious violations. See, e.g., United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bogas, 920
F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1990). However, criminal prosecution for relatively "minor" violations
may be a nuclear deterrent: too big a weapon to motivate widespread voluntary compli-
ance. Arbitrary, scattered use of criminal enforcement powers may be viewed as an abuse
of the moral authority behind environmental laws which may create a backlash of resist-
ance to the appropriateness of the substantive environmental laws. Pollution harms
human health and the environment, but its regulation is perceived as burdening produc-
tive economic behavior. The result is moral ambiguity in environmental laws which de-
clare almost all civil violations to be criminal, (e.g., CWA § 309(b)) but which do not clearly
distinguish in the statute between bad or morally offensive conduct (criminal) and civil
violations. This wide criminal net may prevent "bad" violators from avoiding government
prosecution on a technicality, but in preventing loopholes the law expands the universe of
'criminal" conduct to include almost all civil violations. To the extent the government
overuses criminal tools by prosecuting activity that is beyond public agreement on what is
morally offensive or deviant behavior worthy of criminal prosecution, it may lose public
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suring state performance create enormous pressure to settle cases
quickly through routine compliance orders and penalties small
enough to avoid challenge by the violator because of the premium
placed on the numbers of cases resolved.141
To assess an appropriate penalty takes considerable time and ef-
fort. The economic benefit calculation is information intensive, re-
quiring extensive documentation from the violator as well as expert
evaluation of the acquisition, operation, and management costs of the
proper equipment for compliance and pollution reduction. 342 Then
the gravity penalty factors must be considered. This analysis is time
consuming and labor intensive for the litigants and for the judicial or
administrative decision-maker.3 43 Because EPA's resource allocation
to the states is determined by EPA's "timely and appropriate" action
criteria, states are reluctant to delay settlements merely to obtain
higher penalties.34 Moreover, as states make higher penalty assess-
ments, the stakes to the discharger rise proportionately, motivating
the discharger to litigate both its liability and the penalty more vigor-
support. Hawkins suggests that "the formal processes of the law . . . be employed only
where a regulatory agency can be sure they rest upon the secure foundation of a perceived
moral consensus." HAWKINS, supra note 68, at 207; see also HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrTs
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249-59, 356-63 (1968) (questioning the wisdom of using crimi-
nal sanctions to enforce economic regulation by making regulated business practices "im-
moral" that were previously accepted as routine); Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating
Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 Lov. L.A.
L. REv. 867, 879-91 (1994) (concluding that environmental law has assimilated so poorly
into criminal law because policy makers have done a poor job of considering the values,
purposes and limitations of criminal law; instead, they have "criminalized virtually all envi-
ronmental violations" and, in addition, prosecutors have shown a lack of expertise in both
environmental law and criminal enforcement).
341. Marsh Remarks, supra note 112.
342. This evaluation includes review of corporate environmental management practices
generally, so that equipment is not merely installed, but properly operated and maintained
over time.
343. Merely mastering EPA's extensive penalty policies and guidance documents is a
major undertaking. For examples ofjudicial efforts in assessing penalties that suggest the
amount of work involved, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. &
Mktg., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 2 F.3d 493 (3d Cir.
1993); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1158 (D.N.J. 1989), affid in part, rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985), af]d, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 484
U.S. 49 (1987).
344. Marsh Remarks, supra note 112. State agencies also wish to avoid being accused of
funding their operations with civil penalties; such accusations are possible even if the pen-
alties go into the general fund. See Gerald Esposito, Director of Water, Delaware Depart-
ment of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, Lecture on State Perspectives
on Enforcement of Environmental Law at Widener University School of Law (Nov. 25,
1992) [hereinafter Esposito Lecture]; Spalding Remarks, supra note 108.
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ously. This more intensive litigation absorbs precious enforcement re-
sources, thereby reducing the volume of cases the state can pursue. 345
The same pressures created by litigation exist in each of EPA's
regions, which results in widely divergent penalty practices across the
regions 4.3 ' For instance, in Fiscal Year 1991, the mean judicial penalty
nationally was $100,000 but the mean administrative penalty nation-
ally was only $12,000. Moreover, the disparity of median civil penal-
ties by region was enormous, ranging, for judicial penalties, from a
low of $5000 to a high of $450,000, and for administrative penalties,
from a low of $6433 to a high of $57,000. 47
The pressures created by the costs of litigation apply to an even
greater extent when an agency is deciding whether to pursue a case
judicially or administratively. By its very nature, judicial litigation is
much more time consuming and labor intensive than administrative
litigation. Also, to get to court, EPA must refer cases to DOJ, which
means convincing another agency to pursue the case, a time consum-
ing and unpleasant process that is only successful an average of sev-
enty-eight percent of the time.' Additionally, because the median
1992 judicially assessed penalty was 37.5 times larger than the median
345. Additionally, as the stakes rise for future violations, astute dischargers may fight
stringent permit terms more vigorously to minimize compliance thresholds and thereby
reduce violations and exposure to enforcement sanctions.
346. COMPLIANCE POLICY AND PLANNING BRANCH, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MAN-
AGEMENT REPORT ON EPA FEDERAL PENALTY PRACmncas FY 1991 26 (1992).
347. Id.
Median Judicial Penalties Median Administrative Penalties
Region 7 $5,000 Region 4 $6,433
Region 10 5,000 Region 10 7,000
Region 6 25,000 Region 9 9,000
Region 8 70,000 Region 2 12,000
Region 2 100,000 Region 8 12,750
Region 3 105,000 Region 6 15,000
Region 1 106,000 Region 1 18,000
Region 5 115,000 Region 7 30,808
Region 4 124,944 Region 5 50,000
Region 9 450,000 Region 3 57,500
348. ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992, supra note 33. DOJ data reports a suc-
cess rate of 83%. DOJ STATISTICAL REPORT FY 1993, supra note 35, at 47. Neither EPA nor
DOJ report how many case referrals DOJ declines to prosecute. However, a comparison of
EPA referral statistics with DOJ case filing statistics shows that DOJ files fewer cases in
federal court than EPA refers to it:
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administrative penalty, 4 9 violators are much more likely to resist liti-
gation forcefully. However, only judicially assessed penalties have a
deterrent effect. The public nature of the large penalty assessments
leads to their rapid dissemination to environmental lawyers and their
clients, which immediately deters violations by others who wish to
avoid the expense and public humiliation of judicially assessed penal-
ties. In contrast, administratively assessed penalties are both too small
and too private to motivate voluntary compliance.
For all practical purposes, administrative enforcement activity is
not subject to public scrutiny;... thus there is no independent public
check on state and federal enforcement practices. In comparison, the
judicial actions are open to the public. The DOJ policy to settle CWA
cases only by consent orders signed by a district courtjudge enhances
the public nature of judicial enforcement. Moreover, DOJ will not
even submit the consent order to the court until it has given the pub-
lic notice of the proposed settlement in the Federal Register and an
opportunity to comment, a process which may cause DOJ or the court
% of EPA
Fiscal Year EPA Referrals DOJ Case Fiings Cases Filed
1993 84 (DOJ reports 39 46.4% (68.4%
only 57 referrals) using DOJ data)
1992 77 56 72.7%
1991 91 83 91.2%
1990 87 72 82.7%
1989 94 87 92.5%
349. ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992, supra note 33, app. National Penalty Re-
port FY 1992, at 10.
Judicial Administrative
Fiscal Year Median Penalty Median Penalty Difference
1992 $225,000 $6,000 37.5 times
1991 $100,000 $12,000 8.3
1990 $63,000 $10,650 6
1989 $55,000 $10,000 5.5
Id.; ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTs FY 1991, supra note T-7 of Table 1, app. National
Penalty Report FY 1991, at 11; OVERVIEW OF PENALTY PRACTICES, supra note T-9 of Table 1.
EPA's FY 1993 enforcement report does not include this data for 1993.
350. For instance, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) specifically exempts from
disclosure most records and information compiled for law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (7) (1988). Although CWA § 309(g) (4), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (4) mandates public
notice and opportunity to comment on contested administrative penalty actions, the same
is not true of many state programs. Moreover, for EPA and the states, administrative com-
pliance orders are negotiated, drafted and executed outside of the public's eye. See, e.g.,
Brant Constr. Co. v. EPA, 778 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1985).
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to rethink the settlement terms.35 1 Additionally, the district court
judge may sign the consent order only if it is in the public interest.3 52
2. States and Civil Penalties: The Unsupervised "Race to the Bot-
tom. "--Not only are state administrative penalty matters essentially
hidden from public view, but many states simply do not believe in
using civil penalties for past noncompliance. Rather, they believe
public policy is better served when they work with violators to obtain
compliance.353 A typical example is Delaware, where the environmen-
tal agency is less interested in assessing penalties than in protecting
natural resources, and as a matter of policy, is willing to forego or
reduce civil penalties to obtain compliance schedule agreements.5 54
This philosophy is particularly understandable in a state where about
twenty-five percent of the NPDES permittees are municipalities with
limited staffs and budgets and political leaders that have strong polit-
ical influence in the state.355 Even if such a state agency could force
municipalities to comply with their permits, assessing significant civil
penalties, which get passed on to voters, is difficult politically.356
A significant number of states are reluctant to impose civil penal-
ties for fear of creating a bad business climate.357 These states view
civil penalties as causing present businesses to leave while dissuading
other businesses from moving into the state. Businesses may perceive
stringent state enforcement, such as large visible civil penalties, as cre-
ating a bad business environment, particularly if other states use lax
enforcement as a lure for business relocation. These competitive fears
even drive environmental enforcement behavior at the local govern-
ment level, where publicly owned treatment works (POTW), the CWA
351. See, e.g., United States v. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. 1400, 1404 (D. Colo. 1994)
(noting EPA reaction to public comments on a proposed consent order); 28 C.F.R. § 50.7
(1994).
352. Id. at 1401-02; see aLso Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. 553, 567 (D. Utah
1992), appeal dismissed, 14 F.3d 1489 (10th Cir. 1994).
353. GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 181, at 2.
354. Esposito Lecture, supra note 344.
355. Gerald Esposito, Director of Water, Delaware Department of Natural Resources
and Environment, Address to Environmental Law Section, Delaware State Bar Association
(Oct. 10, 1992). These political leaders typically try to resist complying with orders agreed
to by prior administrations. Id.
356. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Lower Bucks County Mun. Auth., No. Civ. A. 86-7220, 1988 WL
48552 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 877 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 25 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1921 (D.P.R. 1987).
357. GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 181, at 8. One North Carolina
official told GAO that assessing economic benefit-based civil penalties against a violator
might put the facility at a competitive disadvantage with businesses in states without an
economic benefit penalty policy. See also Marsh Remarks, supra note 112; Spalding Re-
marks, supra note 108.
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euphemism for public sewage treatment plants, are often reluctant to
assess penalties on industrial dischargers that violate federal, state, or
POTW-established pretreatment standards and indirect discharger
limitations. 58 These dischargers are often significant employers in
the community and are necessary sources of the POTW's user fees,
neither of which a municipality wishes to jeopardize. Because munici-
palities know that states are unlikely, for obvious and powerful polit-
ical reasons, to enforce diligently violations by a POTW of its NPDES
permit or of its indirect discharger program, the municipality has lit-
tie motivation to enforce stringently against its economically and polit-
ically important users. If the POTW's pollution is sent downstream,
the community derives no local benefit from enforcement. It is thus
not surprising that most of the significant industrial users of POTWs
are in violation of some federal requirements. 59
This local ambivalence towards enforcement is mirrored in the
similarly ambivalent relationship between EPA and the states regard-
ing economic benefit penalty policies. Although we may now have
uniform, federal, technology-based, minimum standards for water pol-
lution from point sources, states retain almost unbridled enforcement
discretion. EPA merely encourages, but does not require, states to
adopt a penalty policy that recovers the economic benefit of noncom-
pliance. Not surprisingly, less than half of the approved state pro-
grams have adopted such penalty policies, and the remaining
approved states are unlikely to do so.s6
Even within EPA, views on penalties differ. Some regions strongly
endorse the EPA penalty policy, while others de-emphasize penalties
in favor of working with violators to obtain compliance, obstensibly in
the belief that this approach will bring a larger number of facilities
into compliance. 61 Unfortunately, this latter approach often signals
to the regulated community that it need not comply until enforce-
358. Industries that send their water pollution to POTWs for treatment are regulated by
the CWA's indirect discharger program. See CWA § 307(b)-(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)-(e).
359. STATIs-rICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 2-2. Of the more than 15,000 POTWs in
the United States only about 1500, the major plants which receive an estimated 82% of the
industrial wastewater sent to POTWs, are required to implement pretreatment programs.
The remaining 18% of the industrial indirect discharges escape all pretreatment require-
ments. According to Professor Houck, "[v]irtually every review of the pretreatment pro-
gram has rated it a failure." Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's
Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REv. 358, 386 (1988). He concludes, "Even the most vigorous de-
fender of federalism has to blush at a program that turns the responsibility for regulating
nearly half the toxic pollution discharged in this county over to 15,000 disparate, local
POTWs." Id. at 387-88.
360. GAO, ENviRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 181, at 2.
361. Id.
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ment begins. As the regulated community recognizes that EPA and
the states are unlikely to take them to court or even to an administra-
tive hearing, violators will be less willing to settle on terms favorable to
the government, thus further undermining the economic incentive to
comply voluntarily. This failure to settle in turn increases the work
load on already overworked agency enforcement staff. Moreover, the
numerical program targets, such as the number of enforcement mat-
ters handled in a year, that are the performance measurement criteria
for individual staff members and for the agency as a whole, motivate
quick settlements with low penalties in lieu of extended litigation.
Finally, from an information-management perspective, it is un-
likely that EPA oversight of regional or state penalty practices will or
can improve significantly because EPA headquarters has insufficient
information with which to oversee regional practices, let alone the
state practices. Audits and reviews of penalty practices are labor inten-
sive and time consuming. Economic benefit or gravity penalty analysis
documentation often does not exist, particularly in administrative
cases. Penalty reviews are so infrequent and so individually detailed,
that the reviews cannot discover overall patterns and trends in pro-
grams, regions, or states.3 62 Moreover, EPA does not collect gravity
penalty component analyses or explanations as to why the penalty in
the final settlement was reduced from the minimum economic benefit
and gravity based penalty. 63 Finally, EPA oversight of trends in the
states is virtually non-existent. EPA does not collect data on state pen-
alty practices, and the information is not easily available, if at all, from
the state agencies themselves. 3"
V. THE ROLE OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT IN THE TRIANGULAR
FEDERAL SYSTEM
In addition to the allocation of responsibility between federal and
state governments, the CWA also allocates enforcement power among
the public and private sectors by giving private citizens authority to
enforce under CWA section 505.36 This section of the Article will
examine the federal/citizen and the state/citizen legs of the CWA en-
forcement triangle to determine whether citizens, as private attorneys
general, are fortifiers of the national enforcement of a national law to
achieve national goals, or whether they are secondary enforcers sub-
362. Id, at 9.
363. Id. This data would be collected in EPA's regional case data on minimum eco-
nomic benefit calculations. Id.
364. Id. at 30.
365. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
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servient to state enforcement policies-policies that define the CWA
as a state-oriented law whose enforcement is suppressed by economic
competition among states. In conducting this analysis, this part of the
Article will first outline citizen suit authority under section 505. The
Article next will discuss the evolving role of citizen suits as the nation's
CWA enforcement safety net, including an empirical comparison of
government and citizen suit activity and an analysis of the policy issues
surrounding citizen enforcement. Then the Article will discuss the
major legal obstacles to citizen suits created when government and
citizen enforcement efforts overlap. Finally, the Article will suggest
changes in the law that will best promote the continued, healthy par-
ticipation of citizens in the enforcement system as a valuable, neces-
sary partner with federal and state governments.
A. Citizen Suits in the CWA Enforcement Structure
Since 1972, the CWA has authorized citizens to act as private at-
torneys general to enforce CWA violations that EPA or the states were
unwilling or unable to prosecute. 66 Congress included the citizen
suit power so that "if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exer-
cise their enforcement responsibility, the public is provided the right
to seek vigorous enforcement action."3 67 This power remained largely
dormant until EPA slashed its CWA enforcement efforts in the early
1980s.3 "8
Public interest environmental groups such as Natural Resources
Defense Council, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, NewJersey Public
Interest Research Group, and others responded by actively using CWA
citizen suits as an enforcement too1369 -exactly as Congress had in-
366. Id.
367. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3730 (emphasis added).
368. In late 1983, GAO reported a significant decline in federal enforcement, U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, GAO/RCED-84-53, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLY-
ING WITH EPA POLLUTION CONTROL PERMrrs (1983), a fact EPA publicly acknowledged a
few months later:
[R]egardless of how one measures, regardless of how one counts, regardless of
whether you look at the permitees in a particular category over 3 months, 12
months or 18 months, the trend is, in fact, the same: We continue to see a signifi-
cant degree of noncompliance by permittees and we continue to see EPA and the
States falling behind in their workload.
Hearings on Implementation of the Federal Clean Water Act Before the Subcomm. on Investigation
and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51
(1984) (testimony ofJack E. Ravan, Assistant Administrator for Water, EPA).
369. Prior to this, citizen suits were primarily "agency-forcing," in that they were brought
against EPA under CWA § 505(a) (2) for its failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty,
such as the timely promulgation of congressionally mandated regulations. 33 U.S.C.
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tended: "Citizen suits are a proven enforcement tool. They operate
as Congress intended-to both spur and [as a] supplement to govern-
ment enforcement actions. They have deterred violators and
achieved significant compliance gains."370
The burst of citizen suit activity in the early 1980s did spur EPA's
enforcement. EPA judicial enforcement efforts rose dramatically,
from 37 referrals to DOJ in FY 1981, to a high of 123 in FY 1988, but
has dropped steadily since then to 57 referrals in FY 1993.371 Given
EPA's limited CWA enforcement resources, the Agency's current ef-
forts are at peak capacity, and it is unrealistic to expect its CWA en-
forcement resources or its level of activity to increase in the future. 72
State judicial enforcement activity has followed a pattern similar to the
experience at EPA. In 1985, the first year for which data is available,
states brought 137judicial actions, rising to a high of 687 in FY 1988,
and dropping steadily thereafter to 204 in FY 1992 although rising to
383 actions in FY 1993.s vs These state enforcement statistics are ag-
gregated numbers; in fact, some states, particularly many in the South
and Southwest, bring few enforcement actions against CWA viola-
tors.3 74 In comparison, citizen suit activity in PY 1981 generated only
six 60-day notices, which rose to 178 in FY 1984, and since the late
1980s, citizen activity has generated between 200 and 300 notices per
year 5.37  Given the limited resources of most states, weak programs in
many states facing increased unfunded federal mandates, and the
funding and political pressures in states with strong programs, state
enforcement activity certainly will not increase, and may in fact de-
crease, particularly if a race-to-the-bottom begins in earnest. More-
§ 1365(a) (2). See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (attempting to
require EPA to place strip mines on list of pollutant sources); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976) (requiring EPA to place lead on its list
of air pollutants); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (compel-
ling promulgation of regulations covering radionuclide emission standards).
370. S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1985).
371. ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1993, supra note T-2 of Table 1, app. Historical
Enforcement Data; DOJ STATISTICAL REPORT FY 1993, supra note 35, at 47. DOJ reports
that EPA referred 57 CWA civil cases in FY 1993, but EPA's report indicates that it referred
84 civil water cases. No explanation is given for this difference, but it may be explained by
EPA's inclusion of cases arising under the Safe Drinking Water Act and other non-CWA
matters in its water referral statistics.
372. Telephone Interview with Mary St. Peter, Attorney/Adviser, Office of Enforcement
for Water, EPA (Mar. 28, 1994) [hereinafter St. Peter Interviewv].
373. ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1993, supra note T-2 of Table 1, app. Historical
Data. Although state and federal water-related judicial referrals increased in FY 1993, the
increase may have been at the expense of Clean Air Act judicial enforcement, which
dropped about 33% in the states and over 45% at the federal level. Id.
374. St. Peter Interview, supra note 372.
375. Id.
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over, for obvious budgetary reasons, EPA oversight of state programs
is not likely to increase. At present, EPA rarely overfiles when an ap-
proved state has taken some action; if the state has obtained a consent
order with a compliance schedule, EPA is unlikely to act simply be-
cause no or low civil penalties are assessed. 76
Amazingly, as of 1993, citizen suit judicial enforcement nearly
equalled all CWA judicial enforcement efforts brought throughout
the nation by all the states and the federal government combined.377
Because of the realities of enforcement at the federal level, EPA and
DOJ have become openly supportive of citizen suits, which signifi-
cantly augment federal government enforcement efforts.3 78 However,
because EPA efforts are insufficient to level the national enforcement
playing field, states trying to create or maintain favorable business cli-
mates do not welcome the supplemental efforts of citizen suits, and in
fact, these states are openly hostile to citizen efforts to challenge de
minimis state enforcement.
Studies of state enforcement have documented the serious inade-
quacies of their enforcement efforts-even in states considered to be
committed to environmental protection. 379 A review of these studies
reveals that:
a) discharge violations, even if chronic, are routinely ignored;
b) reporting violations, particularly omissions of pollution dis-
charge data, are treated by government regulators as unimportant
and are largely unenforced;
c) noncompliance levels are high;
d) enforcement actions are usually limited to telephone calls or
notice of violation letters; and
e) citizens use the CWA citizen suit provisions to bring violators
into compliance when state and federal agencies have failed to do
SO.
3 8 0
376. Id.
377. See supra Table 1.
378. ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990s, supra note 121, at 5-5.
379. For a list of studies, see sources infra note 380.
380. Reauthorization of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Wor*s and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
1716-27 (1991) [hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of Robert Stuart, Program Direc-
tor, NewJersey Public Interest Research Group). The written statement accompanying the
testimony noted that it was based on the following reports:
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, DUMPING ON THE CLEAN WATER ACT: A
CALIFORNIA PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT WORKS SURVEY (1988); ILLINOIS PUBLIC INTEREST
RESEARCH GROUP, AN INVESTIGATION OF CLEAN WATER ENFORCEMENT IN ILLINOIS (1988);
INFORM, INC., TRACING A RIVER'S TOXIC POLLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE HUDSON (1985);
NEWJERSEY PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP (NJPIRG), POLLUTERS PLAYGROUND: AN IN-
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One of the important lessons citizen suits have taught is that "pri-
vate industry, left to its own initiative, will procrastinate indefinitely,
even at the expense of the environment, [and] the government agen-
cies empowered with protecting the environment are far from diligent
in that regard.""8 1 Only from the impetus of citizen suits do govern-
ment agencies take meaningful enforcement action.
Unfortunately, when the government takes an enforcement ac-
tion, it does not mean necessarily that CWA violations actually end.
Typical federal and state enforcement consists of administratively is-
sued consent orders comprised of extended compliance schedules
and de minimis civil penalties, under which pollution can remain un-
abated for years.3" 2 Violations of the compliance schedules in the or-
ders are often met with wrist slaps and further lengthy extensions. 383
Because EPA records consider a discharger subject to a compliance
order as being in compliance, despite unabated pollution during the
life of the order, compliance schedules can also lead to government
VESTIGATION OF WATER POLLUTION VIOLATIONS IN NEW JERSEY (1988); NJPIRG, ENFORCE-
MENT UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT BY THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY REGION II, 1975-1980 (1981); PROJECT ENVIRONMENT FOUNDATION, EN-
VIRONMENTAL AUDIT: A REPORT ON THE WATER QUALITY DIVISION OF THE MINNESOTA POLLU-
TION CONTROL AGENCY (1990); SAVE THE BAY, INC., ZERO TOLERANCE: REDUCING Toxic
POLLUTION IN NARRAGANSETT BAY (1989); SAVE THE BAY, INC., DOWN THE DRAIN: Toxic
POLLUTION AND THE STATUS OF PRETREATMENT IN RHODE ISLAND (1986); and WATERSHED
ASSOCIATION OF THE DELAWARE RIVER, PROJECT OUTFALL: AN INVESTIGATION OF MUNICIPAL
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS IN THE DELAWARE RIVER WATERSHED (1990).
381. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1158, 1163-64 (D.N.J. 1988), af/'d in part, rev'd in par, 913 F.2d 64 (3d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991). In this citizen suit, which resulted in a civil
penalty payable to the United States of $4.2 million, id. at 1160, and injunctive relief, id. at
1159, the violator consented in 1977 to an EPA order to upgrade its water treatment plant
and to pay a $10,000 civil penalty for past violations. Id. at 1164. When seven years later
the violator had not upgraded its plant and was still regularly violating the CWA, the citi-
zens filed suit. Id. at 1165. Three years later, as a result of the citizen suit, and fully 10
years after EPA's consent order, the violator finally began to install its treatment plant
upgrades. Id. at 1162.
382. See id. at 1159-60.
383. See, e.g., id.; see also Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 1095 (1995). In this case, a state agency sent the violator
notices of discharge violations from 1988 to 1991, id. at 377, and entered into an Adminis-
trative Consent Order in 1991 calling for compliance and a $1,000 civil penalty. Id. at 378.
The agency amended the order several times, extending the compliance date to late 1993,
eliminating the effluent limitation for zinc (the toxic pollutant of concern in the case),
and imposing a de minimis $500 civil penalty for each extension. Id. These penalties were
to cover all violations of both the CWA and the consent order for the previous 5 years. Id.
Because the de minimis penalties were consistent with standard state practice, the court
held that they reflected diligent prosecution of an enforcement action by the state agency.
Id. at 380.
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reports overstating the levels of compliance across the country.3 84 If
one were to include these dischargers on current lists of significant
noncompliers, then the reported level of noncompliance would jump
dramatically. Such a calculation for major municipal dischargers re-
vealed large increases in rates in Pennsylvania, Texas, Maryland, Ha-
waii, and in virtually all other states reviewed."8 5
Most troubling is that the compliance orders, which enable viola-
tors to delay compliance and to avoid civil penalties for present and
past violations, are often prompted by the state's and polluter's desire
to preempt citizen suits after the polluter receives a 60-day letter.
Many states routinely preempt citizen suits by entering into mild en-
forcement consent orders after the citizen group sends 60-day notices
to a violator who had not been previously subject to state enforcement
attention.8 6 Because states know that EPA resources are so thin that
EPA will not overfile or interfere, 3 1 they can easily keep enforcement
lax while simultaneously preempting citizen suits, particularly in light
of several recent court decisions hostile to citizen enforcement.388
The result is growing demoralization among public interest groups,
diminished deterrence of violators, corrosion of the nation's enforce-
ment system, and marked increase in EPA reliance on criminal en-
forcement to optimize the deterrent effect of limited EPA
enforcement resources. 389 To the extent the law permits weak con-
sent orders to preempt citizen enforcement, the danger exists that the
384. EPA Inspector General John Martin has testified that:
Another peculiarity of the [EPA non-compliance] reporting system is that once a
violating facility agrees to take corrective action to bring it back into compliance,
it is taken off the list of violators. This occurs even though the facility may be
discharging the same level of pollutants as when it was on the list of [significant]
non-compliers. The violating facility is not reported on the list of significant non-
compliers as long as it is meeting an agreed upon schedule, although final correc-
tive action may be years away.
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 688 (testimony of John Martin).
385. House Hearings, supra note 380, at 1719-20 (testimony of Robert Stuart). In Hawaii,
the rates rose from 0% to 36%, in Maryland from 2% to 31%, in Pennsylvania from 7% to
36%, and in Texas from 7% to 15%. Id.
386. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 1995 WL
311983 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 1995) (where a polluter's attempt to preempt a citizen suit by draft-
ing a complaint, filing it in court, and paying the filing fee for the state's judicial action
against the polluter).
387. Even if EPA desired to overfile, its efforts might be precluded by resjudicata or by
CWA § 309(g) (6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6), or impaired by a district court's discretionary
stay of the action. See discussion supra Parts III.D.2, D.4.
388. See infra Part V.D.1.
389. See ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS FY 1992, supra note 33, app. Historical En-
forcement Data (showing increase in EPA criminal referrals from 20 in FY 1982 to 107 in
1992).
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power of citizen suits to spur enforcement and supplement govern-
ment efforts will be lost.
On the other hand, some commentators worry that citizen suits,
which enforce formally established, legally binding permit terms, may
discourage innovation by interfering with nonpublic, informal under-
standings between EPA and the regulated community. As a result,
they speculate that a mechanism under which industry may be willing
to try new pollution control technology may be lost.390 However,
these fears are unfounded because permits and even consent orders
can be written to allow innovation, and when done properly-follow-
ing the public processes of notice and opportunity to comment-will
shield the dischargers from any citizen suits.
Other critics complain that CWA citizen suits brought by the "en-
vironmentalist enforcement cartel" are economically inefficient.3 9 1
This "overenforcement" then begets pollution control expenditures
whose costs exceed the marginal benefits to society from the reduced
pollution, and thus diminishes the power of governmental discretion
to achieve economic efficiency by selectively not enforcing CWA viola-
tions.3 92 However, when Congress amended the pre-1972 FWPCA by
enacting the CWA, it specifically abandoned the prior water quality
based system, which placed judgments about the economically effi-
cient use of the nation's waters in the hands of waste discharges and
government enforcers and which was utterly unenforceable.393 In-
stead, Congress designed the CWA to require EPA to consider eco-
nomic efficiency of effluent limitations on an industry-wide basis.
This consideration is made at the regulatory stage after public notice
and opportunity for comment, when EPA promulgates regulations es-
tablishing national uniform minimum requirements to be imposed on
every discharger in that industrial category. 9 4
390. See, e.g., Greve, supra note 37, at 380 n.175 ("Pollution control equipment is often
installed on the basis of informal understandings between EPA and regulated firms. Such
understandings provide a means of advancing complicated technology.... The threat of
private enforcement proceedings may thwart such agreements ... ."). Blomquist, supra
note 41, at 404 (discussing arguments that "highlight the detrimental impact that citizen
suits can have on the informal administrative process of give and take, where sound regula-
tory standards require time, judgment, and efficient adjustment based on a number of
bargained-for practical considerations").
391. Greve, supra note 37, at 344-46.
392. Id.; see also Krent & Shenkman, supra note 41, at 1808-14.
393. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
394. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 73-78 (1980) (holding that
EPA is not required by the CWA to consider economic capability in granting variances
from its uniform standards); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 136
(1977) (holding that EPA has the authority under the CWA to issue industry-wide regula-
tions limiting discharges by existing chemical manufacturing plants); Weyerhaeuser v.
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Thus, the argument that the CWA should be made economically
efficient through the use of selective, discretionary government en-
forcement, shifts the power to establish legislative guidelines from
Congress to prosecutors.3 95 Even if government prosecutors were
charged with the responsibility to make the CWA economically effi-
cient, it would be just as hard to provide the necessary level of incen-
tives and criteria to enforcers to undertake an economically optimal
level of enforcement as it would be to draft environmental regulations
that are neither economically over-controlling nor under-control-
ling.3 96 Additionally, in empowering citizens as private attorneys gen-
eral to enforce CWA permit violations, Congress intended to limit the
ability of those in the regulated community to "capture" their regulat-
ing agencies.3 9 7 Congress did not want the regulated community to
use enforcement fora to debate, litigate or even raise economic effi-
ciency issues that EPA had resolved in its regulations.
Those who see the CWA as comprised of underinclusive rules and
negligible enforcement dismiss the economic efficiency criticism of
citizen suits: "Where economists (and to some extent, representatives
of the regulated industries) see the regulatory system caught up in
rigid rules and inefficient enforcement policies, observers who are
more sympathetic to the regulatory mission of the EPA instead see
laxity, indecision and drift." 9' Others find citizen enforcers merely to
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that if the cost/benefit relation-
ship of regulations is consistent throughout an industry, then EPA may impose uniform
regulations on an operator without regard to whether the operator can absorb the added
costs); see also Sanford E. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection
Agency, 62 IowA L. REv. 839, 842-64 (1977) (reviewing EPA's rule-making process under
the CWA as illustrated by the development of effluent guidelines for the corn wet milling
industry).
Economic efficiency is not a factor in the subsequent drafting or enforcement of
NPDES permits. Rather, NPDES permits simply incorporate EPA's national standards and
any more stringent water quality requirements by defining explicit, numerical effluent lim-
itations. Violations of such permits result in strict liability and are easily enforced.
395. Similarly, Justice Stevens has expressed concern over whether federal courts could
decline to use their discretionary equitable powers to enjoin undisputed violations of the
CWA. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 330-31 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
396. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 37, at 880-84.
397. According to capture theory, an agency is
co-opted by those it seeks to regulate, incorporating and reflecting their concerns
into its decision making in the interests of stability and self-preservation. The
shift is a subtle one in which the 'mores, attitudes, and thinking of those regu-
lated come to prevail in the approach and thinking' of many regulatory officials.
HAwKI s, supra note 68, at 3 (citations omitted).
398. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 37, at 884-89. The authors report that these obser-
vations of leniency have been corroborated by EPA officials. Id. at 386-89.
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be additional actors in a behavioral model of enforcement that ac-
knowledges that the actors in regulatory enforcement settings are ra-
tional persons who analyze possible outcomes and respond to
potential financial incentives and punishments "within complex social
and political structures which serve to create and distort incentives in
their own right." 99
B. Statutory Authority for Citizen Suits
The citizen suit provisions of the CWA contained in section 505
provide that any citizen may commence a civil action in federal dis-
trict court for injunctive relief and civil penalties against any person4 °0
who is alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation
under the CWA or in violation of an order issued by EPA or a state
"with respect to such a standard or limitation."4 ° ' The Supreme Court
has interpreted this language as limiting citizen enforcement to ac-
tions only against persons who are alleged to be either currently, in-
termittently or sporadically in violation of an effluent standard or
399. Id. at 889-95.
400. Under the CWA, "person" includes "(i) the United States, and (ii) any other gov-
ernment instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution." CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1).
401. CWA § 505(f) broadly defines "effluent standard and limitation" to include any
unlawful act under CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, which would include the discharge of a
pollutant without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f).
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limitation.4 °2 Only EPA, and not citizens, may obtain civil penalties
for wholly past violations of the CWA. °3
Congress envisioned that EPA and the states would be the pri-
mary enforcers of the CWA, and that citizens would fill any gaps in
government enforcement.40 4 To accomplish this, Congress made citi-
zen suits secondary to government enforcement by allowing timely
government actions to preempt citizen enforcement.
Under section 505(b)(1) (A), a citizen suit may not be com-
menced without giving the violator, the state, and EPA sixty days prior
402. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64
(1987). The Court held that the § 505(a) "alleged to be in violation" language establishes
the good faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation by the alleged polluter as
ajurisdictional prerequisite to a citizen suit. Id. at 64-65. Underlying facts that support the
allegation must be established for a citizen suit to survive a motion for summary judgment
and for the citizen to prevail at trial. Id. On remand, the court of appeals held that a
citizen may establish that the defendant is in violation "either (1) by proving violations that
continue on or after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in inter-
mittent or sporadic violations." Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwalmey, 844 F.2d 170,
171-72 (4th Cir. 1988). This jurisdictional limitation on citizen suits has resulted in sub-
stantially increased litigation as defendants increasingly raise this issue as a defense. See,
e.g., Connecticut Coastal Fishermen Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that citizen plaintiff's belief that gun club might discharge lead shot and
clay targets into the Long Island Sound was not sufficient to meet continuing violations
requirement where gun club had ceased operations); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that citizen plaintiff may re-
quest injunctive relief and civil penalties where defendant poultry processing plant contin-
ued violating the CWA after the filing date); Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey,
Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1538-40 (D.NJ. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 50
F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that citizen plaintiffs were not barred from seeking
penalties in addition to fines imposed by the state where the state fined the company for
discharge violations after the plaintiffs sent 60-day notice but before plaintiffs filed com-
plaint); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 719 F. Supp.
281 (D. Del. 1989) (holding that refinery's post-complaint discharge permit violations were
conclusive to determine that pre-complaint violations were either continuous or intermit-
tefit), order vacated in part by 906 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1990).
403. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 63. Compare CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) with CWA
§ 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). If the law of an EPA-approved state so provides, states may
seek civil penalties for wholly past violations of the EPA-approved state program NPDES
permit. Additionally, states may authorize citizens to enforce wholly past violations of state
NPDES permits in state courts; however, EPA-approved states need not authorize any state
law citizen suits under the state program.
404. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3730:
[T] he Committee concluded that the enforcement presence of the Federal gov-
ernment should be concurrent with the enforcement powers of the States. The
Committee does not intend this jurisdiction of the Federal government to sup-
plant state enforcement. Rather the Committee intends that the enforcement
power of the Federal government be available in cases where States ... are not
acting expeditiously and vigorously to enforce control requirements.
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notice of the alleged violation.4"' Nor may a citizen suit be com-
menced if EPA or the state has commenced, and is diligently prosecut-
ing, a civil or criminal action in a court to secure compliance with a
CWA standard, limitation, or order.40 6 Similarly, a citizen may not
seek civil penalties if EPA or the state has collected an administrative
penalty or has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, an adminis-
trative penalty assessment, unless the citizen suit was commenced
prior to the commencement of the administrative action or within 120
days of the 60-day notice if the 60-day notice was sent prior to the
administrative action.1 7 Once the citizen suit is commenced prop-
erly, a consent order cannot be entered without both EPA and the
United States Attorney General receiving forty-five days notice.4° a
Thus, in each case there are two opportunities for government and
citizen interest to conflict: at the beginning, when diligent govern-
ment prosecution can bar citizen enforcement, and at the end, when
the United States can oppose the entry of a consent decree settling
the case between the citizen and the polluter.
C. Legal Issues at the Government/Citizen Interface: The "Diligent
Prosecution" Bar
1. What is a "Court"?-A citizen suit is barred under CWA sec-
tion 505 (b) (1) (B) if EPA or a "state has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States or
a state."409 The simple language "in a court" has created a split of
authority over whether an administrative enforcement action is an ac-
tion in a court.
a. The "Functional Equivalence" Rule.-One line of cases has
developed out of the Third Circuit's decisions in Baughman v. Bradford
Coal Co.410 and Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
405. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b) (1) (A). Strict compliance with the 60-day notice requirement
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the citizen suit. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493
U.S. 20, 25-26 (1989) (interpreting the 60-day notice requirement in § 7002(b)(2) of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2) (1988), which contains
language virtually identical to the 60-day notice requirement in CWA § 505(b)). Congress
intended this delay to allow EPA or the state to take action on violations that they might
have overlooked. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.CA.N. 3668, 3745.
406. CWA § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1)(B).
407. CWA § 309(g) (6) (A), (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6) (A), (B).
408. CWA § 505(c) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c) (3).
409. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
410. 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). Baughman involved the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The citizen suit provisions
of the Clean Air Act were the model for those of the CWA. See Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas,
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Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.411 These cases hold that any prior dili-
gently prosecuted action in a forum that is the "functional equivalent"
of a court would bar a citizen suit.412 The functional equivalence rule
requires that a tribunal have (1) the self-enforcing power to accord
relief that is the substantial equivalent to that available in federal
courts, including the power to issue injunctive orders and to assess
penalties;4"' and (2) procedural features comparable to federal court,
including the power of citizens to intervene as a matter of right,41 4 an
independent judge, witnesses, hearings, transcripts, and formal
records of decision. 41 5 Applying its version of this test, Baughman held
that the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board was not a "court"
because it had limited penalty power, could not enjoin violations, and
did not permit intervention as a matter of right.4" 6 For similar rea-
sons, the Fritzsche court held that, under the pre-1987 CWA, EPA ad-
ministrative proceedings did not meet the functional equivalence
test.4
17
Under the functional equivalence doctrine, a state418 enforce-
ment agency must possess the full remedial power inherent in tradi-
tional courts, including the power to enforce civil penalty assessments
and compliance orders without obtaining a court judgement. 419
850 F.2d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that "[c]itizen suits, which first appeared in the
Clean Air Act, on which the Clean Water Act was modeled, were intended by Congress 'to
both goad the responsible agencies ... and . .. to provide an alternative enforcement
mechanism'") (quoting Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir.
1970)).
411. 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
412. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool and Stamping Co., 735
F. Supp. 1404, 1414-15 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Illinois Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v.
PMC, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1070, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
413. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 219; see alt.o Fitzsche, Dodge & Olcott, 759 F.2d at 1138.
414. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 219.
415. Fitzsche, Dodge & Olcott, 759 F.2d at 1138.
416. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 218-19.
417. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott 759 F.2d at 1137-39.
418. Actions by local governmental bodies are not actions by a "state." Illinois Pub.
Interest Research Group, Inc. v. PMC, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1070, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (hold-
ing water reclamation district is not a "state" within the meaning of CWA § 505 (b) (1) (B));
New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Limco Mfg. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 608, 610-11
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding actions commenced by city government do not bar citizen's suit);
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Top Notch Metal Finishing Co., 26
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2012, 2014 (D.NJ. 1987) (holding that county utilities authority is
not an arm of the state and therefore does not fall within the plain meaning of CWA
§ 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
419. See PMC Inc., 835 F. Supp. at 1076 (holding that where a state administrative body
cannot enforce its own order, its actions will not bar citizen suits); Atlantic States Legal
Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404, 1414-15 (N.D. Ind.
1990) (holding that the Indiana Department of Environmental Management lacked the
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Thus, even an agency with the power to revoke permits, impose civil
penalties, issue compliance orders and execute consent orders is not a
"court" within the meaning of the statute if the agency must go to a
court to obtain injunctive relief against a polluter.420 EPA or state
compliance monitoring after entry of a consent decree is not the func-
tional equivalent of court action because EPA cannot obtain civil pen-
alties or injunctive relief without judicial action.4 21 Although the
functional equivalence rule has not yet barred any citizen suits, be-
cause no court has held any administrative tribunal to be the func-
tional equivalent of a court, the rule does have the potential to
expand the government's power to preempt citizen suits and thus
limit the role of citizen enforcement.
b. The "Court Means a Court" Rule.--The second line of cases
concerning the meaning of "court" within section 505(b) (1) (B) has
developed in the Second Circuit. The rule in these cases, which limits
the potential preemptive power of government, gives the term "court"
its commonly understood legal meaning and refers to traditional fora
so named.422 Thus, under this rule, the Second Circuit held that a
state administrative enforcement action resulting in an administrative
consent order was not the equivalent of an action in a court that
would bar a citizen suit relating to the same violation.423 The court
based its decision on the plain language of section 505(b) (1) (B) and
congressional intent.42 4 The court noted that Congress "has fre-
quently demonstrated its ability to explicitly provide that either an ad-
ministrative proceeding or a court action will preclude citizen
suits."
425
power to enforce its civil penalty and cease and desist provisions without bringing an action
in court, and so it was not the functional equivalent of a court).
420. Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (D. Md. 1985). In Sierra
Club, the court held that it would not be appropriate to consider a state agency that may
only seek injunctive relief from a court as a "court" for the purposes of CWA § 505(b).
421. Student Pub. Interest Research Group of NewJersey, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
615 F. Supp. 1419, 1427 (D.NJ. 1985); cf Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir.
1988) (a consent order between a polluter and EPA will not bar a citizen suit where the
polluter has not satisfied the mandates of the consent order).
422. See Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that an administrative proceeding will not bar citizen suits); see aizo infra notes
426-427 and cases cited therein.
423. Friends of the Earth, 768 F.2d at 63. The court stated that citizens are "welcomed
participants in the vindication of environmental interests" and held that their enforcement
actions could only be barred if the government filed a timely enforcement action in court.
Id. (citation omitted). The court noted that the administrative tribunal at issue was not a
.court" even under the Baughman "functional equivalent" test. Id. at 62.
424. Id. at 63.
425. Id.
1629
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,42 6 the Ninth Circuit joined
with the Second Circuit in holding that nonjudicial enforcement by a
state agency does not preclude a citizen enforcement suit.4 27 The
court was particularly impressed by the specific reference in section
505 to "court" without reference to any type of administrative pro-
ceeding;428 in contrast, citizen suit provisions in other environmental
laws provide that citizen suits are barred if the government is prose-
cuting in either a court or an administrative action.4 29
In the 1987 amendments to the CWA, Congress added section
309 (g), which permits EPA to assess penalties administratively, barring
only subsequent actions by citizens for civil penalties, not actions for
injunctive relief.4 0 In so amending the CWA, Congress demon-
strated, as the Second Circuit suggested,431 that Congress knew the
difference between a court and an administrative agency. The 1987
addition of section 309(g) into the CWA did not expand EPA's injunc-
tive authority-EPA administrative orders must still be enforced in
court.4 2 Thus, although an administrative penalty might be assessed
by an agency tribunal that is the functional equivalent of a court,433
administrative compliance orders still require judicial intervention,
and therefore, should not bar citizen suits.43 4
426. 834 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).
427. Id. at 1525. This approach has also been adopted in Hawaii's Thousand Friends v.
City of Honolulu, 806 F. Supp. 225 (D. Haw. 1992) and Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
715 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Ky. 1989). In Hawaii's Thousand Friends, the court followed Sierra
Club, holding that because Hawaii's Department of Health actions were not initiated by a
court, citizen suits were not barred. Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 806 F. Supp. at 228-29. The
Lykins court held that administrative action by the state Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Protection Cabinet did not bar citizen suits because of the plain meaning of the
statute. Lykins, 715 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
428. CWA § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).
429. Sierra Club, 834 F.2d at 525; see, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2619(b) (1) (B) (1988); The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2) (1988); Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2) (B)(iv) (1988).
430. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).
431. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985).
432. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).
433. That question became moot in 1987 when Congress passed the Water Quality Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 314(a), 101 Stat. 7, 46 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1 319(g)(6)).
434. However, in Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1186 (N.D. Ala. 1988), the court dismissed a citizen suit under § 309(g) (6) where an out-
standing administrative order for compliance under a comparable state law existed even
though no civil penalties were assessed or collected. Id. at 1187-89. The court held that a
provision in the order which stated that Tyson's failure to comply would subject the com-
pany to civil penalties, criminal fines or other relief was sufficient to bar a subsequent
citizen suit based on ongoing violations. Id. The court's ruling was particularly harsh be-
cause the underlying administrative order specifically did not preclude others from seek-
ing civil penalties, was issued before § 309(g) (6) was added to the CWA, and was issued
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2. "Diligent Prosecution".-In deciding whether a government
prosecution was diligently prosecuted so as to bar a citizen suit, one
federal district court announced the general rule that it will presume
that a state or EPA enforcement action is or was diligently prosecuted,
absent persuasive evidence that the state engaged in a pattern of con-
duct considered dilatory, collusive or in bad faith.43  This presump-
tion is not rebutted merely by showing that the settlement in the state
action was less burdensome to the discharger than the remedy sought
in the citizen suit.4 36 If widely adopted, this rule would strengthen the
ability of states to establish a lenient level of enforcement by virtually
immunizing from attack state settlements of enforcement actions that
preempt citizen suits seeking more stringent compliance or civil
penalties.
However, under essentially identical language in the Clean Air
Act, the concept of diligence has been given different meaning.437
For example, in Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co.,438 the court
stated that "complete deference to agency enforcement strategy,
adopted and implemented internally and beyond public control, re-
quires a degree of faith in bureaucratic energy and effectiveness that
would be alien to common experience."4" 9 By its willingness to ex-
amine the specifics of the state enforcement action for evidence of
actual diligence, the Gardeski approach enables citizens to challenge
state enforcement that appears to be lax."4 Courts have followed a
similar approach in applying the diligent prosecution requirement
under CWA section 309(g) (6), restricting state preemptive power by
refusing to grant the government unfettered discretion to define what
is a diligent prosecution.4'
under a scheme that did not include the right to citizen intervention. Id. at 1188. Contra
Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1000, 1007, 1013-14 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that an
administrative order issued before initiation of citizen suit did not bar the latter actions).
435. Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291, 1293 (D.
Conn. 1986).
436. Id. at 1294.
437. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 7604(b) provides: "No
action may be commenced [by a citizen plaintiff] ... (B) if the Administrator or State has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a
State to require compliance with [an emission] standard [or] limitation .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(b) (1).
438. 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
439. Id. at 1168.
440. The Gardeski court stated that Congress viewed citizen suits as serving an indispen-
sable function in ensuring that government fulfills its enforcement obligations. Id. at 1167.
441. See New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, 772 F.
Supp. 162, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding state enforcement efforts to be "a perfect example
of the state's lack of diligence"). Although the New York Department of Environmental
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3. "Prior Action". -To bar a citizen suit, the state or federal court
action must have been commenced before the citizen suit."4 2 The
statutory right to maintain a citizen suit is thus based on a race to the
courthouse, measured by the date and time of the filing of the com-
plaints with the respective courts.44 For example, a citizen suit filed
one day before the state suit is filed is not barred by the subsequent
state action.444
For a prior state or federal action to bar a citizen suit, the citizen
suit must seek the same relief against the same defendant to enforce
the same standard, limitation or order as the prior state or federal
action.4' Thus, a citizen suit will not be barred by a prior govern-
ment action if the government action did not address the factual
grievances asserted by the citizen group.4' By allowing citizens to
proceed, as long as they are seeking relief for a problem that was not
explicitly addressed in the prior government case, the state's preemp-
tive power is sharply limited. Thus, particularly in complex situations,
this rule makes it more difficult for states to bar citizen suits by cutting
a quick deal with a polluter, unless the state makes the settlement
comprehensive enough to bar a citizen suit.
D. Federal and State Preclusion of Citizen Enforcement
1. CWA Section 309 (g) and Judicial Activism. -As drafted by Con-
gress, section 309(g) granted EPA the power to assess civil penalties
Conservation began its enforcement efforts in 1983, as of 1991 the projected compliance
date was not until 1995. As a result, the court lacked confidence that the state, left to its
own devices without a citizen suit, would enforce the 1995 deadline. Id. at 169; see also
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 1995 WL 311983 (D.S.C. Apr.
7, 1995).
442. See CWA § 505(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1) (B) (providing "[n]o action may
be commenced [by a citizen plaintiff] ... (B) if the Administrator or State has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a
State to require compliance . . ").
443. See Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397, 1404 (D.
Conn. 1987) (stating that the court must apply an inflexible rule that determines jurisdic-
tion based on the time of filing the complaint and may not consider acts done in prepara-
tion for filing).
444. See Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 216 (D.
Conn. 1985).
445. See Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291, 1294
(D. Conn. 1986) (granting defendant's motion for dismissal of citizen suit where state was
already prosecuting an enforcement action against the defendant to require compliance
with the same "standard, order or limitation").
446. See Hudson River Fishermen Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686 F. Supp. 1044,
1052-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that when corollary government enforcement action does
not address the factual grievances asserted by private attorneys general, the citizen suit is
not barred).
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administratively," 7 but at the same time moderated that power,' 4
making it more difficult for EPA to assess civil penalties. Section
309(g) (6) limits the ability of EPA or citizens to seek judicial imposi-
tion of civil penalties if EPA or a state-using comparable law-has
assessed, or is in the process of assessing administratively, civil penal-
ties for the same CWA violations." 9
Unfortunately, several courts have tried zealously to make citizen
suits unambiguously secondary, instead of supplemental, to govern-
ment enforcement. These courts believe in a compliance theory of
enforcement as a matter of substantive environmental policy; under
this view, bringing an individual defendant into compliance is more
important than sanctioning that violator with civil penalties suffi-
ciently large to deter others.450 To impose their compliance theory of
enforcement on the CWA, these courts have ignored the plain con-
gressional language of section 30 9 (g) (6), instead favoring their own
rule that severely limits citizen suits.
The leading, and most flagrant, of these anti-citizen suit, policy-
based rulings is North and South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scitu-
ate,45' in which a CWA citizen suit alleged that the defendant was dis-
charging pollutants without an NPDES permit.452 The court barred
the citizen suit because the state, which did not have an EPA- ap-
proved program, had issued an administrative order mandating com-
pliance with state law.45" Both the district court and the court of
appeals held that the unapproved state law, which did not provide no-
tice to citizens of penalty proceedings or agency orders, was suffi-
ciently comparable to the CWA to trigger the section 309(g) (6) one-
bite rule.4 " The court of appeals held that the issuance of a state
administrative order, without any review by or input from citizens or
EPA, bars not only subsequent action for civil penalties, but any in-
junctive relief as well.4 55 The breadth of this holding is particularly
remarkable because section 309(g) explicitly addresses only adminis-
trative assessment of civil penalties,456 and section 309(g) (6) bars only
447. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).
448. See id. § 1319(g) (6).
449. Id.
450. See infra notes 451-471 and cases cited therein.
451. 755 F. Supp. 484 (D. Mass. 1991), affd, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1992).
452. Id. at 484.
453. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 558.
454. Scituate, 755 F. Supp. at 485-86.
455. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 558.
456. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).
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section 505 citizen civil penalty actions.4 5 7 Neither section mentions
injunctive actions.
Unfortunately, both the district and circuit courts ignored funda-
mental statutory and federalism problems. Massachusetts, as a nonap-
proved state, could not issue an NPDES permit,4 58 and without such a
permit any discharger of pollutants is in violation of section 301 (a),"'
even if the discharger has a permit to discharge under the state's law.
A nonapproved state cannot pursue under its own law an enforcement
action for the federal CWA violation of discharging without an NPDES
permit.4 0 Although the First Circuit and Massachusetts may proclaim
that the Massachusetts water laws "closely parallel" the federal
CWA,46' neither the Massachusetts water law, its regulations nor its
administrative program have been accepted by EPA as being suffi-
ciently consistent with the CWA to allow EPA to defer to state permit-
ting and enforcement as meeting the minimum requirements of
federal law." 2
The deficiencies of the Massachusetts law are not de minimis. For
instance, the CWA mandates public participation in the administrative
penalty assessment process46 while Massachusetts law does not. Nev-
457. Id. § 1319(g) (6). CWA § 309(g) (6) bars citizen suits when the state is prosecuting
the same violations under comparable state law. Id.
458. In a nonapproved state, only EPA may issue an NPDES permit. See supra note 141
and accompanying text.
459. CWA § 301(a) provides: "Except as in compliance with this section and [other]
sections . ..of this title, the discharge of any pollutant shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a).
460. CWA § 402(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h). However, a state can bring a citizen suit ac-
tion as a citizen in federal court under 505. U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627,
1634 (1992).
461. North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 554 (1st
Cir. 1992).
462. To be approved by EPA, the state's governor must petition EPA for approval and
the state program must meet an extensive list of statutory, administrative and funding re-
quirements, and undergo extensive EPA review. CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); see
also State Program Requirements, 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.1 to .64 (1994).
463. CWA § 309(g) (4) (A) requires that "[b]efore issuing an order assessing a civil pen-
alty under this subsection the Administrator... shall provide public notice of and reason-
able opportunity to comment on the proposed issuance of such order." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g) (4) (A) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(d), which mandates that:
Any State administering a program shall provide for public participation in the
State enforcement process by providing either:
(1) Authority which allows intervention as of right in any civil or administrative
action to obtain remedies.., by any citizen having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected; or
(2) Assurance that the State agency or enforcement authority will:
(i) Investigate and provide written responses to all citizen complaints submit-
ted pursuant to the procedures specified in § 123.26(b) (4);
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ertheless, the Scituate court barred a citizen suit for a violation of the
CWA on the grounds that the nonapproved state law was comparable
to CWA section 309(g).' On this point, the Scituate courts also ig-
nored the relevant legislative history. Senator Chafee, one of the prin-
cipal sponsors and drafters of the 1987 CWA amendments explained
prior to the passage of the bill:
[T]he limitation of 309(g) (6) applies only where a State is
proceeding under a State law that is comparable to section
309(g). For example, in order to be comparable, a State law
must provide for a right to a hearing and for public notice
and participation procedures similar to those set forth in sec-
tion 309(g); it must include analogous penalty assessment
factors and judicial review standards; and it must include
provisions that are analogous to the other elements of sec-
tion 309 (g) .465
An EPA-approved state law that requires notice for hearings but
not for enforcement efforts concluded by administrative consent de-
crees is not comparable to section 309(g) (6). Such a law does not
provide the public with a reasonable opportunity to comment on pen-
alty assessments or to seek judicial review similar to that provided for
in section 309 (g) (8).466 Thus, section 309(g) (6) will not bar ajudicial
citizen action subsequent to an enforcement proceeding under this
type of state law.4 67 The legislative history supports this conclusion.
(ii) Not oppose intervention by the citizen when permissive intervention may
be authorized by statute, rule or regulation; and
(iii) Publish notice of and provide at least 30 days for public comment on any
proposed settlement of a State enforcement action.
Id.
464. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556.
465. 133 CONG. REc. S737 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987).
466. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8).
467. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey, Inc. v. New Jersey Express-
way Auth., 822 F. Supp. 174, 184 & n.14 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that where state statute or
regulations under which the NewJersey Department of Environmental Protection and En-
ergy brought an enforcement action required no notice to public, allowed no opportunity
for the public to comment, or granted no public participation in a hearing, the state law
was not comparable and the citizen action was not barred); Public Interest Research Group
of NewJersey, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 949-50 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that the
NewJersey Water Pollution Control Act was not comparable to the CWA because it did not
provide for public notice and opportunity to participate in civil penalty assessments); At-
lantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404, 1415-
16 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that a state law under which the Indiana Department of Envi-
ronmental Management brought an administrative action against a manufacturing com-
pany was not comparable to the CWA and thus did not bar subsequent citizen suit because
the state agency was not authorized to enforce its civil penalty provisions without court
action).
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Congress explicitly recognized the importance of public participation
and notice so that citizens could contest inadequate civil penalties.
"There are several safeguards in this provision to prevent abuse of the
administrative order authority, such as... significant violators escap-
ing with nominal penalties.... Public notice.., must be given in a
manner that will apprise interested citizens of the proceeding."" 8 Ig-
noring this legislative history, the Scituate court held that the Massa-
chusetts law, which provided no notice to the public, no opportunity
to comment and no absolute right to participate, to be comparable to
the CWA based on the fiction of its public participation provisions.
The court reasoned that because the state administrative order was
technically a public document, if someone happened upon it in time,
they could petition, upon a showing of good cause, to intervene. 69 In
essence, the court held that the possibility of citizen intervention after
a final order is issued by the state is comparable to commenting on a
proposed order before it is made final. In so holding, the court disre-
garded the plain statutory language 470 of section 3 09(g) (6), effectively
substituting "after" for "before" and "final" for "proposed."4 71 Follow-
468. S. REP. No. 56, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. 1566,
1583.
469. North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st
Cir. 1992). The court found that the public could have no idea that the order existed, or
even that the state administrate agency was taking any enforcement action against the de-
fendant. See infra text accompanying note 475.
470. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see infra notes 494-499 and accompanying text.
471. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6) ("Before issuing an order assessing a civil penalty... the
Administrator or Secretary... shall provide public notice of and reasonable opportunity to
comment on the proposed issuance of such order.") (emphasis added). Arkansas Wildlife
Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994), adopted Scituate's rejection of the
plain statutory language by holding Arkansas's law to be comparable to CWA § 309(g) (6).
Id. at 381-83. The Eighth Circuit panel held that a state water pollution statute should be
presumed comparable if it "contains comparable penalty provisions which the state is au-
thorized to enforce, has the same overall enforcement goals as the federal CWA, provides
interested citizens a meaningful opportunity to participate at significant stages of the deci-
sion-making process, and adequately safeguards their substantive legitimate interests." Id.
However, Arkansas's statute only provides citizens with an ex post facto right to intervene,
no public notice at any time, and no opportunity to comment while the consent order is
being considered. Id. Nevertheless, the court found the law to be comparable because the
citizen had actual knowledge that the order had been issued before the citizen suit was
filed, and because the court, without any facts in the record, had "no reason to believe that
AWF would be denied meaningful participation in the administrative process had it inter-
vened" after the order was issued. Id. at 382. Although the court failed to indicate what
that after-the-fact participation might have been or its possible effect on the completed
state enforcement, the court nevertheless barred the federal CWA citizen suit because the
suit might have the effect of collaterally attacking the state order. Id.
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ing this reasoning, a final agency decision under the Administrative
Procedure Act,4 72 which mandates public notice and opportunity to
comment,473 would be upheld despite the lack of prior notice and
opportunity for public comment if an interested party could intervene
or even petition the agency to reconsider its decision. However, such
a contortion of the meaning of public notice and opportunity to com-
ment has long been rejected.474
The practical implications of Scituate are especially troublesome
because the right to intervene is of little benefit to the public if the
public is unaware of the proceedings. More specifically:
The detailed, mandatory safeguards of citizen participa-
tion contained in section 1319(g)(4) [CWA section
309(g) (4)] are not comparable to simply having a public rec-
ord on file somewhere for a citizen to look at should that
citizen somehow discover that a particular action has been
taken. Public notice is fundamental to protecting citizen
participation in agency decisions. If the public does not
know about agency actions, it cannot avail itself of any right
to participate.475
In fact, most state administrative enforcement activity is completely
hidden from the public.4 76 Even when the public has a specific inter-
472. 5 U.S.C. § 551-559, 701-706 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
473. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554. Sections 553 and 554 require prior public notice pub-
lished in the Federal Register or prior actual notice as a precondition for both agency rule-
making and adjudication. Id.
474. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 767-68 (3d
Cir. 1982) (holding that EPA's post-promulgation notice and comment procedures could
not cure its failure to provide such procedures prior to promulgation of rule postponing
amendments to regulations dealing with the discharge of toxic pollutants); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the period for comments after
promulgation of a rule cannot substitute for the notice and comment that the APA re-
quires before a rule's promulgation); U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214-15 (5th
Cir. 1979) (stating that "[s ] ection 533 [of the Administrative Procedure Act] is designed to
ensure that affected parties have an opportunity to participate in and influence agency
decision making at an early stage, when the agency is more likely to give real consideration
to alternative ideas"); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1020 (3d Cir. 1972)
(stating "the Administrative Procedure Act requires notice before rulemaking, not after.
The right of interested persons to petition for the issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule,
granted in ... [the] Act, is neither a substitute for nor an alternative to compliance with
the mandatory notice requirements [of the Act].").
475. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97, 102 (N.D.
Ohio 1992).
476. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 126
(2d Cir. 1991) (recounting that during the ongoing litigation of a properly commenced
citizen suit filed in federal court in the absence of any state or federal enforcement against
a long-standing violator, "after several months of private negotiations" the defendant and
the state entered into a consent agreement).
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est in a specific case, despite citizens' previous 60-day notice letter or
jurisdictionally proper citizen suit in federal court, the state and dis-
charger regularly exclude interested citizen groups from enforce-
ment-oriented negotiations.477
Scituate's flawed analysis is particularly unfortunate because the
issue of comparability should never have been reached due to the
threshold problem that Massachusetts, because it was unapproved,
could neither prosecute nor remedy the defendant's CWA violation of
discharging without an NPDES permit.4 78 According to Senator
Chafee, the section 3 09 (g) citizen suit bar applies "only in cases where
the State in question has been authorized [by EPA] under section 402
to implement the relevant permit program."479 The district court
sloughed off Senator Chafee's explication of the law as irrelevant on
the grounds that the statute on its face refers to "comparable" law, not
"comparable EPA-approved law."4"' However, the court failed to ob-
serve comparability is an issue only if there has been prior state en-
forcement of a CWA violation under comparable law.4 81 A state law
that is not approved by EPA under section 402(b) can never constitute
enforcement of a federal CWA violation, for otherwise state law, with-
out congressional or EPA approval, would preempt federal law; an im-
possibility under our constitutional system, where federal law is
supreme.482
477. This observation is based on the personal knowledge of author from his experience
as Director from 1989-1992 of the Widener University School of Law Environmental Law
Clinic. This experience has been corroborated in conversations with lawyers representing
citizen groups and environmental law clinics across the country.
478. CWA § 309(g) (6) (A) only precludes subsequent EPA or citizen suits over "any vio-
lation... with respect to which the State is diligently prosecuting an action under a state
law comparable to this subsection, or for which ... the State has issued a final order...
and the violator has paid a penalty." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6) (A) (emphasis added).
479. 113 CONG. REC. S737 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987). Senator Chafee further noted:
[I]f a nonauthorized State takes action under State law against a person who is
responsible for a discharge which also constitutes a violation of the Federal per-
mit, the State action cannot be addressed to the Federal violation, for the State
has no authority over the Federal permit limitation or condition in question. In
such case, the authority to seek civil penalties for violation of the Federal law...
would be unaffected ....
Id.
480. North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 755 F. Supp. 484, 485 (D.
Mass. 1991), affd, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1992). The court stated that "[n]owhere is there
any suggestion of an additional requirement that the state program have received federal
approval." Id.
481. Just as action by a nonapproved state can never constitute enforcement of the
CWA, similarly, EPA and federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to impose
civil penalties or other relief under the CWA for a violation of nonapproved state water
pollution law.
482. See supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
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The district court did not address this fundamental principle of
federal-state relations under the CWA, but on appeal EPA, as amicus
curiae, attempted to argue this very point. 83 The First Circuit, how-
ever, refused to consider EPA's submittal on the grounds that the is-
sue had not been raised below,48 4 even though the district court's
opinion specifically acknowledged the citizen group's position that
"the Massachusetts Act cannot qualify as a comparable state law unless
the United States Environmental Protection Agency . . . has sanc-
tioned the permit approval system created by that Act."48 5
The court ignored this fundamental problem by maintaining es-
sentially, that if a state unilaterally declares its law to be the equivalent
of federal law, then it is federal law. According to the district court,
because the state legislature had unilaterally declared its law to imple-
ment the provisions of the CWA and meet EPA standards for delega-
tion, Massachusetts had "effectively ordered compliance with both state
and federal standards simultaneously."486 However, states are not left
to decide whether their program meets federal CWA standards for
approval; that decision rests with EPA. But EPA had not approved
Massachusetts's program or otherwise delegated any NPDES authority
to the state;487 thus the Massachusetts agency was not effectively order-
ing compliance with federal law. Nevertheless, the district court, in
the best Lewis Carroll tradition, 8 allowed the state to declare its law
good enough for EPA, without allowing EPA to determine the state
law's adequacy, as Congress required. The court essentially allowed
this unilateral self-delegation, disregarding the importance of EPA's
extensive evaluative process" which involves insuring public partici-
pation before ruling on the state's application49 ° and insuring af-
483. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556 n.8 ("The EPA, in its amicus brief takes the position that in
order for a state law to be comparable to section 309(g), it must have been certified by the
EPA under section 402 of the Federal Clean Water Act. This argument was not raised by
the parties below. Hence, we decline to consider it here.").
484. Id.
485. Scituate, 755 F. Supp. at 485.
486. Id, at 487 n.4 (emphasis added).
487. Id. at 485.
488. Consider the following exchange:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
LEwis CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOING GLAss 80-81 (MacGibbon & Kee 1972) (1872).
489. CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988).
490. CWA § 402(b) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (3).
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fected neighboring state participation.49 1 Perhaps most significantly,
the court barred citizen enforcement of the CWA without the state
taking on the substantial obligations of actually administering an ap-
proved NPDES program for EPA.
On appeal, the First Circuit ignored this issue entirely by simply
announcing the remarkable fiction that the issue had not been raised
in the proceeding below. 49 2 Instead, it found the nonapproved state
law sufficiently comparable to section 309(g) to bar a citizen suit for
civil penalties.49 The court of appeals did not stop there: it pro-
ceeded to extend the preclusive effect beyond the plain language of
section 309 (g), which only bars subsequent judicial actions for civil pen-
alties by EPA and citizens, 494 to rule that it would be "absurd" to have
the statute preclude only civil penalties without also precluding claims
for injunctive relief.4 95 In effect, the court rewrote section 309(g) to
preclude all citizen suits, including both actions for civil penalties and
prayers for injunctive relief. In so doing, the court ignored the plain
language in CWA section 3 09(g) (6) (B), which creates a safe harbor
from citizen suit preclusion by state enforcement.496 Without refer-
ring to the statute or the legislative history, the court concluded,
based solely on out-of-context dicta from Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,497 that "citizen suits are intended to
491. CWA § 402(b) (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (5).
492. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556 n.8; see supra note 483.
493. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556.
494. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6) (A). This section bans civil penalty actions under CWA
§ 309(d) and CWA § 505 with respect to which the EPA or a state has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting an action under a comparable law, or for which EPA or a state has
issued a final order and the violator has paid a penalty. I.
495. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 558. But see Orange Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F.
Supp. 1003, 1017-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the CWA does not preclude actions for
declaratory or injunctive relief); Coalition for a Liveable Westside, Inc. v. New York Dep't
of Envtl. Resources, 830 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that § 309(g) (6) en-
sures that a CWA violator will not be subject to duplicative civil penalties, but that the
statute does permit "a federal district court to entertain an action for injunctive relief for
situations where, for example, a permit holder may have paid the relevant civil penalties
but continues to violate its permit limitations or where the injunctive relief obtained in the
state proceedings turns out to be inadequate to address the violations at issue"). Ironically,
in Scituate no civil penalties were ever assessed or paid.
496. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B)(i), (ii). This section provides that the limitations con-
tained in subparagraph (A) on civil penalty actions under CWA section 505 shall not apply
with respect to any violation for which a citizen suit has been filed prior to the commence-
ment of a state enforcement action, or for which 60-day notice has been given prior to the
commencement of state action and the citizen suit was filed within 120 days of the notice.
Id.
497. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). The Court in Gwaltney addressed the limited question of
whether CWA § 505(a) permitted citizens to sue for wholly past CWA violations. Id. at 56.
The Court's analysis centered exclusively on the meaning of § 505(a)'s limitation that citi-
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supplement" governmental primary enforcement responsibility,4 98
and that "it is inconceivable to us that the section 309(g) ban is only
meant to extend to civil penalty actions."499 Although the ordinary
dictionary meaning of supplemental is "added to complete," "extend
or strengthen the whole," or "make up for a deficiency,"00 it is as-
sumed from the context that the First Circuit employed the term to
demote citizen suits to secondary501 status. 50 2
zens could only sue persons "alleged to be in violation," which the Court characterized as a
state in which violations were likely to recur, even ifjust sporadically. Id. at 59-61. In its
decision, the Gwaltney Court noted that "[t]he [§ 505] bar on citizen suits when govern-
ment enforcement action [in a court] is underway suggests that the citizen suit is meant to
be supplemental rather than to supplant government action." Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
The Court uses "suggests" because Congress never used "supplemental" in the CWA nor in
its legislative history. Although there had been no government enforcement in the case,
the Court speculated, without reference to the language of the CWA, its legislative history,
or any relevant fact in the case, that allowing suits for wholly past violations might interfere
with a government settlement of an enforcement action. Id. at 60-61.
In contrast, the discharger in Scituate was actually in violation, so Gwaltney should have
had no relevance. See Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and County of Honolulu, 806 F.
Supp. 225, 229 (D. Haw. 1992) (holding that Gwaltney does not address the question
whether the CWA bars citizen suits notjudicially enforced). Nevertheless, the First Circuit
applied Gwaltney's dicta as though it were black letter statutory law and rejected the specific
statutory language and legislative history of § 309(g) (6) as though it were an ill-conceived
use of dicta by a floundering litigant. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555-58.
This court-made enforcement policy ignored Congress's lack of concern over the
timeliness issue, which is reflected by several statutes that allow citizen suits for wholly past
violations. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988)
(permitting a citizen suit against any person "who has contributed... to past handling,
storage, treatment, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment") (emphasis added);
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1988)
(permitting a citizen suit against any person who has failed to do any of certain enumer-
ated acts). Simple statutory interpretation that compared the use of present tense phras-
ing in CWA § 505 with the use of past tense in other citizen suit provisions would have
been sufficient to decide these cases. In 1990, when Congress amended the Clean Air Act,
it specifically modified the present tense wording by adding a past tense provision as a
Gwaltney fix. See Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (permitting
citizen suits against any person 'who is alleged to have violated [the Act] if there is evi-
dence that the violation has been repeated"). Thus, by the time the First Circuit decided
Scituate in 1992, there was ample evidence that the Gwaltney enforcement policy dicta did
not reflect congressional intent and should not have been the foundation for interpreta-
tion of the CWA.
498. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 558.
499. I&
500. THE AMER.IcAN HERITAGE DIcrioNAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1804 (3d ed.
1992).
501. "Secondary... a. Of the second rank; not primary. b. Inferior. c. Minor; lesser." Id.
at 1629.
502. However, because the Supreme Court failed to define "supplemental" it is pre-
sumed the word is to have its ordinary dictionary meaning. Accordingly, Scituates notion
that citizen suits should be supplemental means that citizen suits are either added to corn-
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If the court had reviewed the legislative history of the CWA, it
would have discovered that Congress had intended specifically that
section 309(g) operate as written. According to the conference report
accompanying the final version of the 1987 CWA amendments, the
limitations of section 309(g) (6) would not apply to (1) an action seek-
ing relief other than civil penalties; (2) an action under section
505 (a) (1) filed prior to commencement of an administrative civil pen-
alty proceeding for the same violation; or (3) a violation which has
been a subject of a notice of violation under section 505(b) (1) prior
to the initiation of the administrative penalty process, provided that
an action under section 505(a) (1) is filed within 120 days of the no-
tice of violation.5" 3 The Agency can prevent duplicate proceedings by
intervening in the ongoing citizen enforcement suit or by bringing its
own judicial action before a citizen suit is filed. 5°4 Despite this expres-
sion of legislative intent, other courts have taken Scituate as leave to
limit citizen suits in ways never intended by Congress.50 5
There has been a similar reliance on Gwaltney's dicta instead of
the CWA's plain language in construing other aspects of section
309 (g)(6). For instance, when Congress amended CWA section
309(g) (6) (B) (ii) it explicitly created a citizen suit safe harbor that al-
lows federal court actions to proceed despite citizen-state prosecution
if the citizens filed suit within 120 days of issuing their 60-day notice
letter and if the state does not commence its enforcement action until
after the 60-day letter was sent to the defendant, state agency, and
EPA.5° 6 Nevertheless, in Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co.,507 the Second Circuit allowed an otherwise timely and
proper citizen suit to be dismissed because the state agency subse-
quently brought and concluded an administrative enforcement ac-
plete enforcement of the CWA, to make up for a deficiency in enforcement, or to extend
or strengthen the EPA and state CWA enforcement as a whole.
503. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, 133 (1986).
504. Id. at 43-44, 133.
505. See, e.g., Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1993).
The Arkansas Wildlife court held that a state consent decree constituted diligent prosecu-
tion under comparable state law despite the assessment of de minimis penalties, which ig-
nored the violator's economic benefit. Id. at 380-81. Despite stipulated penalties in the
pre-existing consent order of over $50,000 and $120,000 respectively, id. at 378, the court
characterized the low penalties actually assessed, only $500, as within the agency's discre-
tionary powers to remedy the permit violation so long as the state did not "fail to exercise
[its] enforcement responsibility." Id. at 380. Agreeing with Scituate, the court stated that
the policy considerations which prevent a plaintiff from bringing a contemporaneous civil
penalty action also must preclude a plaintiff's requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Id. at 383-84.
506. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B)(ii).
507. 933 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991).
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tion.508 The court held that if the subsequent EPA-approved state
settlement reasonably assures that the discharger's violations will
cease, then, despite the statutory language, the properly commenced
citizen suit for injunctive relief and civil penalties may not proceed. 50 9
In reaching this result, the court heeded only dicta in Gwaltney which
cautioned against changing "the nature of citizen suits from intersti-
tial to potentially intrusive."5"' Remarkably, the court simply ignored
Congress's carefully considered statutory balancing of government
and citizen enforcement activity. The same result could have been
reached without contorting the statute.511 The district court could
have found the discharger liable for CWA violations, and then in-
voked its equitable discretion to refrain from imposing any further
injunctive relief. The court then might have determined indepen-
dently whether the penalties imposed by the settlement were ade-
quate,5 t2 using the factors mandated by section 309(d). I
Because most states are reluctant either to impose meaningful
penalties that deprive violators of their economic benefit or to add a
gravity component for deterrence,514 decisions such as Eastman Kodak
allow states to undercut citizen enforcement intended to prevent
states from racing to the bottom by lax enforcement. In Eastman Ko-
508. Id. at 127.
509. Id.
510. Gwalmey of Smithfield, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 54, 61
(1987).
511. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017
(2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a properly commenced citizen suit for civil penalties was not
mooted by a subsequent settlement between the violator and a local agency in which a
$6600 penalty was assessed and $250,000 was to be invested in treatment system upgrades).
The Pan American Tanning court distinguished this case from its decision in Eastman Kodak
on the grounds, inter alia, that the $2 million "extracted" by the state from Kodak repre-
sented a "dispositive administrative and criminal settlement." Id. at 1021 (quoting Eastman
Kodak, 933 F.2d at 127).
512. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Hercules, 830 F. Supp. 1525,
1538-40 (D.NJ. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
although civil penalties assessed under non-comparable state law did not bar a subsequent
citizen suit, the federal court, when ordering civil penalties, might nevertheless consider
the adequacy of the previously assessed state penalties).
513. Under § 309(d) violators
shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation.
In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shaU consider the serious-
ness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from
the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with
the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator,
and such other matters as justice may require.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (emphasis added).
514. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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dak, the state assessed a civil penalty in excess of $1 million. 1 ' In
Scituate, however, the state administrative order did not assess any civil
penalty; nevertheless, the court barred the otherwise proper citizen
suit even though Congress explicitly limited section 309 (g) preclusion
to final state orders where "the violator has paid a penalty assessed"
under section 3 09(g) or a comparable state law.516 The First Circuit
rejected plaintiff's "paid a penalty assessed"5 17 argument as "a narrow
reading of Section 309(g) (6) (A) which turns on the logistical happen-
stance of statutory drafting."51 Preferring compliance-based enforce-
ment policy over sanction-based policy, the court held that civil
penalties should not be imposed on violators engaging in remedial
efforts because penalties "are, in fact, impediments to environmental
remedy efforts."519 In contrast, both Congress and EPA have long de-
clared civil penalties to be central to the CWA's enforcement scheme
because without adequate and consistently imposed civil penalties,
particularly in judicial actions, polluters will have little motivation to
515. Eastman Kodak, 933 F.2d at 126.
516. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (6) (iii).
517. Plaintiff; had argued that "a citizens suit for penalties is only barred when a previ-
ously brought state action seeks to sanction an offender monetarily." North & S. Rivers
Watershed Ass'n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 555 (1st Cir. 1991); cf. Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 949 (D.N.J. 1991) (noting that
CWA § 309(g) (6) (A) expressly states that a citizen suit is barred after a state concludes an
action only if the violator has paid a penalty assessed). Contra New York Coastal Fisher-
men's Ass'n v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(ignoring the statutory language and holding that the issuance of consent orders without
the assessment of monetary penalties will bar a citizen suit). The New York Coastal Fisher-
men's court further held that the failure of a state to impose civil penalties, where it had the
power to do so, does not require a finding that the state is not enforcing a comparable
statute. Id. See also Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 777 F.
Supp. 173, 181 (D. Conn. 1991) ("33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) bars citizen suits where a state
agency conducting enforcement proceedings against the defendant has authority to assess
civil penalties, regardless of whether the agency has actually assessed such penalties.").
518. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556.
519. Id. The First Circuit did not indicate the factual or legal basis upon which it disre-
garded Congress's enforcement design for the CWA. Section 309 authorized civil penalties
that deprive a violator of the economic benefit of noncompliance and imposes a gravity
component for assessed penalties. These elements are crucial to the enforcement system
around which the entire Act is built, and are vitally necessary to achieve widespread volun-
tary compliance with the CWA. The First Circuit apparently adopted the opposite view:
violators should not comply until the government makes them, and they should not be
deprived of the economic benefit of their illegal conduct if, as the result of government's
enforcement efforts, they agree to come into compliance sometime in the future. See Scitu-
ate, 949 F.2d at 557 (noting that the administrative order "leaves open the possibility of
imposing penalties upon the town").
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comply voluntarily with the law.52° Thus, Scituate and Eastman Kodak
represent substantive judicial activism in the extreme.5 21
Other courts have not been so hostile to citizen suits or congres-.
sional enforcement policy. Where a government's enforcement ac-
tion failed to address the factual grievances and violations alleged by a
citizen group, the New York federal district court held the citizen suit
not barred by the prior government action.522 The NewJersey federal
520. See supra notes 306-310 and accompanying text. The Senate Committee on Envi-
ronment and Public Works, which authored the 1987 CWA amendments, agrees. On May
10, 1994, after extensive hearings on a variety of issues, including enforcement, the full
committee reported out the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1994, S.2093,
which explicitly rejects Scituate. S. REP. No. 257, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1994), which
accompanied the bill to the full Senate, provides:
Section 309(g) (6) (A) currently provides that neither the Administrator nor a
citizen suit plaintiff may bring an action for a civil penalty with respect to certain
violations, including violations "with respect to which a State has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting an action" under comparable State law, or for which "the
State has issued a final order not subject to furtherjudicial review and the violator
has paid a penalty." Some courts have interpreted this provision broadly. In
North and South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir.
1991), the court held that an administrative order issued by the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts barred a subsequent citizen suit plaintiff from seeking penalties
or injunctive relief, even though the Commonwealth had not been authorized to
operate the Act's permit program, its administrative order had not assessed any
penalty, and there was no public notice or comment on the proposed order.
The broad interpretation of section 309(g) (6) (A) in the Scituate decision and
other decisions undermines vigorous enforcement. The Act's enforcement sys-
tem relies on states assuming primary enforcement authority, but preserves a
residual Federal role for the rare but important cases where State enforcement
actions are inadequate to fully protect public health and the environment. In
such cases, as EPA Assistant Administrator Herman testified, "it is crucial that the
power of the Federal government is available to insure that the violations are
halted, that the violator is adequately penalized and does not profit from the
violation, and that the violator addresses any environmental damage caused by
the violations." Accordingly, the bill amends section 309(g) (6) (A) to eliminate
the State bar to overfiling with respect to both Federal and citizen actions.
Id.
521. This activism has been explained as a negative reaction by courts to the hybrid
statutory creations that citizen suits represent. James M. Hecker, The Citizen's Role in Envi-
ronmental Enforement: Private Attorney Genera, Private Citizen, or Both, 8 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Spring 1994, at 62. These courts appear to be uncomfortable with citizen suits
because of the traditional judicial deference toward government's prosecutorial discretion.
See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (holding that the presumption of
reviewability of agency action does not apply to an agency's decision not to undertake
certain enforcement actions). As a result, many courts, without regard to statutory lan-
guage or congressional intent, rigidly and incorrectly alternate between two different para-
digms of citizen suits: (1) citizens as "private attorneys general" who "stand in the shoes" of
the federal government, and (2) citizens as private litigants enforcing a cause of action
independent of the government. Hecker, supra, at 31.
522. Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686 F. Supp. 1044, 1052
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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district court noted that under the explicit terms of section
309(g) (6) (B) (ii), subsequent parallel state proceedings will not pre-
empt a citizen suit if the citizen group gave sixty days notice of the
violation to the violator, EPA, and the state, neither government filed
suit in court, and the citizen group filed its complaint within 120 days
of the notice.5 2' According to the court, "Congress was presumably
aware of the risks and inefficiencies of parallel actions when it drafted
[CWA section 309 (g) (6) (B)] and determined that some duplication is
acceptable. '5 24  Other courts have held that section 309(g) (6) (B)
does not bar a citizen suit because of a prior federal administrative
enforcement action, unless the action specifically sought civil penal-
ties under section 309(g), as opposed to a compliance order issued
under the general enforcement authority of section 309(a).52 5
The language of section 309(g)(6) is a clear statement of Con-
gress's precise balancing of power between citizen and government
enforcement. In fact, the Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas described the language as "unambiguous. "526 Properly,
courts looking to the clear language of the statute have rejected Scitu-
ate, stating that Scituate redrafts a "clear and unambiguous" statute
5 27
523. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Yates Indus., Inc., 757 F.
Supp. 438, 444 (D.N.J. 1991).
524. Id. at 444-45; see also Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Elf
Atochem N. Am., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1164, 1173 (D.N.J. 1993). In ElfAtochem, the court
considered whether under § 309(g) (6) a state had commenced an enforcement action
before or after the citizens sent their 60-day letter. The court held that only a formal
administrative notice and order "issued pursuant to state regulations specifically providing
for due process protections in the initiation of enforcement proceeding, was the actual
initiation or 'commencement' of an enforcement proceeding" by the state agency. Id.;
accord Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Ref. Co., 681 F. Supp. 609, 611 n.2 (D.
Minn. 1988) (holding that notice of violation issued by the state did not constitute com-
mencement of an enforcement action).
525. See Washington Pub. Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d
883, 885 (9th Cir. 1993); Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. Bekaert Corp., 791 F. Supp. 769 (W.D.
Ark. 1992). Faithfully following the language of the CWA, the Bekaert court stated, "Con-
gress has defined when citizen suits are barred by administrative action in section
1319(g) (6). Congress has not provided that citizen suits are barred whenever an adminis-
trative action is underway or simply because there may be some duplication with a govern-
ment proceeding." Id. at 775.
526. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 806 F. Supp. 145,
146 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that the § 309(g) (6) (A) (i) presumption applies only when
EPA has brought an action assessing administrative civil penalties after public notice and
other statutory requirements have been met).
527. Coalition for a Livable West Side, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Envti. Protection,
830 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The district court held that CWA § 309(g) (6) only
bars subsequent judicial actions for civil penalties, so that a violator will not be subject to
duplicative civil penalties, one administratively and the other judicially assessed, for the
same CWA violations. Id.
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in which "the express words of section 13 19(g) (6)'s bar provision ap-
pear to have been chosen with care.5" 8 Unfortunately, as the next sec-
tion of the Article shows, by making citizen suits secondary instead of
supplemental, Scituate, Eastman Kodak and their progeny enable the
states to weaken their enforcement effects while simultaneously pre-
cluding citizen suits that seek more vigorous enforcement.
2. State Preclusion of Citizen Enforcement: The Unlevel Playing Field,
Part 2.-Both the federal government and the states can preempt
CWA citizen suits by diligently prosecuting an action in court against
the violator before a citizen suit is filed for the same violations. How-
ever, it has long been the established practice of EPA not to initiate
preemptive enforcement in response to a sixty-day letter;5 9 although
a sixty-day letter will not necessarily stop EPA action on a matter that is
already proceeding down the EPA enforcement pipeline.53 ° Several
reasons exist for this practice. First, sixty days is simply far too short a
time for EPA to get a case through its system.5 ' Second, EPA's trans-
action costs of pursuing a case are too high to warrant initiating en-
forcement solely to preempt a citizen suit. Finally, EPA supports
citizen suits as an important enforcement supplement, and thus does
528. Id.
529. See infra note 531.
530. Telephone Interview with David Drelich, Attorney/Adviser, Office of Enforcement,
Water Enforcement Division, EPA (Oct. 18, 1993).
531. A rare preemption occurred on a Sierra Club citizen suit against a discharger that
was already in EPA's enforcement pipeline. When EPA headquarters received the 60-day
notice, it directed the regional staff to tell the Sierra Club that EPA was already pursuing
the case and intended to prosecute. However, the Sierra Club also desired to pursue the
case because they wanted to prosecute a broader range of violations than the narrower
EPA enforcement action contemplated. Apparently, there was a disagreement between the
EPA regional staff and the citizen group, which erupted into a race to the courthouse. The
region tried to accelerate its internal processing on the case in order to file before the
citizen group. Acting as fast as it could, EPA filed the case 77 days later. The citizen group
filed its case 77 days and one hour later. Litigation erupted over the preemption issue.
For tactical reasons, the region did not want interference in the case from the citizen
group. However, EPA headquarters was afraid that case law might result that would allow
citizen suits to be unnecessarily preempted. Id.; see also Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Ameri-
can Recovery, 762 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985) (citizen group filing two hours before govern-
ment group did).
For a case that did create unfavorable precedent, see EPA v. City of Forest Green, 921
F.2d 1394, 1403-05 (8th Cir. 1990), which holds that a consent order in federal court be-
tween EPA and a polluter barred, on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a
previously filed CWA citizen suit against the same defendant for the same CWA violations.
Id. at 1405. This preclusion rule only applies in the limited circumstances of concurrent
actions by citizens and EPA in federal court for the same violations. See Hawaii's Thousand
Friends v. City and County of Honolulu, 806 F. Supp. 225, 229 n.19 (D. Haw. 1992) (noting
that res judicata and collateral estoppel were not applicable because the government
agency did not pursue its enforcement action in court).
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not wish to discourage them by preemption. In fact, over the last sev-
eral years EPA has actively tried to support citizen suits by opposing
court decisions that would allow state administrative actions to pre-
empt CWA citizen suits unnecessarily.532
However, citizens face regular battles at the state level for en-
forcement primacy. Preemption for the sole purpose of removing citi-
zen suits from a state's enforcement arena has become more of a rule
than an exception. If citizen suits result in preemptive state action
because the state wants vigorously to enforce clean water laws against
polluters, then the citizen efforts have been successful in protecting
the environment. However, states sometimes take action against a
polluter at its request in order to shield that polluter from a citizen
suit;5 13 this type of preemptive action does not succeed in protecting
the environment. Elsewhere, a hostile and perhaps embarrassed envi-
ronmental official attempted to discourage citizen suits by the Chesa-
peake Bay Foundation, threatening that the state would preempt every
CWA citizen suit which the group tried to bring in the future.S
Several states have adopted this preclusion approach in practice,
if not in explicit words.535 Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), one of the groups that began bringing CWA citizen suits in
the early 1980s, has been preempted by states at least fifty times since
532. Although EPA and DOJ resources are extremely limited, they nevertheless filed
amicus briefs in the Scituate, ICI Americas, Pan Am. Tanning, and Pendelton Woolen Mills and
Laidlaw cases.
533. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 1995 WL
311983 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 1995).
534. Interview with Ann Powers, Vice President and General Counsel, Chesapeake Bay
Foundation (CBF) (July 21, 1994). Powers recounted an explicit threat of future preemp-
tion made to her in the late 1980s by a senior environmental official in the State of Mary-
land. Around the time of the warning, the group had been a litigant in several major
citizen suits such as Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp.
620 (D. Md. 1987), and Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F.
Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 484
U.S. 49 (1987).
According to Powers, a change in leadership at the state agency has now resulted in a
marked shift in attitude. Recently, the state and CBF cooperated in a CWA enforcement
effort against a municipality. However, this cooperative attitude of the agency is being
undermined by legislative efforts to restrict citizen challenges to state-issued NPDES per-
mits. These efforts are loosely modeled on similar efforts in Virginia. In CBF's view, the
Virginia NPDES program is so ineffective that EPA should withdraw approval. CBF cur-
rently has a petition to that effect pending before EPA Region III. See Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Petition for Corrective Action, An Order Commencing Withdrawal Proceed-
ings, and Other Interim Relief with Respect to Virginia's Water Pollution Control Program
(submitted to EPA, Region III, Nov. 5, 1993).
535. These states include Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Michigan, and New
Jersey. See infra notes 540-547 and accompanying text.
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1986.36 In each case, the state enforcement action, whether judicial
or administrative, resulted in lenient sanctions and relief to local dis-
chargers, who sought protection from NRDC's citizen suit.51 7
In response to NRDC's suits, states developed the practice of
wholesale preemption of the citizen enforcement. Michigan set the
example in 1986. In Michigan, NRDC had sent out nineteen sixty-day
notices to eighteen different industrial CWA violators. Before suits
were filed, all eighteen companies approached NRDC together with a
single offer to settle in bulk all CWA claims for the lump sum civil
penalty of $1.5 million.5"' NRDC refused this offer as insignificant
compared to the widespread, serious violations of each company. On
the fifty-ninth day after the sixty-day notices were given, the State of
Michigan filed nineteen judicial settlements in state court, obtaining
penalties NRDC considered slaps on the wrist, and preempting all of
the NRDC cases.5" 9 Neither the state nor the violators reimbursed
NRDC for the $43,000 in attorneys fees, expert expenses and other
costs incurred in preparing the cases.-54
Two years later, NRDC was planning to prosecute a series of cases
in Connecticut. Mindful of its bitter experience in Michigan, NRDC
initially contacted the state officials to determine if the state and
NRDC could work together. After reviewing the cases with the state
and reaching an understanding that it would not interfere with the
citizen suits, NRDC proceeded to send twenty-two sixty-day notices to
industrial indirect dischargers in serious violation of their pretreat-
ment obligations. Despite the prior understanding, Connecticut, for
unexplained reasons, responded by preempting all the best cases,
leaving what the state viewed to be the weakest cases for NRDC to
pursue. Although NRDC had prepared all of the cases, the state let
many of the cases it preempted languish, and it obtained generally
weak enforcement results. In comparison, NRDC pursued the weak
cases in federal court, and obtained significantly greater sanctions
536. Telephone Interview with Nancy Marks, Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense
Council (July 5, 1994) [hereinafter Marks Interview].
537. Id. It was NRDC's policy not to settle any citizen suits without obtaining (1) a com-
pliarice order that would rapidly bring the violator into full compliance with the CWA; (2)
civil penalties payable to the U.S. Treasury or payments for environmental projects, instead
of civil penalties, in an amount that, at a minimum, deprived the violator of the economic
benefit of its violation; and (3) payment of its attorneys' and experts' fees. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
1649
MARYLAND LAw REVIEW
from the court and in settlement than the state obtained in the strong
cases it had preempted.54
Alabama preempted eight NRDC cases in 1988-1989.542 After
NRDC sent sixty-day notices to CWA violators, the violators sought
protection from Alabama state legislators, who successfully petitioned
the Alabama Attorney General to preempt the citizen suits.5 43  The
State of Maine also preempted NRDC on the last round of cases
NRDC filed in that state.'14 Georgia also has pursued this course,545
as has South Carolina. 46 Some states effectively preempt citizen suits,
without doing so explicitly, by executing administrative agreements
with the violators that can interfere significantly with the federal law-
suit. This practice has become common in many states. 547
The routine preemption via administrative action that Eastman
Kodak, Scituate, and ICI Americas permit will allow interested states to
protect local industries and municipalities from citizen suits. These
states can use a state inspector or engineer to issue administrative con-
sent orders to dischargers without notice to the public, and with low
or no civil penalties. At the same time, those citizen suits that are not
preempted are burdened routinely with litigation over a group's
standingeM and Gwaltney parameter-by-parameter disputes, 49 which
extend litigation and consume the valuable time and resources of
small citizen group staffs."O The public interest environmental com-
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Interview with James Simon, Director of Natural Resources Defense Council's En-
forcement Project (Mar. 21, 1989).
544. Marks Interview, supra note 536.
545. Id.
546. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 1995 WL 311983
(D.S.C. Apr. 7, 1995).
547. Id.; Telephone Interview withJames Hecker, Attorney, Trial Lawyers for PublicJus-
tice (July 5, 1994); see, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933
F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a citizen suit may not challenge the terms of a settle-
ment between a violator and the state unless there is a realistic prospect that the violation
alleged in the citizen complaint will continue regardless of the settlement).
548. See, e.k., Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey, Inc. v. NewJersey Express-
way Auth., 822 F. Supp. 174, 179-83 (D.NJ. 1992) (holding that citizen group did not have
standing to sue violator); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. and
Mktg., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1992) (holding that injury to aesthetic or recreational
interests is sufficient to confer standing).
549. See supra note 497; see also Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1549, 1557 (D.NJ. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part 50 F.3d
1239 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that newly-filed complaint in extended litigation may run
afoul of Gwaltney's wholly post violation language).
550. For instance, NRDC's Enforcement Project, one of the largest in the country, was
comprised of only four attorneys and one scientist. Marks Interview, supra note 536.
1650 [VOL. 54:1552
1995] ENFORCEMENT IN A TRIANGULAR FEDERAL SYSTEM
munity has become increasingly demoralized, most noticeably at
NRDC, which recently disbanded its CWA enforcement project be-
cause it was too expensive to maintain in light of the litigation bur-
dens resulting from state preemption, standing, and Gwaltney.551
E. Citizen Suits: The Enforcement System's Safety Net
When Congress created citizen enforcement authority in the
CWA and other environmental statutes, Congress realized that its
"hopes for reliable enforcement required the efforts of citizen attor-
neys general."55 As one commentator notes:
To rely on the existing bipolar institutions for zealous appli-
cation of new standards and procedures was to ask too much
of institutional self-interest and good-ol'-boy human na-
ture .... Citizen outsiders who understood the new para-
digm and were willing to take on the burdens of volunteer
pluralism were a structural necessity if reform was to be
brought into the system over the passive or active resistance
of the old insiders .... [I]f citizens did not enforce the law,
no one would.555
Congressional hopes for reliable private enforcement have been met.
The regulated community has become extremely concerned about cit-
izen suits, 5 5 4 and greater voluntary compliance among polluters now
exists as a result of the increase in citizen suits in the mid-1980s.
Additionally, citizen suits account for most of the important CWA
enforcement court decisions, almost all of which have made CWA en-
forcement easier. For instance, citizen suits have established that
DMRs containing permit violations are a sufficient basis for obtaining
summary judgment against the polluter.55 Citizen suits have also lim-
551. Id. Although over the project's 10 year span, NRDC brought hundreds of cases,
and eventually recovered sufficient attorneys fees and expenses to cover its costs, it did so
at substantial financial burden-as of 1993, the project was about $1,000,000 in the red.
552. ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory
and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A L. REv. 981, 1006 (1994).
553. Id. at 1007.
554. See, e.g., Written Statement of Hal Bozarth, Executive Director, Chemical Industry
Council of New Jersey, Before the Environmental and Natural Resources Subcommittee
Regarding H.R. 2727 and Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act, 1994 WL 224047
(F.D.C.H.) (Mar. 22, 1994) (asserting that "granting third parties the ability to sue is bad
public policy, and I adamantly oppose the use of citizen suits"); Brief of Anicus Curiae
Connecticut Business and Industry Association, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 54 (1987) (No. 86-473) (suggesting that citizen suits should be
limited because they are overly burdensome).
555. See Student Pub. Interest Group of NewJersey, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 1419, 1430 (D.NJ. 1985) (rejecting defendant's argument that the violations cited in
the DMRs were "within the margin of analytic error").
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ited some defenses that polluters can assert,"' and have led courts to
reject other defenses as a matter of law.557
Citizen suits are valuable for many other reasons. First, a citizen
suit in federal court exposes the violator to the risk of substantially
greater civil penalties than tend to be at stake in state courts or agen-
cies or in EPA administrative actions.5 58 Citizen suits also expose vio-
lators to the equitable power of federal courts to order expensive
abatement. As a result, polluters seem to be more fearful of citizen
enforcement than state enforcement, and are thus more willing to set-
tle the citizen suits than state judicial actions.55 9
Second, citizens are outsiders to permit deals and POTW plan
approvals.560  This institutional distance may remove certain con-
straints from the enforcement process. For example, sometimes a
state agency may approve new designs or technologies in a discharge
permit. If the plant fails to meet the effluent limitations in the per-
mit, the state may be unwilling to enforce permit violations resulting
556. For example, federal courts in New Jersey have restricted the ability of polluters to
assert the "upset" defense. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. P.D. Oil &
Chem. Storage, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1074, 1085-87 (D.NJ. 1986); Student Pub. Interest Re-
search Group, Inc. v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 642 F. Supp. 103, 108 (D.NJ.
1986). An upset is "an exceptional incident in which there is unintentional and temporary
non-compliance with technology permit effluent limitations because of factors beyond the
reasonable control of the permittee." P.D. Oil & Chem. Storage, 627 F. Supp. at 1086.
557. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 690, 692 (N.D. Ill. 1988), the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois rejected the polluter's argument that the method specified by its NPDES permit to
monitor its own effluents could not monitor pollutant levels appropriately, and thus the
polluter should not be bound by that method. Id. at 692-93. The court stated, "DMC may
not contend here that the use of its test results is not part and parcel of its NPDES permit."
Id. at 693.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. and Mktg., Inc., 719 F.
Supp. 281 (D. Del. 1989), the court rejected defendant's attribution of permit violations to
sampling errors because that argument contradicted Congress's intent to hold entities
strictly liable for pollution levels in excess of permit limits. Id. at 288-89. The court further
rejected defendant's argument that some permit violations should be overlooked as statisti-
cal outliers. Id. at 289.
558. For example, compare the median penalties collected by EPA regions reported in
the tables in note 347, supra, with the $1.285 million verdict imposed in Chesapeake Bay
Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 1986), affid in part, rev'd
in part, 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1988). This penalty was subsequently reduced to $289,822.
890 F.2d at 698.
559. Interview with Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Esq., Pace University Law School Environ-
mental litigation Clinic and Natural Resources Defense Council (Apr. 5, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Kennedy Interview]. Kennedy is convinced that this increased likelihood of settlement
makes citizen enforcement a crucial supplement to federal and state CWA enforcement.
560. Generally, the state agency must approve sewage treatment plant plans before the
plants are built; an NPDES permit is needed to operate them. Typically, every NPDES
permit prohibits any construction without prior agency approval.
1652 [VOL. 54:1552
1995] ENFORCEMENT IN A TRIANGULAR FEDERAL SYSTEM
from the deficient designs or technologies which it had previously ap-
proved. Naturally, citizen groups have no such reluctance to seek
plant modifications that will abate the pollution.
Third, citizen suits are not subject to the individual reluctance
some regulators bring to the enforcement arena. Because govern-
ment engineers tend to move on to industry positions during their
careers, disincentives may exist for a state engineer to antagonize local
industry or to earn a reputation for being unreasonable by refusing to
tolerate small deviations from permit limitations. On a deeper level,
government and industry engineers often share similar professional
outlooks, which can blur the line separating the two sides and result in
a mindset that perceives certain violations as too insignificant to
enforce.
Fourth, citizen enforcement is not subject to the political pres-
sures that might hinder state enforcement. An example is the Hud-
son Valley Tree case in Newburgh, New York." 1  Newburgh, an
economically depressed city, had approved a plastic Christmas tree
manufacturing plant to be constructed on a wetland without the nec-
essary permits or an environmental impact statement. The citizen
group, followed by the state, sued to protect the wetland from destruc-
tion.56 The company brought to the ensuing negotiations a union
representative, a city official, the local Congressman's legislative aide,
and a representative of the federal grant office. 6 ' Simultaneously,
the state agency's headquarters office, which was itself being pres-
sured by the Congressman, pressured the state's attorney to back off
enforcement.564 However, the project's proponents realized that
political pressure would not solve their problem because the citizen
group was not susceptible to the political pressure and was prepared
to litigate regardless of the state's position. The proponents thus
agreed to a negotiated solution that protected the wetlands. The citi-
zen group is convinced that without its presence, the state would not
have been able to protect the wetland.' 5
Fifth, for similar political reasons, citizen groups are more willing
and better able to enforce the CWA against municipalities and state
facilities than is the state. As a result of vigorously prosecuted citizen
561. Kennedy Interview, supra note 559.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id. Ironically, under Eastman Kodak, ICI Americas, and Scituate, any state action to-
day would deprive the citizen group of the ability to shield the state agency from outside
political pressure.
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suits, state agencies now can improve compliance from municipalities
by threatening to turn cases over to citizen groups if the municipality
does not bring its POTW into compliance. When states and citizens
understand and respect each other's strengths and weaknesses and
use their respective strengths in support of the others' weaknesses, the
impact of the enforcement program can be greater than the sum of its
parts.
Sixth, without citizen suits, regulators would pursue few, if any,
actions against nonmajor polluters, those discharging less than
1,000,000 gallons per day.566 In New York, for instance, small dis-
chargers' DMRs are sent only to the local county health departments.
Neither the state agency nor EPA ever see them, and the county
health officials do nothing more than store them.567 Interested citi-
zens are the only potential regulators who look at the DMRs, and citi-
zen suits are the only potential enforcement of violations in this
category.5
68
Seventh, citizens are better able than state inspectors to discover
unpermitted discharges. Sneak pipe discharging and intermittent
dumping, often called "midnight dumping," take place at odd hours
in hidden locations. Catching a polluter in the act may require days
of continuous observation, which state inspectors, who are already
overburdened and who usually work only normal business hours, can-
not maintain. But regional citizen groups with dedicated member-
ships can and do maintain the intensive, prolonged surveillance
necessary to catch these polluters. Unfortunately, because of
Gwaltney, citizens cannot sue under the CWA to enforce against wholly
past violations. Therefore, citizens probably cannot prosecute these
violators under the CWA. Additionally, state agencies may already be
so overburdened that they will not bring administrative actions against
these unpermitted violations, although they may support a criminal
prosecution by a state attorney general or local county district attor-
ney.56 9 Thus, because of Gwaltney, unless the state brings a criminal
charge, many of the most flagrantly illegal discharges may not be sub-
ject to CWA enforcement.
Finally, EPA, and EPA-approved state agencies, given their lim-
ited resources, naturally should focus on nation-wide and state-wide
566. Id.
567. Id. In counties that have no health departments, the permitees keep their DMRs in
their own files.
568. Id.
569. Interview with Cesare Manfredi, Director, Region 2, New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (Apr. 24, 1989) [hereinafter Manfredi Interview].
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concerns. Pollution that does not trigger national or state enforce-
ment may nevertheless raise legitimate local or regional concerns.
Acting as private attorneys general, local citizens can bring CWA en-
forcement actions against violators who would not otherwise be prose-
cuted by EPA or the states.
Ironically, because of the success of citizen suits, the regulated
community now understands that regulators may not overlook permit
violations that permitees may consider minor. This understanding
has motivated many dischargers to minimize potential violations by
seeking more liberal permit terms through tougher permit negotiat-
ing. Permit disputes over what is a reasonable detection level can be
especially protracted when permits contain limitations at or near de-
tection levels. At these levels, minor variations in testing technique,
within an acceptable margin of error, may lead to differences in re-
portable discharge quantities that can mean the difference between
compliance with or violation of the permit.570 To an already over-
loaded office, even one permit challenge, which can require at least
two weeks of engineer and attorney time for an administrative hear-
ing, is onerous.571 Moreover, even if a hearing is not needed, the in-
creased attorney involvement at all levels and the increased challenges
to proposed permit limitations by dischargers have made permit limi-
tations discussions more protracted. Some state environmental offi-
cials attribute, with some irritation, part of this extra workload to
citizen suits pursuing what state personnel consider minor permit vio-
lations that the officials never would have prosecuted.
5 7 2
CONCLUSION
The ability of citizens to bring and settle cases favorably
573
prompted EPA to enforce the CWA more stringently than before citi-
zen enforcement began in the early 1980s. 74 Industry, except in
those states that regularly preempt citizen groups, now understands
that it cannot make private deals with EPA or the states over enforce-
570. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine, 692 F. Supp. 801
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
571. Manfredi Interview, supra note 569.
572. Telephone Interview with unnamed water enforcement official, Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Resources (Feb. 27, 1992). This common phenomenon of
official irritation may be driven by a sense of "[o]rganizational self-preservation [which]
makes it imperative for the [agency staff] 'to manufacture the appearance of activity....
the symbolic reality of impact, the fiction of real power.'" HAWKINS, supra note 68, at 10
(citations omitted).
573. See supra note 537 (describing NRDC's settlement policy).
574. However, EPA's enforcement activity in approved states is negligible.
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ment of permit limitations. However, the widespread state preemp-
tion of citizen suits points to a widening crack in the structure of the
enforcement system. Because the federal government has all but
abandoned its enforcement role in approved states, states can and do
offer the inducement of weak enforcement as a method of economic
competition. Moreover, those states that prefer a compliance-based
enforcement policy over the CWA's sanction-based policy can and do
abandon civil penalties as an enforcement tool. As the CWA case law
has developed, states can now protect their industries and their en-
forcement policy preferences from active challenge by routinely pre-
empting citizen suits. It is unlikely that any citizen group will invest
significant time and resources on CWA enforcement in a state that has
previously preempted a large number of citizen suits.
If a consistent pattern of state preemption of citizen suits devel-
ops, it would undermine the entire CWA federalist enforcement sys-
tem. While states that preempt citizen suits may assuage companies'
fears when the citizen group is threatening to sue, the states may also
drive away the substantial enforcement support citizen groups can de-
liver. If enough states maintain weak enforcement programs or main-
tain antagonism towards effective civil penalties,575 and if enough
states preempt citizen enforcement efforts, then the CWA will become
merely a state-oriented law enforced according to local state concerns.
For the CWA to achieve the national goal of improved water quality,
the federal government either must become more active in enforce-
ment or it must better protect citizen groups, as its surrogates, from
preemption by states. If the federal government does not reassert its
CWA power, directly or through its citizen surrogates, then the nation
will be left with the prospect of states competing for industry by dem-
onstrating a consistent commitment to lackadaisical CWA
enforcement.
The CWA is the product of the tensions in a federal system be-
tween a desire for uniform, national pollution standards and a desire
for local control responsive to local needs. Its substantive goals and
effluent limitations are set nationally by EPA, but enforcement and
designation of water quality standards are an almost exclusively local
activity. The CWA can only achieve its national goals if the regulated
community complies with it, yet the enforcement engine that drives
compliance is state-based, not federal. EPA's almost total abandon-
ment of its enforcement role in approved states allows each state to
575. Effective civil penalties must deprive polluters of the economic benefit of their pol-
lution. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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use its enforcement discretion to determine the meaning of the CWA.
In the absence of a strong federal presence, the only check on state
discretion is citizen enforcement, and this check is fragile if states can
preempt citizen suits. Even in states which value enforcement by citi-
zens, the state-citizen relationship is paradoxically strained: the more
successful the citizen enforcers are, the greater the pressures discharg-
ers exert to liberalize permits. Unfortunately, in CWA permitting is-
sues, the time and expense required by attorneys and experts are so
great that it is nearly impossible for citizens either to assist in or to
monitor permit design. Hypertechnical enforcement by citizens
could result in subtle permit changes allowing increased discharges if
overworked state engineers bend under industry pressure. On the
other hand, vigorous citizen enforcement probably accounts for much
of the compliance that does occur.
On balance, only a strong state/citizen leg of the CWA enforce-
ment triangle will achieve the level of enforcement necessary to assure
widespread compliance with the CWA. This partnership can be
strong only if states are prevented from using their preemption power
to oust citizens from the partnership, and if citizens can recover their
attorneys fees and expert expenses incurred in the CWA permit draft-
ing process. Citizen enforcement would be further enhanced by an
amendment to the CWA allowing citizens to seek civil penalties for
solely past violations, as the Clean Air Act and the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act now allow.
These changes would allow citizens to play the supplemental role
Congress envisioned: to extend and strengthen the CWA enforce-
ment system. EPA enforcement is insufficient to keep the CWA a fed-
eral law with national goals. Stronger citizen suit provisions will better
enable citizens to monitor state enforcement and directly ensure en-
forcement of national requirements when state enforcement is weak.
A triangle with three strong sides is a remarkably strong configura-
tion, but without fully empowered citizens as private attorneys gen-
eral, the strength of the CWA's triangular federalist enforcement
system will not be achieved.
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